

October-December 1980

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From the Commander

CEWI—A Validated Concept?

US Army Tactical Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) concepts, doctrine, and materiel systems have made dramatic progress in the five years since the Chief of Staff, US Army, directed their consolidation and integration into organizations assigned to and under the full command of corps and division commanders.

USAICS was designated the "lead horse" in implementing this decision and, in cooperation with HQDA, INSCOM, FORSCOM, and TRADOC, produced implementing CEWI operational and organizational concepts, TOEs, and literature to support a HQDA-directed Force Development Testing and Experimentation (FDTE) of the CEWI. The FDTE was conducted in March 1977 and the test report was published in July 1977. The test report was coordinated Army-wide and, as approved by HQDA, included recommendations from the field, primarily from USAREUR and FORSCOM corps and division commanders.

This was a milestone in US Army in-

telligence electronic warfare and security evolution, integrating, for the first time, these disciplines into an integrated single organization under the full command of corps and division commanders. The combat developer had solid, validated operational concepts, organizations and materiel baselines from which to compare today's intelligence and security EW capabilities with those required to support the integrated battlefield through the 1990s. With the approval of the CEWI Battalion at the Division, the combat developers set to work to make CEWI even more responsive to command requirements. In two years the division intelligence/EW capabilities have improved dramatically with the addition of new SIGINT/EW systems. Security has also made progress with renewed emphasis on all aspects of security and counterintelligence. The Collection and Jamming Company, CEWI Bn, TOE 34-167H, has been or is in the process of being changed to add new capabilities, e.g., Trailblazers (AN/TSQ-114) or to upgrade capabilities: TEAMPACK (AN/MSQ-103) in lieu of the old AN/MLQ-24 and TACJAM (AN/MLQ-34) in lieu of the AN/GLC-3. The Stand-Off Target Acquisition System (SOTAS) is scheduled to be introduced in limited numbers into the division by 1985.

The combat developers, in concert with designated division commanders, will further assess CEWI Bn Operational and Organizational (O & O) concepts and doctrine during user evaluations tentatively programmed through FY 83. We expect to gain objective data and recommendations from division commanders and their G2s and G3s as to the validity of CEWI concepts, doctrine, and materiel systems and make appropriate recommendations to HQDA.

Before turning to the Corps, we should note the advent of the US Army Operational Concept, Tactical Intelligence (HQ, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-1) which established definitions and heretofore unarticulated time and distance relationships of profound impact on combat developments, both in terms of current intelligence/EW capabilities and those projected through the 1990s.

In keeping with these principles, the current CEWI Group, Corps, collection capabilities focus on the corps area of influence and concurrently on the divisions' areas of interest to 150 km forward of the Forward Line Own Troops (FLOT). CEWI Group collection capabilities include ground and airborne SIGINT; Moving Target Indicator (MTI), photographic and infrared; and HUMINT. However, these assets do not provide minimum essential coverage of corps requirements and thus existing

systems are being product improved or new systems are being developed. Representative programmed product improvements include:

- Improved GUARDRAIL V including the High Accuracy Airborne Locations System (HAALS).
- Reconnaissance/Surveillance Manned Air Vehicle—future (SEMA-X) to replace existing manned reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition and SIGINT/EW airborne platforms.
- Side-Looking Airborne Radar Data Link (AN/UPD-7A and 7B) to transmit MTI data from inflight aircraft to ground terminals in corps and divisions.
- Stand-Off Imaging Sensor System (SISS) to provide high resolution imagery at extended ranges.
- Single Channel Collection system—Rear (SCCS-R) HF collection. The combat developer's attention is not limited only to improved collection systems. The Tactical Exploitation of National Space Capabilities or TENCAP program is identifying national capabilities to support tactical commanders. The Echelons Above Corps (EAC) Army 86 Study is defining tactical-EAC functions, relationships, dependencies and procedures.

The system being designed to tie the division, corps, EAC, Allied, and national systems effectively and efficiently together is the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) of which the US Army component at division, corps, and EAC is the All-Source Analysis Center (ASAC). It is a fact that Army collection capabilities have historically outstripped analysis and dissemination capabilities. The ASAC, as an automated, computerized system for intelligence/EW management, analysis, and dissemination, will far surpass today's manual system and insure rapid, accurate intra-echelon coordination and dissemination. The Technical Control and Analysis Center, Division, (TCAC), is an interim self-automated management, analysis, and dissemination system currently being fielded and evaluated to provide empirical data in its evolution to the ASAC.

Although today's CEWI concepts are validated, USAICS combat developers are dedicated to optimizing responsiveness to tactical requirements by the continuing analyses of intelligence/EW concepts, doctrine, and systems based upon the Intelligence EW and Mission Area Analysis (MAA) efforts exercise and gaming results, studies (both "in-house" and contractual), and above all field recommendations.

Feedback

Reflections of a CEWI Battalion Commander

by COL Joseph C. Wilson

Here are some reflections upon my experience as Commander, 504th MI Group, the Army's test organization for the CEWI concept at Corps level. I was the commander from activation on 21 April 1978 until 21 September 1979.

Absolutely essential for success of the CEWI concept was the close cooperation, coordination and harmony between the Corps G2 and the MI Group Commander. We recognized this early on and prepared a memorandum of understanding (MOU) which formalized our agreement. Our MOU recognized that the G2 was responsible for the production of intelligence. The Group provided resources to assist the G2 in this role, both in garrison and in the field. The Corps Intelligence Support Element (CISE) of the Headquarters and Operations Company (HOC) was placed under the operational control of the G2 and the Group Commander retained command (—) functions. The OIC of the CISE was rated by the G2 and endorsed by the Group Commander. This arrangement worked very well for us.

Similar arrangements were worked out for the Battlefield Information Coordination Center (BICC) elements. They were placed under the operational control of the supported units on a day-to-day basis while the Group kept command (—).

It is my understanding that a new TO&E for the Group will change many of the organizational problems we were having. I would only comment that there should be a better way to evaluate the CEWI Group. We had several meetings with various agencies at Forts Hood, Leavenworth and Huachuca to "examine" the problem, but the process seemed to be unnecessarily prolonged. It was also difficult to determine who was responsible for what. I would hope that in the future a specific command would be tasked to finalize a TO&E by a specific date with supporting roles fully defined.

Lastly, our organization, imperfect as it was, wherein all the various intelligence disciplines were under a single

commander directly subordinate to the Corps Commander, was to me a vast improvement over the previous method of providing intelligence support. I was proud to have a part to play in the evolution of the CEWI concept.

Correction

The National Training Center (NTC) was incorrectly referenced to AR 350-2 on page 2 of *Military Intelligence*'s July-September 1980 issue. The proper citation should have been AR 350-50.

Editor

Editor,

It was most gratifying to note comments "From the Commander" regarding HUMINT "The Forgotten INT" (*Military Intelligence*, April-June 80).

Recognition of HUMINT with its unique abilities to see, hear, and judge an action from close proximity is as appreciated as it appears to be rare.

We thank BG Teal and hope more of our colleagues in general and MI Magazine in particular will remember "The Forgotten INT" more frequently.

Stanley H. Hyman

COL, MI
Commanding
500th MI GP

What Magazine?

Occasionally, the word filters back from the field that a unit or soldier never knew about *Military Intelligence Magazine*. They never received it.

Do you know of such a unit? Have you come from such a unit? If so, send us the unit's address so that we can place it on our distribution list.

And once you have read your distribution copy of *Military Intelligence Magazine*, pass it on. See that someone else can read it, too.

Authors

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LTC Sheridan



LTC Sheridan is the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, 3rd Armored Division. He received his Bachelors Degree from the University of Wisconsin in 1961, attended C&GSC in 1971 and received a Masters Degree in Economics from Georgetown in 1975. His previous assignments include Commander of a CI Detachment in Vietnam, Action Officer in OACSI, DA, and Commander, Hq Co, US Army. He was assigned to the 525th MI Group in July 1980 and will assume command of the 519th MI Bn in FY 81.

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MAJ Lorentzen



MAJ Lorentzen has had a variety of HUMINT, counterintelligence and tactical/strategic intelligence assignments in the United States, Panama and Vietnam. He holds a MA degree in economic and political geography from the University of Texas and is a fully-qualified Latin American FAO. MAJ Lorentzen has served as an assistant professor of geography at West Point and as the commander, 441st MID, 10th SF Group, Fort Devens. He is currently the S2 of the 10th SF Group.

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MAJ Wood

2LT Boyack

MAJ Wood is currently Chief, USAIS Reserve Training Devens. His previous assignments include course developer and instructor at USAISRTD, project officer for two research and development systems in Turkey and Pakistan and various command, staff and operations positions in the EW/Cryptologic field for the 173rd Airborne Brigade (SEP), 24th Provisional Corps, and I Field Force, Vietnam. MAJ Wood has a BA in English Literature/Writing and a Master's in Military History/Military Arts and Sciences and is a graduate of Infantry OCS, MIOBC, MIOAC, Command and General Staff College and the Armor Field Grade Officer's Refresher Course.

2LT Boyack has served as a senior traffic analyst with the 175th RR Co in Vietnam, operations sergeant of the 506th ASA Det (Language), course developer for 98C and 37A-RC courses at USAISD, and is currently serving as the assistant operations officer of the 505th ASA Co (Bde Spt), Fort Devens, MA. He is a graduate of USASATC&S, DLI, and MIOBC and is currently completing his PhD in mathematics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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1LT Warne



1LT Richard N. Warne has a BA in political science and an MA in public administration from Brigham Young University. A graduate of the MI Officer Basic Course and the Tactical Surveillance Officer Course, LT Warne is currently the Motor Officer for the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (ARS), 525 Military Intelligence Group, Fort Bragg, NC.

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CPT Weaver



CPT Weaver graduated from the University of North Carolina with a degree in mathematics. He was commissioned through Infantry OCS in April 1973 and completed the MI Officer Basic SIGINT course at Fort Devens, MA and was subsequently assigned to Field Station Berlin from September 1973 through May 1977. A 1978 graduate of the MI Officer Advanced Course, CPT Weaver was assigned to INSCOM CONUS MI Group, Fort Meade, MD, with duty at NSA, until November of this year. He has completed the MI Officer Cryptologic Advanced Course and the Defense Intelligence School Intelligence Indications and Warning Course and is currently enroute to an assignment in Korea.

Happy
Holiday
Season

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COL Harmon



COL William E. Harmon has held a variety of command and staff positions in the 2d Armored Division, 11th Air Assault Division, 101st Airborne Division, Special Forces, the Special Warfare Center, I Corps (Gp), II Corps, USARPAC, MACV, DIA, and the DA Staff. He is currently the Deputy G2, XVIII Airborne Corps, and will assume command of the 525th CEWI Group in January 1981. A graduate of the MI Advanced Course, Command and General Staff College, and the US Army War College, COL Harmon holds a BA in Political Science from Arkansas Tech and an MA in International Relations from the University of Southern California.

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CPT Daschke



CPT Daschke served in Vietnam as a recon and an intel sergeant. He was commissioned in 1973 and has served as a cavalry platoon leader, 3d ACR; S2, assistant S3 and brigade S2, 3d ID. He is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic and Military Intelligence Officer Advance Courses and flight school. CPT Daschke is currently an intelligence analyst for the Directorate of Combat Developments, USAAVNC, Fort Rucker.

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
SFC Peery



SFC James H. Peery is the project NCO for the Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS) in the Directorate of Combat Developments, USAICS. SFC Peery has been assigned to the Intelligence School as a radar instructor, SQT developer and EPMS project NCO. Past assignments have included radar/sensor duties with the 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR, Vietnam; the 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Germany; and project master (redesignated), TCATA Fort Hood, TX. SFC Peery is a 1973 graduate of the Advance NCO Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition Course, Fort Sill, OK.

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1LT Paternostro



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CPT Keller




CPT Jack B. Keller, Jr. is a reserve officer assigned to the 24th PSYOP Company (Tactical/DS), Denver, CO. He is a graduate student in Russian History and is currently on a military leave of absence from studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder. A graduate of Infantry OCS and Officer Advanced Courses, Basic Airborne School, Special Forces Officers Course, Jungle Operations Course, S2/Combat Operations Course and USAFIS' Soviet Military Power Week, he is currently enrolled in the PSYOP Officer Correspondence Course and the Russian FAOP-RC training. CPT Keller served in Vietnam with the 4th Infantry Division and the Pleiku Province Advisory Team, MACV. He has served as Platoon Leader, Adjutant, SFOD Commander, Brigade S2 and Assistant S3. This article is drawn from his experience as Development Officer and Coordinator of the Opposing Forces Europe Operations and Intelligence Course, for which he was awarded the Army Commendation Medal 1st Oak Leaf Cluster. He is presently serving on an SADT tour at Headquarters, Sixth US Army, where he is coordinating the revision of the OPFOR Course.

CEWI: From Concept to Reality

by LTC Richard M. Sheridan

This article will address the problems inherent in stationing a military intelligence (or any other) unit in Europe, the operational tailoring required and how the 3d Armored Division arrived at an "optimal" solution to insure that the 533d Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) Battalion will support the mission of the Spearhead Division.

The most difficult aspect of introduc-



ing a new unit into the force structure in Europe is stationing. In simpler terms, "Where do you put it?" Almost every kaserne (post) is filled to capacity and some kasernes are extremely overcrowded. The result is very little unused billet, administrative or maintenance space and almost no extra hardstands to park vehicles. Community commanders vigorously resist any attempt to squeeze in more personnel and/or equipment.

In 1978, the 3d Armored Division began initial (staff) work on organizing a CEWI Battalion. From January to August 1978, the initial concept for stationing the battalion was prepared and, with some difficulty, coordinated with the military communities involved. Because the military communities of the 3AD, like most divisions, are dispersed over a very large area, planning and coordination was no easy task. In late August, however, the plan was approved by the V Corps commander and the decision was made to assign a CEWI Battalion to the 3AD in FY 80. The 503d Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence Battalion (Provisional) (Figure 1) was born. The battalion's provisional status was required to allow a dedicated group of officers and NCOs to identify and solve the problems associated with the formation and station-

Soldier) when General Blanchard, then CINCUSAREUR, directed that no force development action having an adverse impact on our soldiers' "quality of life" would be approved. The concurrence obtained from one community after months of intensive coordination was withdrawn because our stationing plan would have caused additional crowding of personnel in billets and, in a less quantifiable way, more crowded commissaries, PXs, movie theaters, snack bars, craft shops, etc. It seemed that

our entire stationing plan would have to be redone as there was, from our view, little near-term prospect for increased billet space as a minimum, let alone any way to overcome other adverse impacts on quality of life.

Regrouping, we proposed formation of the battalion headquarters alone in FY 80 with deferral of the remaining spaces until FY 81 or later. This proposal, which would at least have gotten the battalion into the force structure in FY 80 and "on the ground," was disapproved by higher headquarters. A subsequent proposal was to form a majority of the battalion and defer 109 spaces until FY 81. (The figure 109 represented the billeting shortfall realized when we compared available billet space to total requirements for a full battalion.) The spaces selected for deferral were spread throughout the battalion to include service support, to insure no piece of equipment was delayed or a portion of a unit not activated as a result of the deferral. The proposal was accepted and eventually approved by DA. In August 1979, we received the permanent order and TOE for the 533d Military Intelligence Battalion. The battalion will have five companies (Figure 2). The order has a carrier date of 16 March 1980 and an effective date of 16 September 1980.

Figure 1.

ing of the unit free of day-to-day tasks within the Division. This concept proved costly to the G2 staff because two majors assigned full-time to the provisional CEWI Battalion staff were charged against the G2, HHC, TOE. The cost, however, was well-justified by the final organization and stationing plan.

From late 1978 to mid-1979 extremely detailed stationing proposals were made; continued coordination with the communities, most especially with the engineers; submission of work orders for renovation of buildings; and billets, administrative and maintenance surveys to identify and document space requirements. Plans for stationing were set back in mid-1979 (the Year of the

The 109 space increment will have an effective date of September 1981. We have submitted an MCA request for renovation and when completed, the renovated billets will accommodate the additional 109 personnel needed to fill out the battalion.

Although I have only addressed stationing problems thus far, tailoring the

quarters and the 503d MI Company Headquarters from Drake Kaserne to Michael Barracks, begun consolidation of personnel and supply and started organizing some of the subordinate companies. The battalion headquarters, a major portion of Headquarters and Operations company (I would prefer the Army called it HHC), A Company

form A Company (Collection and Jamming) required no relocation, and only a redistribution of assets from two to three platoons. This transition was completed in June 1980. The overriding consideration for locating the Collection and Jamming Company in one area was to facilitate training. This was done with the full realization that the relation-




Figure 2.

battalion to insure optimal support within the division without causing monumental and unsolvable leadership and training problems for the battalion and company commanders was of concern throughout our planning. The approved plan was a compromise between the physical space limitations, the leadership and training requirements and the requirement to provide optimal support to the Division. Our initial preference was to locate the Battalion Headquarters and a majority of the subordinate companies at Drake Kaserne with the Division Headquarters on the northeastern side of Frankfurt, but space limitations made that impossible. Our second choice was to keep it in the Frankfurt area close to Division Headquarters. Michael Barracks, located on the west side of Frankfurt, was a logical selection for several reasons: Michael Barracks was completely "owned" by the 856th ASA Company, it had unused administrative, billet, maintenance and hardstand space, and adjacent buildings could be renovated to accommodate additional personnel and equipment.

We have moved the battalion head-

(Collection and Jamming), and C Company (Service Support) will be located at Michael Barracks. The 503d MI Company has begun its transformation to Headquarters and Operations Company, and the individual sections of the battalion staff are operational. The Hq and Ops Company will be the carrier for C Company (Service Support) until it is formed. The disruption caused by the organization of C Company should be minimized since we will be using as a base the maintenance and supply apparatus of the 856th ASA Company, already located at Michael Barracks.

The DTOC Support element (a part of Hq and Ops Company), communications personnel to operate the SSO facility and several maintenance personnel, a total of 65 people, will continue to work and be billeted at Drake. Billeting personnel at their work location took priority over desirability of having all personnel located at their company headquarters. This eased stationing difficulties, because these personnel could use the administrative area vacated by Hq, 503d Military Intelligence Company as billets.

The 856th ASA Company which will

ship to a supported brigade will not be as close as if the platoons had been stationed in the same kaserne as the brigade. We do, however, envision a direct support relationship between the Collection and Jamming platoon and its brigade.

The Ground Surveillance Company (B Company) will be located at three different kasernes. The concept was to locate a platoon with the brigade it will support in order to establish a close working relationship and facilitate training of the GSR teams. The brigades have the tracked vehicles and several local training areas where limited tracking and target identification can be accomplished. The company headquarters will be in Friedberg, a central location in relation to where the platoons will be stationed. The positioning of the GSR platoons with each brigade does exacerbate command and control problems for the battalion and company, but the training opportunities with the brigade more than offset the disadvantages. The GSR Company headquarters and one platoon were formed in March and a second platoon was organized in

(continued on page 54)

CEWI for Special Forces in Europe

by MAJ Edward J. Lorentzen

In past issues of *Military Intelligence*, much attention has been focused on the organization, capabilities, field test results and, most recently, the status of conventional Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) units being implemented at division and corps level. Except for one article recommending a type CEWI company¹, nothing has been written about implementing CEWI in the US Army's unconventional warfare (UW) units, the special forces groups. Former CEWI battalion commanders have praised their units and said that no division can be without a CEWI battalion.² Special

forces groups earmarked for employment in Europe need their own CEWI companies to provide the integrated all-source analysis and electronic warfare (EW) support needed at all levels of command.

Figure 1 depicts the current organization of the special forces group. The organic MI/ASA units exist to support the group headquarters, the three battalions, those committed Operational Detachments Bravo (ODB) and, most importantly, the 54 Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA).

There are no conventional, combined-arms maneuver units in special forces. The 12-man ODA or A Team is a highly-trained, multi-disciplined team of professionals who

are infiltrated into a denied area deep in the enemy's rear to interdict lines of communications and destroy fixed and mobile targets, to report essential strategic intelligence and to develop the resistance or guerrilla warfare (GW) potential. It is the G2 or "force multiplier" role of organizing and training a regimental-size force of "patch-pocket patriots" that distinguished the ODA from its ranger and reconnaissance counterparts.

The ODAs are directed, at least initially, by either the SF group Special Forces Operating Base (SFOB) or one of the battalion Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) situated in the secure rear area of an allied nation thousands of kilometers from the denied area. Whenever the resistance force within the denied area becomes so developed that additional command and control is needed on the ground, the SFOB/FOB may employ an SF company headquarters or ODB to act as an area command, coordinating the activities of several ODAs. Thus, at the height of UW operations (as depicted in Figure 2) the group's intelligence assets must be able to provide all-source analysis and EW support to four levels of command: the committed ODAs and ODBs, the battalion FOBs and the SFOB. But current intelligence and EW assets are inadequate to do the job!

Deficiencies existing in the SF group's current CEWI assets include an outdated MI Detachment (MID) Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), a poorly organized and equipped Special Operations Detachment (SOD) and the absence of order-of-battle (OB) analysts at battalion and company level.

The MID (TOE 30500G) was originally organized in 1968 as a fixed-station Counterintelligence (CI) Regional Office, complete with sedans. All intelligence specialties were either CI or human intelligence (HUMINT). Several subsequent personnel and equipment changes have modified the detachment's capabilities to provide improved support to the SF group. Thirteen CI and HUMINT positions were converted to interrogator and tactical intelligence positions. Two three-man combat




Figure 1. The Special Forces Group.




Figure 2. Special Forces Command and Control.

intelligence teams were created, each to be infiltrated with an ODA to collect and report intelligence; since no communications equipment was authorized, however, the teams proved totally dependent on the ODAs for security and support. It was September 1978 before the military sedans were replaced by tactical cargo and utility trucks. Other bulky, non-essential equipment originally designed for the fixed-station CI mission remains on the Modification TOE despite submission to US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) of several recommendations for equipment deletion.

The SOD (TOE 32-104H) provides low-level voice and morse intercept and limited imitative communication deception (ICD) in the denied area and Special Security radio teletype (RATT) communications between the SFOB and two FOBs and between the SFOB and higher communications intelligence (COMINT) control and processing agencies. While personnel and equipment MTOE changes have corrected most of the major weaknesses, certain deficiencies remain. The SOD's field intercept unit is the three-man Special Operations Team Alpha (SOTA), the Army's only airborne, man-portable intercept unit. While the SOTA can perform tactical COMINT, EW is limited to ICD because of the non-availability of man-portable jammers. Because the three-man SOTA carries two AN/TRQ-30 receivers and associated equipment, it cannot carry High Frequency (HF) radio equipment to communicate directly with the SFOB/FOB. Consequently, whenever the SOTA is infiltrated, it must accompany an ODA or area command (ODB) and must remain

with that commander for security. Because they are skilled morse operators, SOTA personnel inevitably become the ground commander's communicators instead of the intelligence collectors they were intended to be. Since no traffic analysts (98C) are assigned to the SOTA, all intercepts are raw combat information. Except for whatever is of immediate interest to the ground commander in a sanitized form, all intercepts must be transmitted to the SFOB/FOB for analysis.

In the high-intensity war most likely to

occur in Europe, it will be extremely difficult to successfully infiltrate ODAs into the denied area, let alone the SOTA's and combat intelligence teams. As a result, the 10th SF Group, earmarked for commitment in Europe, began field testing alternative intelligence support concepts including the MI Support Team and the 6-man SOTA.

In late 1977, nine intelligence analysts (96B) and the one imagery interpreter (96D) assigned to the group S2 section were attached to the MID. The MID was then organized into three MI Support Teams (MISTs), one supporting the SFOB and two supporting the two battalion FOBs at Fort Devens.³ Each MIST provided OB analyst, interrogator, CI and HUMINT support; the SFOB MIST retained the imagery interpreter. The MIST concept, first tested during Empire Glacier 1978, has since been successfully employed in two group ARTEPs, two European Command exercises (Flintlock) as well as Empire Glacier 1980. The attachment of group S2 personnel to the MID has resulted in centralized management and training of all analysts. Through habitual association, each supported headquarters now appreciates and anticipates the intelligence support provided by its MIST.

As a result of these tests, the intelligence analyst has emerged as an integral part of the SF community. Prior to its night airborne infiltration, each ODA is isolated for several days to conduct mission planning. During isolation, the




Figure 3. Combat Intelligence Company.

analyst provides current intelligence on potential targets and their vulnerability criteria, enemy conventional and rear area security forces; weather, terrain and area analysis; and the nature, organization and training of the resistance potential. In essence, the analyst acts as the ODA's personal interface with theater intelligence resources and agencies. Experience indicates that each analyst can support three ODAs in isolation concurrently. Once the ODAs have infiltrated, the analyst monitors their intelligence reporting and provides current intelligence updates.

In 1979, the 10th SF Group successfully fielded an all-source integration center (ASIC) at the SFOB. MID analysts and the imagery interpreter with Special Intelligence accesses were integrated with EW/COMINT specialists from the SOD. The resulting all-source intelligence products provided the commander and his staff with an enhanced intelligence picture of the denied area.

Evaluation of several field tests has resulted in the adoption of the 6-man SOTA. The additional personnel have allowed the SOTA to carry its own HF radio equipment and conduct sustained 24-hour intercept operations and has improved the SOTA's security so that it can operate independently. Non-technical means have been adopted for communicating with the ground commander.

In 1978, TOE 30-137H8 was published, establishing a 121-man Combat Intelligence Company organic to the SF group for integrated intelligence analysis, operations security and limited EW support. Figure 3 depicts its organization for field employment. While sufficient RATT communications, maintenance and administrative personnel are authorized, the mix of tactical intelligence and EW specialties does not meet the needs of the SF commander in Europe.

The TOE drafters organized the company based upon experiences gained in Vietnam: too many CI/OPSEC and too few imagery interpreter personnel are authorized. The majority of personnel are allocated to the SFOB, but in separate sections according to specialty.⁴ The closest approximation to an all-source center, the Mission Management and Dissemination (MM&D) section, has no imagery interpreters. While a Special Operations Team Bravo composed of EW/COMINT specialists is to be deployed with each FOB, only one OB analyst is authorized at the FOB level. Intelligence personnel in addition to the nine SOTAs would be infiltrated into denied areas where the US possessed air superiority. Retaining their three-man organization, the nine

SOTAs would perpetuate the communicator rather than collector role.

The concepts of organization and operation embodied in the Combat Intelligence Company currently envisioned are not consistent with the realities of a European war of high intensity in which the US may eventually achieve air parity, except for the SOTAs, company personnel will be infiltrated into the denied area.

As verified by the 10th SF Group's field tests, a more functional and realistic approach to organizing the Combat Intelligence Company would entail the creation of four all-source integrating centers (ASICs) to support the SFOB and three FOBs. Each ASIC would have sufficient OB analyst personnel to support the ODAs in isolation, EW/COMINT specialists and imagery interpreters to interpret imagery received by secure facsimile and reports received by secure teletype. The CI/OPSEC role would be limited to one officer providing OPSEC advice and assistance and conducting liaison with host nation security forces and agencies. Each ASIC would have its own secure RATT communications team.

Certain intelligence specialties (e.g., interrogator) would not be needed. Field interrogation in the denied area would be conducted by the ODAs; those personnel extracted from the denied area using sophisticated aerial recovery equipment would be of such strategic importance that they would bypass the SFOB and FOBs to be interrogated by specialists at the national and/or combined level. Remote sensor personnel would not be needed either; if a mission were to require specialized sensors, functional teams would train the ODAs in isolation. At the area command level, the six-man SOTA, including a traffic analyst, would provide the ODB or ODA commander with timely analysis of intelligence collected from within the denied area. The resulting Combat Intelligence Company organic to SF groups committed to Europe is depicted in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Proposed CEWI Company.

Unfortunately, NATO's SF groups must continue to operate with outdated, inadequate intelligence force structures and equipment. As currently planned, the projected FORSCOM activation of Combat Intelligence Companies in Active Army SF groups is FY 1983, a priority lower than eight National Guard divisions receiving CEWI battalions in FY 1981.⁵

The special forces groups have a vital role to play in the NATO Commander-in-Chief's arsenal of forces. Through selective employment in the early phases of the war, each ODA could divert the attention of at least one enemy division from the front lines to rear area security. As the resistance potential develops, even more enemy forces could be diverted to rear area security.

Without adequate all-source analysis and EW support, however, the SF group cannot do its job as effectively as it might. The current MI/ASA assets are inadequate. The Combat Intelligence Company as organized under TOE 30-137H8 is also inadequate to meet the intelligence/EW requirements of the European wartime environment although it can be improved. If the activation date were advanced to early FY 1981, even at reduced manning levels, and the all-source integration concepts suggested here were adopted, all levels of command from SFOB to ODA should be better prepared to accomplish assigned missions. The risks of infiltrating US Army special forces soldiers deep behind enemy lines in Europe warrant reconsideration. The Special Forces community needs CEWI, too!

Footnotes

1. MAJ Jeffrey G.F. Tom, "MI Support of Unconventional Warfare," *Military Intelligence*, July–September 1977, pp. 10–15.
2. LTC D. Gordon, "CEWI Battalion," *Military Intelligence*, October–December 1979, pp. 22–28.
3. One battalion is stationed at Bad Toelz, Federal Republic of Germany.
4. Allocated to the SFOB are the entire company HQ, the Mission Management and Dissemination (MM&D) section, the OPSEC section, the COMSEC Monitor team, the Imagery Interpretation team, the majority of the Communications team, one Interrogation team and the Remote Sensor (REMS) team.
5. MAJ J.G.F. Tom and CPT R. Tom, "CEWI Update," *Military Intelligence*, July–September 1979, pp. 16–20.

CEWI in the Reserves

by MAJ Charles Wood
and 2LT Steve Boyack

Introduction

CEWI won't work in the Reserves!

Pessimistic? Perhaps not. Although the controversial Division Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) organization has yet to be fully tested and operationally validated, plans are already afoot to begin reorganizing US Army Reserve tactical intelligence units into this new configuration in FY81.

In our opinion, reorganization of the USAR units into TOE 30-165H CEWI battalions would cripple their ability to train and would further compound Reserve Component (RC) commanders' recognized difficulties in maintaining fill, keeping soldiers MOS-qualified, and fulfilling readiness requirements. A TOE change in an RC unit is a traumatic event from which it takes years to recover. If we plan to reorganize RC intelligence units, we'd better do it right the first time, or face another decade of unsatisfactory unit readiness.

Equipment, Personnel, Time

Reserve units have the same mission as their active Army counterparts—to be prepared for combat. The RC commander, however, faces problems beyond those of his AC counterpart.

First is a serious shortage of mission-essential equipment resulting from low DA funding. For example, of 25 AN/MLQ-24 ELINT sets authorized in RC EW/Cryptologic units, only one exists. Electronic Countermeasures equipment like the AN/TLQ-17 and the AN/GLQ-3 is almost completely absent. Only one unit has an emitter location capability and only a few have access to speech security equipment.

A second problem area is in personnel shortages. Each unit must recruit personnel from its own area, since citizen-soldiers must live near their units. Obtaining MOS-qualified intelligence personnel is particularly difficult: while an AC commander at least knows that his new assignees have been to AIT in their PMOS, the RC commander often faces the uphill battle of cross-




Figure 1. CEWI Battalion (AC).

training a prior-service recruit into an intelligence slot with only two weeks of school training a year.

The third and most critical shortage facing an RC commander is time. Training only 38 days each year, the RC unit spends most of its time isolated from other units. Two days each month (24 days/year) are available for company, platoon, team and individual training and only two weeks (typically nine training days) are available for training with the supported division or brigade. The RC commander has the same paperwork requirements as his AC counterpart and additional ARCOM and Readiness Group obligations. Often rated by a transportation or quartermaster officer with no understanding of his unit mission and receiving only limited support from the "full-time" AC, an RC commander who can prepare his unit to deploy overseas with its own equipment on short notice and be ready to provide intelligence to a division in combat is a truly heroic figure.

The CEWI Battalion was developed to provide integrated, all-source intelligence, electronic warfare and operations security support to the division. The now-familiar organization of the

CEWI Battalion is shown in Figure 1. It is manned by 43 officers sharing 14 specialties, 26 warrant officers sharing 10 specialties, and 510 enlisted personnel sharing 41 MOS.

As presently configured under TOE 30-165H, the CEWI Battalion is wholly unsuitable for the Reserve Electronic Warfare/Intelligence structure. First, the four individual companies spend two-thirds of their training days as separate companies because collocating all the elements of a battalion is impossible from a recruiting point of view. Under the CEWI TOE, intelligence collectors and analysts are found in two different companies, precluding the conduct of critically important integrated intelligence training. Realistic training is further hindered because Headquarters and Operations, Collection and Jamming, and Ground Surveillance companies would have none of the radio teletype and teletype communications, C-E maintenance, mechanical maintenance and food service support necessary for normal operations. This would make it impossible for these units to conduct CPX, FTX or fully-integrated training except during annual training. It is unrealistic to expect workable SOPs to develop under these conditions or for a battalion of strangers to operate effectively at ARTEP Level 1 during two weeks' AT.


Secondly, the CEWI structure would require a major expansion in the number of Special Compartmented Intelligence Facilities (SCIF) which are absolutely necessary for 98 CMF reservists to conduct MOS training. With additional real-world materials becoming available under REDTRAIN, the requirements for SCIF become even more urgent. There are insufficient SCIFs today for existing RC EW/SIGINT units' needs; an unnecessary proliferation of these facilities presents a security hazard and a needless expense to a Reserve Component short of mission-essential equipment and training funds.

Thirdly, the CEWI Battalion as presently configured will be expensive because newly-generated officer and senior NCO slots will be rapidly filled without a corresponding increase in intelligence capability (too many bosses,

too few workers). CEWI needs fewer supervisors, more collectors and more analysts.

The Solution?


What is the solution to the implementation of CEWI in the Reserves? One proposed solution is called "horizontal slicing." Under this concept the battalion's four companies are organized identically with a "slice" of each functional element of the battalion. Although solving the RATT/TTY communication support problem and the C-E maintenance support problem, this solution still requires a SCIF for every company, an even worse proliferation than that of the standard CEWI Battalion. Worse still, the "horizontal slices" approach would prove a training nightmare for a company commander. With 127 EM holding 41 different MOS, he would have to manage 41 MOS qualification and maintenance programs, each for an average of three soldiers. Additionally, since soldiers in Reserve units must fill a unit vacancy in a higher grade in order to be promoted, he would have to change MOS nearly everytime he wanted promotion—a formula for a unit of perpetually unqualified troops.



Another preferred solution popular among "experts" without recent tactical unit experience is that of "CEWI cadre and MOS cells." This would consist of a CEWI battalion HQ cadre with many small MOS training cells scattered throughout the country, which would conduct training for the maintenance of individual MOS skills. The cells would be called together once a year (Annual Training) to work together as a CEWI Battalion under the HQ cadre. This "solution" fails to recognize equipment maintenance configuration problems and the critical need for unit training in addition to individual training. It is preposterous to expect personnel who have performed only individual skill training to coalesce into a fully functional Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence battalion in one jump. This "cadre and cellular" concept would be effective only for training individual filler personnel, and could never satisfy the requirement for deployable RC units to support Active Army and National Guard Commanders.

Our Proposal

CEWI will work in the Reserves if initially implemented as shown in Figure 2 and subsequent figures and as






Figure 4. Headquarters and Operations Co, CEWI Battalion (RC).

described below. The CEWI Battalion (RC) is divided among three functional companies and three separate language detachments. As can be seen from Figure 2, the Service Support Company has been discontinued and its assets allocated to the remaining companies so that they will be independently functional during the training year with their own organic communications, C-E maintenance, mechanical maintenance and food service support. Ten officer, two warrant and 40 enlisted spaces would be saved. (See Figures 1 through 8).

The Headquarters and Operations Company of the CEWI Battalion (RC) consists of the Battalion Headquarters, the Intelligence Operations Platoon, the Long Range Surveillance Out-post (LRSO) Platoon and the Service Platoon as indicated in Figure 4. Before proceeding further we emphasize that all subordinate companies of the battalion are directly under the command of the battalion commander regardless of geographical location. The CEWI battalion commander may report to an ARCOM, GOCOM or intermediate commander in the normal RC

chain of command, however each CEWI company or detachment commander will be responsible to and rated by an MI commander knowledgeable of his subordinate's mission and concerned with his unit's readiness.

Under the Intelligence Operations Platoon is the DTOC Support Element, consisting of the Collection Management and Dissemination (CM&D) section, the All Source Production (ASP) section, the Tactical Command Post (TAC CP) section and the OPSEC Management and Analysis (OPSEC M&A) section. This DTOC Support Element is augmented by the C&J Company DTOC Support Element (formerly the ATSE) when the battalion is united for training or mobilization. In the same way, the BOC element of the Operations Company would form the battalion operations center, augmented by the TCAE of the C&J Company, while the Ops Co interrogation, counterintelligence (CI), and COMSEC teams augment the C&J Platoons for training or mobilization.

The Long Range Surveillance Out-post Platoon has six patrol teams

whose mission is to conduct reconnaissance deep within enemy lines.

The Ground Surveillance Company is composed of two Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) Platoons of 12 radar teams each and, if augmented, two Remote Sensor (REMS) Platoons of five teams each. The mission of this company is to provide direct support to committed brigades and/or maneuver battalions and general support to the division.

The Collection and Jamming (C&J) Company of the CEWI Battalion (RC) depicted in Figure 6 consists of three C&J Platoons, an aircraft section, a communications platoon, the battalion's Technical Control and Analysis Element (TCAE) and a DTOC Support Element. The communications platoon will be responsible for all of the battalion's RATT equipment. As mentioned above, the TCAE and DTOC Support Element will be augmented to like elements of the HQs and Ops Company when the battalion is united. In addition to our previous criticisms of the Active Component CEWI TOE for the Reserves, we think that, given the emphasis placed by DA, TRADOC and




Figure 5. Collection and Jamming Co, CEWI Battalion (AC).

others on electronic warfare, intelligence, the newly lethal battlefield, and enemy capabilities, it is ludicrous, if not criminal, to allocate only four voice collection teams to support an entire division. Thus, for the CEWI Battalion (RC), we have included two additional teams for a total of six (two for each C&J Platoon).

The flight platoon has been attached to the C&J Company rather than the HQ & Ops Company in order to permit MOS training of the on-board operators and develop a working relationship with the TCAE personnel who will control and support airborne EW operations. Note that all of the battalions EW/Cryptologic personnel, with the exception of the COMSEC specialists (MOS 05G) are in the C&J (EW) company, obviating an immediate need for a peacetime SCIF to service the Hqs and Opns Co.

The striking difference between our proposed TOE and the "conventional" CEWI TOE is that in the former, the company organization more nearly parallels the functional organization of the battalion. The Operations company contains the tactical intelligence, HUMINT and operations management elements of the battalion, with interrogators working for interro-

gators, OPSEC specialists for OPSECers, and so on. The expanded C&J Co on the other hand, is a fully-functioning integrated EW/SIGINT organization, capable of operating and training independently. Its mission is to prepare to produce SIGINT product and conduct managed EW from the first day of its integration with the rest of the battalion. Each of the major elements of the battalion now has a manageable training task, and if each achieves it, the amalgamation of the companies into a functional battalion will be relatively easy, since each of the battalion's major intelligence subsystems: SIGINT, HUMINT, TAC INTEL/Analysis, Surveillance and Reconnaissance will already be working.

The three Language Detachments of the CEWI Battalion (RC) report directly to the battalion commander, as do the three companies. The detachments are necessary for increased manning of the battalion; when the battalion is united, personnel from these detachments are used as trained fillers for 98G and 96C positions.




Figure 6. Collection and Jamming Co, CEWI Battalion (RC).

The existence of these small (1 CPT, 1 WO, 13 EM) detachments allows the battalion to spread its recruiting base across a larger geographical area and helps to combat the most critical MOS shortage of both AC and RC units: qualified "high-density" linguists. Each detachment would be targeted on a

specific language, based on the battalion's CAPSTONE mission, and without exception, each member of the detachment would have to be qualified in the target language to be eligible for membership. The concept of the ASA RC Language Detachment has already successfully tested, as noted by LTC

Frey (Feedback, *Military Intelligence* J-S 79). A typical CEWI Battalion might have two Russian detachments and one German detachment.

Concomitant with any CEWI Battalion implementation is a continuing requirement to cross-train intelligence analysts (96C) and EW/SIGINT analysts (98C) as well as TAC INTEL, CI and SIGINT officers. Team, platoon, section and company training must be coordinated and implemented throughout the year by the battalion commander so that the CEWI Battalion (RC) can perform as an integrated unit during its two-week Annual Training and upon mobilization.

Conclusion

All-source intelligence production and integrated tactical intelligence operations are ideas whose time has clearly come. We support them fully. However, the current divisional CEWI Battalion organization is unsuitable for the Reserves. The "horizontal slices" approach is unsuitable for the Reserves. The "cadre and cells" recommendation is unsuitable for the Reserves.

Our proposed CEWI Battalion (Reserve Component) minimizes turbulence, provides fully-integrated electronic warfare intelligence support to the division commander, expands collection capability with fewer personnel, and does it in a way that promotes peacetime training to wartime standards.




Figure 7. Ground Surveillance Co, CEWI Battalion (AC).




Figure 8. Ground Surveillance Co, CEWI Battalion (RC).

525 Military Intelligence Group (CEWI): The Eyes and Ears of the Corps Commander

by 1LT Richard N. Warne

In most projected European or Middle East conflicts, United States forces will initially have to fight outnumbered against an adversary that is well armed and highly mobile. To successfully operate and achieve victory, our forces will need to be flexible and have the ability to concentrate superior combat power at critical times and places. This can only be accomplished if we focus intelligence assets in such a manner so as to provide the commander a clear picture of the terrain, weather, and enemy strengths, weaknesses, dispositions and weapons.

The 525 Military Intelligence Group (CEWI) is currently organized to focus intelligence efforts and provide all source intelligence collection, processing and dissemination to the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander. It is especially significant as the XVIII Airborne Corps is the nucleus of the Rapid Deployment Force (Army). In most contingencies, the 525 MI Group (CEWI) will provide the bulk of the battlefield intelligence to the Army Forces commander.

This article provides an overview of the 525 MI Group (CEWI) and provides information on its mission, organization and capabilities. Also it will examine how the Group collects and disseminates intelligence and finally what progress has been made in organizing and implementing the CEWI concepts at Fort Bragg.

Mission Organization and Capabilities

The mission of the 525 MI Group (CEWI) is to provide combat intelligence, signal intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), electronic warfare (EW), operations security (OPSEC) support to the XVIII Airborne Corps. The mission is not new. This mission has been given to a number of separate units for years. What is new is that this mission will be carried out by a single integrated organization that is assigned to and under the operational control of the commander. All intelligence disciplines needed to perform the mission will be coordinated to provide an accurate assessment of the enemy on the battlefield within an integrated management system.


The 525 MI Group (CEWI) is unique when compared to other CEWI groups in the US Army because it will be lighter and must have the capability to begin deployment within 18 hours to support XVIII Airborne Corps elements. Approximately 30 percent of the personnel assigned to the 525 MI Group (CEWI) will be jump qualified and all equipment will be air-droppable or air-transportable.

The 525 MI Group (CEWI) is being organized into a Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment to provide command and control functions for the group and three CEWI battalions: the 319th Operations Battalion (OPS), 224th Aerial Exploitation Battalion (AEB), and the 519th Tactical Exploitation Battalion (TEB). (See Figure 1.)

tion of captured enemy equipment.

6.) Provide intelligence assets in direct support of ground maneuver forces.

To insure that all of these functions are accomplished in a timely and efficient manner, three "intelligence management echelons" exist: the Gross Management Echelon, Tasking Echelon and the Execution Echelon. As indicated in Figure 2, the Corps Tactical Operations Center (CTOC) is the overall Gross Manager of the intelligence collection system. Normally the Corps G2 prepares a collection plan for this purpose. The CTOC Support Element from the 525 MI Group (CEWI), working under the supervision of the Corps G2, takes the Corps commander's Essen-




These units working in a coordinated intelligence-gathering effort have the capability to:

- 1.) Plan, coordinate and manage intelligence, electronic warfare and operations security support.
- 2.) Provide aerial and ground signal and imagery intelligence.
- 3.) Provide all source intelligence production.
- 4.) Interrogate enemy prisoners of war and provide counterintelligence, and document exploitation support.
- 5.) Provide limited technical exploita-

tial Elements of Information (EEI) and translates them into intelligence requirements for the CEWI Group.

When the CEWI Group's Tactical Operations Center (GTOC), consisting of the Group S2, S3 and the Technical Analysis and Control Element (TCAE), receives the requirements from the CTOC it translates these requirements into specific tasks for subordinate units for execution. All taskings for the Group's electronic warfare and signal intelligence collection assets are tasked by the TCAE, which maintains



the SIGINT/EW data base for the Corps and exercises technical control over all Corps SIGINT/EW assets.

Once the information/intelligence has been collected, it is reported directly to the consumer. The consumer in most cases for the non-SIGINT intelligence will be the CTOC, but can be anyone else so designated. Signal information will be reported to the TCAE in the CEWI Group Operations Center. The GTOC will then forward the signal analysis to the Corps G2 all source production element for integration. Communications, key to the timely movement of this information is provided by the Communications Company in the 319th Operations Battalion.


During the past 15 months, the 525 MI Group has been aggressively moving

toward full fielding of a CEWI Group in order to support XVIII Airborne Corps and anticipated Rapid Deployment Force (Army) missions. When fully operational in October 1981, the 525 MI Group (CEWI) will have an authorized strength of 1604 officers and enlisted personnel at ALO 1. With the exception of the 224th Aerial Exploitation Battalion, most of the personnel and equipment will come from assets already at Fort Bragg. The movement toward CEWI has not had a major impact on the Group's intelligence collection units. This is because Colonel Owen B. Seaton, Commander of the 525 MI Group, and key individuals at Fort Bragg have long espoused the benefits of CEWI and have adjusted existing organizations to closely parallel the Group CEWI concept.

Let us now take a look at each battalion in the Group to see how it is being organized and the mission it will accomplish once the CEWI Group is fully activated.

319th Operations Battalion (OPS)

The 319th Operations Battalion was provisionally organized on 1 October 1980 under the command of LTC Delton R. Morris. This battalion will eventually consist of 473 soldiers organized into three companies: a Headquarters and Service Company, Operations Company and a Communications Company (see Figure 3). The Headquarters and Service Company will provide the administrative, maintenance, supply and food service support functions for the battalion. It will work closely with the other companies to insure that the battalion has the necessary logistical and administrative support to carry out its mission.



The Operations Company of the 319th CEWI Battalion will be the focal point of all 525 MI Group (CEWI) operations. The Operations Company will provide personnel for the CTCOC Support Element, GTOC and the TCAE.

At the TCAE, located in the GTOC, the extensive data bases needed to task and control electronic warfare and signal intelligence assets are maintained. Computers and other ADP equipment are used to analyze and store the vast amounts of SIGINT information. The use of automated equipment in the TCAE permits it to produce near real time signal intelligence for the Corps Commander. The TCAE and other elements in the Operations Company also interface with national level agencies and provides the Corps commander with intelligence produced by national assets.

The Communications Company, commanded initially by CPT John F. Pipkin will provide all of the communications support for the CEWI Group. The company will be equipped with AN/GRC 122 Radio Teletypes, FM radios, AM radios, radio relay and land line equipment. To enhance the Rapid Deployment Force role of the Operations Battalion, all personnel and equipment in two of the Communications Platoons of the Communications Company will be completely air dropable.

The mission of the Communications company is critical to the successful operation of the CEWI Group. Combat information is useless unless it can be quickly and accurately transmitted to the consumer. This is especially true with highly perishable signal intelligence.

224th Aerial Exploitation Battalion (AEB)

The 224th Aerial Exploitation Battalion (AEB) will provide photographic, infrared, and side looking airborne radar (SLAR) imagery as well as aerial signals intelligence in support of the XVIII Airborne Corps. The battalion will consist of 400 soldiers commanded by LTC James M. Coughlin. This battalion is currently being organized at Hunter Army Airfield near Savannah, GA.

The battalion will have a Headquarters and Headquarters Company to provide the necessary administrative, logistical and food service support and two aviation companies, an Electronic Warfare Aviation Company and an Aerial Surveillance Aviation Company (see Figure 4).

The Electronic Warfare Aviation Company will have six RU-21 GUARDRAIL Communications intercept and direction finding aircraft and six RV-1 QUICKLOOK non-communication




Figure 4.

emitters collection aircraft. The unit will have the capability to fly 10 two aircraft GUARDRAIL missions (4.6 hours each) to intercept, record and locate Very High Frequency (VHF) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) radio communications per week. Thirty single aircraft missions per week (2½ to 3 hours each) can be flown to detect and identify noncommunications emitters. The GUARDRAIL and the QUICKLOOK aircraft are currently scheduled to begin arriving at Hunter Army Airfield shortly after January 1. The GUARDRAIL aircraft and personnel will be transferred from Company C, 15th Aerial Exploitation Battalion, currently stationed at Fort Bliss, TX.

The Aerial Surveillance Aviation Company will have 14 assigned OV-1 Mohawk aircraft. The aircraft will be equipped with photographic, infrared and SLAR equipment and will be able to provide near all weather day or night

surveillance of the Corps area of operation. Imagery interpretation products produced by the company will be exploited by the Imagery Interpretation Platoon organic to the company. As of this writing, six Mohawks from the 172 MICAS from Fort Wainwright, AK, have been assigned to the CEWI Group and stationed at Hunter Army Airfield, GA. Additional aircraft are expected during FY 81.

519th Tactical Exploitation Battalion

The 519th Tactical Exploitation Battalion is currently being formed primarily from units assigned to the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion and is currently commanded by LTC William A. Bentz. The Battalion will have a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Interrogation Company, Operations Security Company and an Electronic Warfare Company (see Figure 5). The

(continued on page 55)



Figure 5.

The Role of the KGB in a Tactical Environment

by CPT Ronald J. Weaver

Introduction

The Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) Committee for State Security is the most recently reorganized clandestine apparatus in the Soviet Union whose parentage dates back to the investigative agency founded by Feliks Dzerzhinsky on 20 December 1917. The KGB is the primary intelligence, counterintelligence, surveillance and security organization of the Soviet Union. While it has been renamed and reorganized many times since 1917, its mentality, ideals and aims have changed little although today's KGB less brutal and more sophisticated than the NKVD and MGB of the Stalin era. "The KGB keeps in step with the political developments, always anticipating and strengthening Soviet diplomatic or military maneuvers with intelligence preparation. It is regarded as the first aggressive arm of the Soviet political offensive."¹

In defining the wartime role of the KGB, it is necessary to cite the World War II efforts of its forerunners, to correlate some strategic operations which have wartime applications and to disclose its internal organization.

Scope and Responsibilities

The KGB is enormous in scope and size due to the tremendous resources and responsibilities given it by the Soviet government and the Communist Party. The KGB is organized into four chief directorates, seven independent directorates and six independent departments each with several subdivisions. In theory, the KGB is subordinate to the Soviet Council of Ministers but, in practice, it is more closely associated with the Politburo, which supervises its daily operation through a department of the Central Committee.


The First Chief Directorate is responsible for foreign operations, the Second Chief Directorate for operations against Soviet citizens and foreigners inside the Soviet Union and the Fifth Chief Directorate for operations against the general Soviet population and particularly the Jewish population. The Chief Border Guards Directorate is responsible

for patrolling and protecting borders and outlying frontiers.

The seven independent directorates include the Technical Operations Directorate which develops and produces most of the technical devices used in KGB operations (except communications equipment); the Administrative Directorate responsible for normal logistic and administrative duties such as travel accommodations and the acquisition and management of property for KGB operations worldwide; the Personnel Directorate; the Surveillance Directorate, responsible for surveillance

and the development of surveillance equipment; the Communications Directorate, responsible for intercepting, monitoring and deciphering foreign or illicit communications, produces cipher codes and develops communications equipment; the Guards Directorate furnishes officers to protect principal Party and government leaders. The Armed Forces Directorate will be discussed in more detail later in this article.

Of the six independent departments, only the Special Investigations and State Communications Departments are of operational significance to the



KGB role during hostilities. The Special Investigations Department is primarily responsible for investigating cases of suspected treason, espionage and penetration of the KGB or Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye (GRU) by foreign intelligence agents. The State Communications Department KGB signal troops maintain and safeguard telephone and radio systems used by Soviet government agencies and military headquarters. The remaining departments are: Finance, Operational Analysis, Physical Security of the KGB, and Operational Registry and Archives.

Wartime Operations

In time of war, KGB agents (primarily from the Chief Directorates) will conduct operations against nations hostile to the Soviet Union. The internal organization of the First Chief Directorate, which is responsible for all clandestine activities abroad except military espionage assigned to the GRU, is comprised of three subdirectorates: Illegals, Scientific and Technical, and Planning Analysis; two Special Services: Information and Counterintelligence; two Special Departments: Disinformation and Executive Action; and 16 regular departments.

The Illegals subdirectorate selects, trains and deploys KGB agents who unlawfully live in foreign countries under false identities. William Fisher, alias Colonel Rudolf Abel, was a famous illegal. During the rise of Lenin and at the start of the Bolshevik Revolution, there was plenty of private interest in the Soviet Union and numerous offers of assistance from abroad: "One being a rich, old man living in the south of the US. The NKVD (forerunner to the KGB) contacted him more directly and persuaded him to adopt one of our men as his son. This man, once a refugee in the USA, is now an American citizen and a rich man ... ours to use whenever the need arises."²

The Scientific and Technical subdirectorate, created to intensify the theft of Western nuclear, missile and space research data, engages in and coordinates all scientific, technical and industrial espionage.

The Information Special Service assembles and distributes all routine information gathered by all KGB branches except the Scientific and Technical subdirectorate. Although it publishes reports, it does not maintain an independent body of analysts to determine the meaning and import of the data. This requires the reader to analyze reports and appears to be a major flaw in the system.

The Counterintelligence Special

Service seeks to penetrate foreign security and intelligence agencies, prevent espionage within the armed forces and direct counterintelligence operations against personnel of the Soviet armed forces. Its mission can best be explained through this intercepted Soviet order issued to the Western European KGB residences:

In accordance with the decision of the Collegium, it is imperative that you take immediate steps to utilize all available possibilities for acquiring or injecting our agents in the intelligence and counterintelligence services of the USA, UK, German Federal Republic, and France. You and the Residency must clearly understand that without the presence of agents in the specified organizations we will not be able to conduct operations successfully under difficult circumstances; and we are not in a position to guarantee the security of the work of Soviet intelligence services abroad and the safety of Soviet nationals (illegals) in the countries of your assignment.³

The Disinformation Department conducts clandestine acts and campaigns intended to sway the decisions to foreign governments while demoralizing foreign societies and defaming groups or individuals hostile to the Soviet Union.

The Executive Action Department, the ultra-secret department responsible for political murders, assassinations, kidnappings and sabotage, is intended to allow Soviet leaders to immobilize the West through internal chaos during future international crises.⁴

The Second Chief Directorate, responsible for controlling the Soviet people and foreigners within the Soviet Union, attempts to recruit US embassy personnel (including military attaches and military guards) and foreign students, and endeavors to neutralize intelligence operations conducted from or through the US embassy. It also investigates and interrogates every Soviet citizen who has been in contact with an American inside the Soviet Union.

The Fifth Chief Directorate suppresses all political dissent and reinforces the controls over the Soviet population. An overlap of responsibility is directed to both the Second and Fifth Chief Directorate in order to assure the Soviet leadership that no internal cancer, such as anti-Soviet partisan groups, underground operations, exist or pose a threat to the USSR system.

The Border Guards Directorate

is an elite army/navy of approximately 300,000 personnel. Belonging to the KGB and in no way under Army control, the Border Troops are equipped with the latest weaponry, including artillery and armor. Its ships have been known to range far beyond Soviet waters on intelligence gathering operations. It guards the entire Soviet state which is divided into border districts, each with its own border unit assigned. "Officers from the Border Guards Directorate served as advisors in Hanoi during the Vietnam War and have borne the brunt against the Chinese along the Sino-Soviet border."⁵

The Armed Forces Directorate, one of the largest and most vital, overseas the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense, the GRU, conventional ground, naval and air forces, border troops, the militia, the Internal Security Troops under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), strategic rocket and nuclear forces, civil aviation and the Moscow military district. Officers from the Directorate are employed at every echelon of the armed forces down to company level, in each military district, with every naval group, and at every military front.

Although the GRU concentrates on military rather than political intelligence, through its own personnel in military counterintelligence, the KGB enjoys a one-way window on activities of the GRU. The highest officers of the GRU are accordingly under KGB surveillance and often the GRU officers play the dual and uncomfortable role of informers for the KGB.

The GRU


Complementing this extensive array of intelligence collection is the military intelligence organ of the Soviet Union, the GRU. A division of the Soviet General Staff, the GRU is theoretically and administratively independent of the KGB, although this is a contested issue. There is a rivalry, especially concerning espionage, between the KGB and the GRU. The KGB scope of the interest is broader, encompassing political and economic affairs in general and overlapping with the GRU on military affairs and military intelligence.

The independence of the GRU is a matter of controversy despite the fact that the GRU has its own schools, its own spaces in Soviet embassies, runs its own operations, reports to Moscow through its own channels, and is chartered as a separate and independent intelligence organization. "Although the GRU concentrates on military rather than political intelligence, through its own personnel in military counterintelligence, the KGB enjoys a one-way window on activities of the GRU. The highest officers of the GRU are accordingly under KGB surveillance and often the GRU officers play the dual and uncomfortable role of informers for the KGB.⁶ When two high ranking officers of the GRU were discovered to be CIA and British MI-6 agents, the Soviet Politburo assigned a KGB First Deputy Chairman to direct the GRU and he, in turn, brought with him five senior KGB officers and placed them in positions throughout the GRU hierarchy. Thus, the GRU leadership consists of professional KGB officers rather than military personnel and the GRU cannot operate without the prior clearance, knowledge and approval of the KGB.

The KGB in the Military

Elements of the KGB are found throughout the military, down to company level. Those KGB officers report through their own chain of command to KGB Headquarters and are exempt from military orders. The KGB agents direct a network of informants in the unit to which they are assigned or attached and enlist civilian informants in the vicinity of the unit. KGB spies continuously provide the Communist Party and the Central Committee with ideological appraisals of individual officers and political evaluations of individual units.

KGB border guard officers operate both active intelligence gathering and counterintelligence activities. "In each border district, they are organized and deployed in unit sizes ranging from division (Cat I), brigade (Cat II), and regiment status, (Cat III).⁷ Units may be ground, naval or a combination of both. They have maneuver groups as reserves as well as signal companies and sapper platoons. These units are responsible for preventing unauthorized traffic across the Soviet frontier and defending Soviet territory in the event of invasion until relieved by regular army units. To perform these duties, the border troops have extensive networks of informants within the USSR and in foreign states adjacent to the Soviet Union. These networks report any information suggesting a possible attack on the USSR, including foreign troop



movements or increased activity near the Soviet frontier.⁸

The Special Service Counterintelligence agents are permanently assigned to the Counterintelligence Section within all army echelons down to division level. Below division level these officers are attached from the division counterintelligence section. The number of counterintelligence officers assigned to a unit depends on branch of service; unit, organization, location, mission and role; and the political situation. From one to three or more KGB officers will be attached to a regiment. At all levels, these officers conduct surveillance of all officers and men to detect potentially anti-Soviet tendencies in speech and deed; to observe political attitudes and discover hostile intelligence penetration; to interrogate prisoners of war; safeguard key documents, facilities and secret installations; and conduct disinformation activities, planting false information through various techniques to mislead foreign intelligence agents.

The KGB-controlled Internal Security Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are armed with all types of weaponry (including artillery and armor) and organized into motorized rifle divisions, artillery, tank or mortar regiments or separate special battalions to protect particularly important government ob-

jectives, railroads and other key lines of communications. They also maintain custody of and convoy prisoners of war into the Soviet interior. The use of these troops for other missions without KGB approval is impossible.

Deep-Cover or Dominant Agents

In wartime, the KGB activates deep-cover or dominant agents planted within hostile nations, using strategic intelligence operations against military and political objectives at the tactical and national levels. The wartime mission of the KGB is found in a speech Stalin delivered to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in March 1937:

In order to win an engagement in time of war, it is necessary to have several corps of Red Army men. But in order to pluck the victory on the front, several spies somewhere on the army staff, or even division staff, capable of stealing the operational plans and giving it to the opponent is all that is necessary. In order to construct a great railroad bridge thousands of men are needed but in order to blow it up, several people are sufficient.⁹

During World War II, state security

agents in the first echelon of advancing forces organized the administration of "liberated" territories and secured documents, personnel and property desired by the Soviet government (as in the Battle of Berlin).

There are several indications of KGB deep penetration agents social, economic, political and military organs of foreign nations. At the outbreak of war, they will, on order of the Central Committee, meticulously set about destroying the enemy from within. The Executive Action agents will initiate "widespread sabotage to paralyze a nation's will and ability to respond to an international crisis. It envisions plunging foreign capitals into panic and disarray by stopping transit systems, shutting off electrical power, disrupting water supplies, and blocking key traffic arteries" while conducting assassinations, murders and kidnappings of political and key government officials. Subversive activities will be conducted to discredit individuals or the government as a whole; form and support organizations, parties, groups and unions hostile to the existing rule; create an opinion of Soviet strength, and inevitable world victory; divide and conquer the populace by inciting class, national and religious hatred; infiltrate and sabotage anti-Communist and anti-Soviet organizations; organize partisan movements, armed uprisings and disorders through arson, massacres and murder; and produce doubt, fear and panic at critical moments among the armed forces and the general populace of the opposing country.

Counterintelligence Efforts

The counterintelligence officers employed down to company level in the military will "act primarily to undermine the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence organs" and will conduct counterespionage within Soviet forces. They will organize intelligence collection and subversive activities in the enemy rear and organize guerrilla (partisan) movements. Guerrilla forces organized by the KGB will conduct constant reconnoitering, terrorist activity and propaganda activities in enemy territory. Thousands of these partisans/KGB agents infiltrated German service as interpreters, cleaners and laborers during World War II. The KGB counterintelligence mission in time of war is exemplified by the nickname "SMERSH," an abbreviation for "SMERST SHPIONAMI" or translated "Death To Spies!" These officers will collect information on enemy engineering preparations of the theater of mili-

tary operations, the military industry, training and equipment, personnel resources and reserves, war plans and operations, mobilization plans, strategic concentrations of troops and the deployment of the enemy's armed forces.

In addition to fighting off enemy forces until the Soviet army is committed to battle, the Border Troops will also protect the rear borders of the active army front, conduct pass checks for units and troops within their border districts, and guard the old border when the Soviet army attacks and as combat operations are moved into enemy territory. Where the situation at the front is critical, they may be committed to battle with KGB approval.

Internal Security Troops

Whether in their assigned interior districts or in enemy territory, the Internal Security Troops guard property being evacuated or, upon withdrawal of Soviet forces, destroy property, depots, stores, equipment and other valuable items which cannot be evacuated readily. They will evacuate prisoners of war deep into Soviet territory and defend railroad lines, stations and other key lines of communications. The Interior Troops are also concerned with counterintelligence activities and will be organized in Moscow-controlled field divisions to suppress any organized resistance to the Soviet state.

The Communications Directorate and the State Communications Department will furnish specialized officers to provide communication code security for all the top level government bureaus, as well as for the KGB units. These communications specialists are often collocated with divisional signal units where they maintain and operate separate equipment and control communication channels for the KGB. They will control all coding and decoding operations within the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and its outposts or operatives in foreign countries. Responsible for signals intelligence, involving the breaking of codes, monitoring of radios, intercepting of transmissions and operation of tracking stations designed to locate their origins, communications officers will be deployed throughout the military.¹²

At or near the frontlines, the counterintelligence officers will interrogate prisoners of war. Until the early 1950s, interrogations included torturing and beating prisoners to death.

"... such crudities are now in disfavor. Tortures are largely psychological and less intense and far less frequent than they were in 1939 or 1949. But the de-

VICES of beatings, tortures and privation remain within the interrogator's grasp, to be used when needed."¹³

Psychologists, hypnosis and drugs are used sparingly. The network of informants who have penetrated or infiltrated the opposing country will greatly aid intelligence gathering. Penetration is the insertion of a Soviet agent inside the enemy intelligence forces as a trusted operative.

"Deep cover agents, after World War II, were emplaced in East Germany in the eventuality that the puppet East German province will be someday merged in a greater Germany, thus changing the Soviet intelligence reckoning from a friendly 'base zone' to a hostile 'sector.'"¹⁴

In 1950, agents were recruited in the very heart of US military headquarters in West Germany. Three Soviet agents recently discovered in the West German ministry in Bonn were known to have access to highly classified military and political information.

On the battlefield, the KGB will also protect important government and military installations. The KGB maintains custody of all nuclear materials and warheads and is responsible for the "absolute security of all nuclear or thermonuclear enterprises whether civilian or military."¹⁵ The KGB will also protect certain scientific installations, leading scientists and technicians and certain military leaders.

KGB Problem Areas

Although it is large, powerful and omnipresent, the KGB faces some grave problems which may surface in time of war, including possible opposition from within. As written in the Soviet Constitution, the KGB is subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the official governing body. In fact, however, the KGB works directly for the Party and, in practice, bypasses the formal government because one of the ten secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party is always assigned to direct the State Security Committee's activities. Furthermore, every KGB officer is a member of the Communist Party or of Komsomol, the Communist Youth Organization, which is the Party's feeder organization. No other agency of the Soviet state shares such intimate contact with its leaders as the KGB. No major decisions on intelligence or terror operations outside the Soviet Union can be taken without the direct permission from the full

(continued on page 54)

Military Intelligence

Collection Management at Division and Corps Level

by COL William E. Harmon

Introduction

The G2's collection management effort is focused on one objective: satisfy the commander's information needs with respect to the enemy, weather and terrain as quickly as possible in order to provide timely intelligence in support of friendly operations. There are a variety of techniques available to assist in this effort. These techniques often become ends unto themselves when we lose sight of the objective of timely intelligence in support of friendly operations. Some of the overly sophisticated, bulky, temperamental, automated systems which self-destruct when the TECHREP leaves the van fall into the category of ends unto themselves.

Collection/Plan Worksheet

The Collection Plan/Worksheet is probably the single most important collection management tool taught to every intelligence officer and specialist. It displays the commander's requirements, the agencies available for tasking and requests which have been levied and satisfied. In its present form, however, the Collection Worksheet is absolutely worthless. Designed primarily for classroom use, it becomes burdensome when most urgently needed: as the situation gets hectic and confusing and the plan in its matrix format makes the transition to a worksheet. Under these circumstances, the worksheet's life expectancy can be measured in minutes. The battlefield is constantly changing and collection requirements must frequently be assigned new priorities. The worksheet becomes a burden because it is not easily manipulated when priorities change, requirements are added, the situation changes, or when there is a shift change.

This problem can be solved manually by using a visual file index system. One collection management technique

places the Collection Plan/Worksheet in a visual file index book (NSN 7460-00-281-3195) containing 5x8 inch cards. A collection requirement is visibly displayed across the bottom of a card. The remainder of the card provides priority, requestor, request number, time requested, time when information will no longer be of value, additional distribution, collection agencies tasked, time tasked, time the answer was received, the answer itself, and the time the information requested was disseminated to the requestor. In addition to the visual file book, charts of the commander's essential elements of information (EEI) driving the collection effort and of the agencies tasked must be displayed to prevent overloading or overlooking any single collector.

Requests for information are received in a standard format and assigned request numbers by the originator which, when referenced during dissemination, reduces transmission time. Different colored cards can be used to show priorities. If a request must be answered within a certain time frame, a red card will highlight its importance to the collection manager no matter how many shift changes take place.

The cards themselves can be grouped in a number of ways: Order of Battle (OB) factors, geographic regions, requestor, collector, etc. Experience has shown that the file may start out one way only to be reorganized through necessity as the situation changes. This can be quickly accomplished as the cards are easily manipulated, while Collection Worksheets must be erased and started again.

When the collection requirement is satisfied, the card is removed and the collection visual file remains undisturbed. Disruption is unavoidable when trying to neatly erase grease pencil entries from the Collection Worksheet. More importantly, the card can then be filed on a geographic reference basis enabling the collection manager to build

a data base on the responsiveness of the collection agencies. The collection manager may find that, in geographic reference square 7, a knowledgeable prisoner of war has given timely information or that an agent net in geographic reference square 4 can respond quickly. This will facilitate more thoughtful tasking and, hopefully, more timely return of the information requested. It must be emphasized that this collection technique does not replace OB files. It is a collection management technique which thrives on simplicity.

Who is the Collection Manager?

The G2 directs the collection effort, because he should be most attuned to the commander's information needs regarding enemy, weather and terrain. While the G2 directs the collection effort, however, the individual carrying it out will be an enlisted specialist (96B), possibly an E5 but probably an E4. His title of collection specialist will differentiate him from the collection manager who is usually the G2 or the operations officer at division level. At corps level an officer is often designated as the collection manager during sustained operations.

It should be pointed out that, under current situations, there is room for confusion regarding the level at which collection management takes place. The collection manager must: 1) know the collectors available in all disciplines; 2) know the current status of all collectors; 3) know the collection capability as reflected by the current status; 4) have the ability and authority to task.

A number of elements fall into three of the above categories in specialized collection areas but not the first. An understanding of the total collection effort is required by the division and corps collection manager. Other sub-systems in their respective specialized collection areas include:

R&S

Technical Control and
Analysis
Center (TCAC)

IPW Section

S2's Controlling
Patrols

Imagery/Sensor Collection

SIGINT Collection

HUMINT Collection

HUMINT Collection

Therefore, in order for a division or corps collection management system to exist, there must be a focal point for responsibilities 1-4, above.

The Collection Management Process

Collection requirements are identified in the planning process and during operations. All divisions and corps have systems designed to expedite collection requirements. When the requirement reaches its destination—the desk of the collection manager/specialist—a series of sequential events intended to preclude overloading the collection system takes place. If the collection manager/specialist accepts everything forwarded by subordinates as Priority One, the result will be chaos. He must, of course, retain the priorities sent to him by higher headquarters.

Validation

The first step is to ask: Is this a valid collection requirement? At division level the fact that a subordinate brigade, separate battalion, or staff element has asked the question makes it a valid requirement. Collection requirements levied by higher headquarters are also accepted as valid requirements. At corps, the question: Has the subordinate properly utilized the assets organic or allocated to it to collect the information? must be asked. If the answer is yes, then it is a valid requirement. Corps also retains priorities sent by higher headquarters. Validation of a requirement means that it is worthy of allocating resources which are organic, allocated, or available by request to higher headquarters.

Research

Once the requirement has been validated, the next step in all cases is research. Is the information readily available in the files of the All Source Analysis Section or one of the collection

sub-systems? If the information is available on recently flown imagery, don't fly another mission. Because research is an early step, the collection manager/specialist must be centrally located and cleared for access to the All Source Analysis Center. If the information is available, it is transmitted by the most expeditious means to the requester and others with similar interests.

Relook

If a cursory search fails to provide the information requested, the next step is to determine if there are sources readily available which may have the information. A PW or recently returned patrol may have current knowledge; recent imagery or intercepts from sensors may provide valuable information when given another look with new perspective. Only after research and relook does the collection manager/specialist consider sending out the collection task.

Formulation of the Collection Task

To prevent confusion, the collection manager/specialist must properly transform collection requirements into specific collection tasks for each collection sub-system he wishes to task. The collection sub-system will further refine the requirement. Ambiguous collection tasks will generate ambiguous responses which must be reformulated to satisfy the requirement, thus tying up the collector unnecessarily. The collection manager/specialist must determine target characteristics, which collector(s) is (are) best suited for the mission, the priority of the request and when the information will no longer be of value. There is an implied task when managing time-sensitive items: the collection manager/specialist must understand the relationship between the collection system and the target. To be deliberately, and not accidentally, successful in a time-sensitive collection effort, the

following must be known: 1) the time required to task the collector after the need is identified by the requester; 2) the time needed to acquire, process and transmit the information to the original requester; 3) the original requester's response time to react to the information; 4) target mobility. Once these factors have been analyzed, the time-sensitive collection task may not be given a high priority because of an inability to use the information in a timely manner.

The collection manager/specialist must match each requirement against the proper and most responsive collector, to provide a proper balance of duplicity, and avoid overloading the system while maintaining the priority system to ensure that, at any given time, available assets are collecting the priority information satisfying the commander's operational needs.

Cueing

The collection manager/specialist must realize his collectors will be providing information which should cue other collectors: SIGINT or unattended ground sensors may cue photo missions on assembly areas, etc. He must therefore disseminate current intelligence to his collectors. This important point is too often overlooked.

To be responsive to the commander's key operational needs, the collection manager/specialist must always be able to rapidly cancel requirements in order to purge the system to make room for higher priority tasks. If an armored division commander moving north sees the opportunity for a flanking maneuver to the west, the collection system must respond to his requirements if his maneuver is to succeed. It is as important to be able to cancel a requirement as it is to levy one when limited collection resources are available. In situations where information becomes available from other sources, the collection requirement must be cancelled immediately.

Collection Alerting System

Whether manual or automated, the vehicle by which the collection manager/specialist maintains his collection effort must be highlighted at a glance: priority items, time-sensitive items, collectors' commitments, collection efforts by area and discipline, and requirements by requester. It must be flexible enough to reorient on a moment's notice and simple enough to be turned over to another shift in 5-10 minutes.

vital for the analyst's accounting and validity checks.

Multiple communications paths to the same collector can cause confusion, excessive redundancy of tasking, and overloading of collection assets. One example is multiple paths to SIGINT collectors. The corps G2 identifies a collection requirement to locate the 3d Motorized Rifle Regiment. The requirement is tasked to the 11th MECH Division (a subordinate of the corps) and to the corps CEWI Group's Technical Control and Analysis Center (TCAC). The 11th MECH Division G2 passes the task to the forward brigades and the division's CEWI Battalion TCAC. The division G2 passes the requirement to the TCAC as "located the 3d MRD." The Division TCAC translates this into SIGINT tasking of a SIGINT position. Shortly thereafter the division TCAC receives from the corps TCAC a technical support request to monitor and direction-find a certain radio frequency. The division TCAC may not recognize this as the same task. Smart soldiers, aware of this potential danger, can easily prevent it.

Collection Requirement Match

The collection management effort is only effective if it can match incoming information to collection requirements. Incoming information from someone other than the collector tasked may nevertheless satisfy a requirement. If so, the old requirement must be rewritten and the collector(s) notified of the modification. Due to scarce resources, we must take advantage of every opportunity to narrow the scope of requirements. Modified requirements may require new priorities and adjustments to time requirements.

Multiple Paths of Communications

There is an inherent danger in the division/corps collection environment for information following multiple communications paths (SIGINT Spot Report from the TCAC; the same report sanitized in a brigade INTSUM) to the analyst and confirming itself as if it had been originated from two or more sources. Identifying information sources and the time of information is


Credibility

It is the collection manager/specialist's responsibility to ensure that the requestor knows the validity of the information received in response to any request. Often the information will be sanitized at division level before transmission to subordinates. The system must be efficient enough for a Battalion S2 to recommend a course of action to his commander based on his feel for the validity of the information.

Conclusion

The collection management system has withstood the acid test if:

- The G2 is briefed by the All Source Analysis Section and, on his return to the collection manager/specialist, finds all the enemy information voids are validated collection requirements tasked to more than one collector.
- Just after the night-shift change, the G2 can go to a subordinate headquarters or collection sub-system and know all the requirements levied by his collection manager/specialist.
- The G2 can go to higher headquarters for the status of all his outstanding collection requirements, and in turn brief the higher headquarters on the status of all the collection requirements it levied on him.
- The division collection effort can be successfully reoriented in 15-30 minutes following a change in direction of attack.
- The G2 is successfully cueing his collection sub-systems as information begins to flow back.
- Most importantly, the commander's key operational requirements for information on enemy, weather and terrain are met in a timely manner.



Terrorism and Communism: A History and Profile Conclusion

by Rudolf Levy

Preface

The tremendous increase of terrorism worldwide has brought home the point that no nation, even the perennially neutral Switzerland, is safe from terrorists. Terrorist organizations that once concerned themselves with an occasional bombing, arson or assassinations now cross frontiers at will, intimidating and terrorizing innocent peoples without the slightest regard for life, international convention or morality. And in most cases, terrorism has achieved terrorist goals.

The epidemic spread of terrorism is due in large part to ignorance and fear reaching into the highest levels of governments, apathy and mostly an inadequate response to terrorist acts. One fact remains clear: terrorism must be stopped.

To effectively combat terrorism, it is absolutely essential to know everything there is to know about the terrorist, his motivations, ideology and organizations and the conditions promoting terrorism. Marxist and Communist ideologies give terrorist acts legitimacy. Although many students of Marx claim that he did not advocate terrorism, Marx did advocate violent revolution and the destruction of all non-communist systems. Lenin's implementation of Marxist theories yielded terrorism on a grand scale.

The too-vivid atrocities in Germany, Italy, Israel, Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Congo, Ethiopia, Laos, Vietnam and elsewhere clearly reflect the terrorist mentalities of such organizations as the Black September Organization, The Baader-Meinhof Gang, The Japanese Red Army, The Red Brigade, the Irish Republican Army, the Tupamaros, FALN, Pathet Lao, Viet Cong, Khmer Rouge, The Dev Genc. All of these organizations have overt Marxist-Communist affiliations. These affiliations necessitate an understanding of the Communist ideology that motivates the terrorists. Anyone involved in counterterrorist operations, especially the intelligence officer, must be thoroughly familiar with every aspect of this phenomenon.

Communist Internationalism

Lenin as Marx was firmly convinced that the entire world must become Communist, or Communism could not succeed. As soon as he felt that his power was consolidated, he began to work on his "Blueprint for World Domination." The plan was presented to the Communist Party Presidium shortly after the Communist Party headquarters was moved to Moscow from Petrograd.

Here, for the first time, Lenin stressed the word "force and flexibility." He stated that:

Revolutionary methods, organizational excellence and flexible courses of action will be developed for the future Communist international activity. The revolutionary activity under the leadership of the Moscow mother party will flourish worldwide, gathering support and momentum. Communist elite will operate in all the oppressed countries of the world. We shall support the struggle with terrorism, materials, leadership, ideology and, if necessary, with the force of our military arms.

This concept of operations was approved by the Ruling Committee of the Communist Party and the methods are still in force today.

The Blueprint for World Conquest

- Encourage disputes among workers and employers. Infiltrate labor movements and labor unions. Emphasize the exploitation of the worker; organize strikes, walk-outs and work slowdowns. Spread the ideas of a classless society and the advantages of public ownership, concentrating on the lower and less educated classes. Use violence against the establishment, the supporters and terrorize those who do not support the proletarian movement.

- Start civil wars and incite minorities to revolt against the ruling class in colonial, backward and underdeveloped

countries. Send Communist and terrorist cadre into areas and nations where the conditions will promote discontent and revolution. Place highly trained and motivated agents in positions of influence to keep movements going and inform the local population of Communist support. Recruit local citizens into the movement and establish training and logistical support for local terrorist revolutionaries. An especially ripe situation presents itself in nations where racial groups are oppressed. Keep people afraid of terrorists.

Trained local revolutionaries will be pushed forward into the new revolutionary government to insure the local Communist Party a majority and the elimination of all opposing factions. Continuous material support creates economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union, insuring the alignment of the country with international Communism. The Communist cadre will further insure that the violence of the revolution is maintained (as in Cuba, China, Angola and Ghana, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Afghanistan.)

Take advantage of protracted conflicts and the turmoil which follows a civil or general war, when hunger and lack of resources drive national leaders to seek outside help. The Communist cadre will enter with many promises, some of which will be fulfilled. Treaties are concluded only to appease the weak and are made to be broken. As soon as a country is within its fold, the Party shall sustain revolutionary violence and never let go, continuously intimidating the people through state sponsored terrorist organizations.

- Create Communist parties in all the countries of the world. They must operate openly as well as underground. The Communist Party must have discipline and well-trained leadership. New cells for propaganda, sabotage, terrorism and kidnapping must be formed with all the security required to prevent detection. Agents and organizers from abroad will be sent to target countries by legal (as diplomats and attaches and on official visits) and illegal means. The means to accomplish these tasks are limited only by

the training and imagination of the Communist terrorist leadership. Intelligence is one of the most important facets of the terrorist and Communist operation: the terrorist cadre must stay informed on all problems within an area. If there is no cause for discontent, cause must be created.

- Unify all Communist parties under Moscow's leadership. The Communist International (COMINTERN), a body of Communist delegates from all countries, was established shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution for the purpose of stringent control and planning. Communist party congresses met to develop the strategies for further operations. Many of today's US terrorist organizations trace their lineage to the early Communist-Socialist Parties. During World War II, the COMINTERN was disbanded by Stalin to appease the Western democracies (mainly the US) and obtain lend-lease program aid and to give the impression that the Communists had abandoned the idea of world conquest. After World War II, the COMINTERN was no longer necessary because of the legalization of most Communist parties and because of the number of nations establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Agents were placed in foreign countries with ease by overt means. Communist parties flourished following World War II, facilitating the epidemic growth of Soviet influence throughout the world. The modern Communist organization has all means of communications and material support at its disposal. Liberation movements incited by Communist agitators many years ago are still being exploited by the Soviet Union.

- Plant Communist agents in labor unions, schools, communication media, the political arena and other institutions. (Searches of records and background investigations have uncovered an astonishing number of cases of Communist infiltration into our school systems and other institutions.) Lenin directed an infiltration campaign as early as 1919. Organizations which would not be suspected as being Communist were established to serve as fronts for Communist and terrorist activities within a country. Front organizations are crucial because they can advance the cause of Communism faster and more effectively than the Party itself. The fronts today serve as direct support above ground organization for the terrorist.

"Never appear in the foreground, let our friends do the work. A university professor, who, without being a party member

lends himself to the interest of the Soviet Union or to the party cause, is worth more than any card carrying party member. Every man has his value, a writer of reputation or a retired General of the Armed Forces who espouses our cause to some degree can help us to achieve our goals quicker and cleaner. An entertainer who enjoys popularity among the people, can influence and advance our cause further. A Union leader who is on the outside of our ranks, but defends our goals and policies is worth more than a thousand card carrying party members."

Dimitri Manuilski
Communist Party
Theoretician

Front organizations had been created all over the world just prior to the Second World War. Many actively supported the Communist forces fighting during the Spanish Revolution in 1936. Some took an active part or recruited mercenaries (such as the Abraham Lincoln Brigade from the US). The names of some of these organizations were such that no one, without close scrutiny, would have suspected a Communist front. Today, front organizations provide speakers for public gatherings, conduct drives for funds, and support and organize rallies for local Communist parties, garnering support from uninformed or unsuspecting public.

Lenin's preoccupation with Communist front organizations resulted in a special drive to establish these groups throughout the world. Their chief functions were described by Lenin in 1920:

1. Sponsor agitation campaigns; with concerns of the people turning to violence & terror;
2. Collect money. (Fronts are the chief local source of funds for the indigenous party and terrorist organizations.);
3. Provide speakers, educators, and entertainers for noncommunist activities to promote *inter alia*, civil rights, equality, peace, and a ban on nuclear weapons;
4. Issue literature. Writers of prominence should be influenced to produce literature which promotes proletarian causes and denounces the bourgeoisie; (Pete Seger)
5. Sponsor mass rallies, especially where people are most vulnerable, such as at universities and labor gatherings. Berkeley riots started by Mario Savio as Freedom of Speech-1st Amendment movement, turning into

Anti-Government-police brutality. Some of the most notorious terrorists of today started out in the campus disorders of the 1960s.

6. Lobby for or against some procedure, bill or law. Any cause is a good cause if it advances the international movement.

7. Influence high officials whom the party cannot overtly reach. Individuals in high positions should be cultivated and their cooperation elicited, even if blackmail is necessary.

8. Teach Marxist doctrines; preach scientific socialism; promote atheism and materialism. Encourage split of family as the basic cell of society.

9. Solicit support from people who are not informed about Communist aims or the front's mission. Espouse causes close to people's hearts even if the causes are Anti-Marx.

10. Create discontent among the masses by proclaiming the Marxist idea of "linking the struggle with the fight for porkchops—talking about the price of butter rather than revolution, but adding that the price will go higher as long as the Capitalist dominates the government." And that the only way to better life is the destruction of the current social system.

11. Use terror as the ultimate weapon of the Communist movement. Violence always brings people to their knees. Terrorist organization must be effective, well-trained and totally ruthless. "Kill ten and frighten ten thousand"—Mao Tse Tung. An international training network will be established to serve the needs of the revolutionaries.

Lenin's plans were made clear long before the Bolshevik Revolution began:

First we will insure our position at home, then we will take the people of Europe, then we will take the masses of Asia . . . We will progress at an unbelievable pace . . . And then we will encircle the United States of America which will be the last bastion of Capitalism, we will not have to attack, it will fall into our hands like an overripe fruit from a tree.

The Communists have not abandoned their stated goals. All one has to do is to look at the areas as close as 90 miles in Cuba, or the efforts in Central and South America and Quebec, let alone tremendously escalated terrorist acts within the United States.

Terror International

While not all terrorists are Marxist or

left-oriented, the majority of the most active ones (85 percent) are.

Because of the international nature of the Communist movement, in-fighting and competition have created three main factions among the political and the "armed" organizations:

The Marxist Leninists-Traditionalists. Terrorism is used selectively and conducted through Front organizations in conjunction with political maneuvering and subversive activities. The political sponsoring organization in the USA is the Communist Party Marxist-Leninist, who officially condemns terrorism, but in reality sponsors terrorist activities and surrogate warfare.

Trotskyites. Trotsky advocated unrestrained use of terrorism and the linking of all terrorist organizations worldwide. The Socialist Workers Party USA is the political umbrella for the Trotskyite movement. The Worker Student Alliance, from which the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) evolved, initially embraced the Trotskyite ideology. Trotskyite organizations use Front activities in affluent areas and universities for recruiting.

Maoists. While Maoist revolutionary philosophies and theories were established by the late Mao Tse Tung during his early revolutionary days, Maoism did not become a separate ideology until the final Communist split between the Soviet leadership and Mao in 1959. Like Trotsky, Mao advocated global terrorism which transcended national borders and regarded all non-communist or non-socialist nations as enemies with whom there could be no compromise. Maoists do not conceal their terrorist organizations. In the United States, Maoist organizations include the Revolutionary Communist Party USA, the Revolutionary Communist Youth Brigades and the new Revolutionary Student Brigades activated from ultra-radical elements of the SDS and the Weather Underground. Most terrorist groups have adopted Mao's revolutionary and terrorist theories, including The Baader-Meinhof organization in Germany, The Red Brigades of Italy and the Japanese Red Army. Maoist groups are known for extreme violence and international cooperation.

Terrorist Goals

- Alienate peoples from their governments.
- Influence, discredit and destroy the present system.
- Breakdown social structures.
- Erode trust in established governments.
- Foster insecurity and fear among the people.
- Show the present government to be inept in dealing with terrorism and other problems.
- Force overreaction by government in power.
- Glorify terrorists and their politics.
- Destroy property.
- Disrupt law and order.
- Create a climate for revolution.

Mao's decline in popularity in China may signal further splits in the Maoist groups found worldwide.

Conclusion

Although contemporary terrorist organizations trace their lineage to the crude and undisciplined bomb throwers of the Bolshevik Revolution, most of today's terrorists are disciplined, motivated, well-trained, well-organized and well-financed. Terrorism is an international system, precisely as Lenin directed it to be on 16 October 1905. Lenin even then realized the value of coordinated international terror in support of political and military operations.

Terrorist training is conducted in well-staffed camps in the United States, Central and South America, Cuba, Lebanon, South Yemen, Syria, Libya, Iraq, East Germany and North Korea. Subjects include politics, the military, intelligence, agitation campaigning and recruiting in addition to unconventional warfare, subversion, sabotage, assassinations, bombings and bomb manufacture. A terrorist "graduate school" is Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University. The billions of dollars of financial support required by this world-wide network of camps is provided by the Soviet Union, Libya and

other socialist countries and by many Middle Eastern nations. Increasing numbers of US terrorists and "radical activists" are being trained in these camps, a number of which have been established in the western United States.

Terrorist organizations cooperate internationally: the massacre at the 1972 Munich Olympics was perpetrated by the Black September Organization with the help of the Baader-Meinhof Gang and Italy's Red Brigade (which transported the weapons used in the massacre). The 1972 attack on Israel's Israel's Lod Airport was carried out by the Japanese Red Army on behalf of Black September; the Baader-Meinhof Gang and the Red Army Faction participated in the Entebbe hijackings, and several Palestinian Liberation Organization operations, Irish Republican Army activities and in the 1975 kidnapping of OPEC oil ministers in Vienna, Austria, which was organized by Carlos.

Grenades stolen from the US Army Ammunition Storage Facility at Miesau by the Baader-Meinhof Gang have been found in the possession of the Japanese Red Army while others were found in Ireland.

Encouraged by success, terrorists are becoming bolder in their attacks, choosing larger targets preferably involving US citizens and facilities. More nations support these organizations, giving them sanctuaries and cover. Support of terrorist organizations is an integral part of the national policies of several countries around the world.

Terrorist tactics designed to support political and military goals are not mysterious: they are based on revolutionary theories and practices of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky and Mao which have been refined by Marcuse, Fanon, Guevara and Marighella (whose manual of the Urban Guerrilla is the main guide of contemporary terrorists).

A thorough knowledge of terrorism and the philosophies and nations sustaining it is not merely important to intelligence professionals who may one day participate in counterterrorist operations, it is imperative.

PLA

(continued from page 37)

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ASCI Viewpoint

CEWI in the Active Army



by Major General
Edmund R. Thompson

Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) units in the Active Army are a direct result of the recommendation made in Chapter 2—Tactical Integration—of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) dated 16 September 1975. The recommendation states, "Consolidate Army resources, primarily devoted to the collection and processing of intelligence and to the conduct of electronic warfare, in support of tactical commanders, at the corps and division level, into integrated organizations, assigned to and under the full command (less SIGINT OPCON) of the supported commander." Thus, slightly more than five years ago the Army embarked on an intelligence force modernization mission which has not only affected the tactical forces, at corps and below, but has also dramatically affected intelligence force structure at Echelon Above Corps (EAC). This was the challenge five years ago.

How far have we come? Since the 522nd CEWI Battalion was activated and assigned to the 2d Armored Division on 21 October 1976 under a test series TOE, the progress made, although it may have appeared slow and ponderous, has been remarkable.

- First, by the end of FY 80, less than four years after the activation of the original test battalion, there are four CEWI battalions in CONUS and two in Europe.

- Second, by the end of FY 83, all 16 CEWI Battalions; four CEWI Groups (Corps); three CEWI Companies (Separate Brigade); and three CEWI Companies (Armored Cavalry Regiment) will have been activated and will be supporting our tactical commanders.

- Third, Military Intelligence Branch has a dynamic career progression profile for intelligence personnel. CEWI has provided the vehicle through which intelligence officers will serve as platoon leaders while lieutenants, company commanders while captains, etc. CEWI has also been instrumental in the development of Operations Security (OPSEC) doctrine. A combat perspective has been developed for our counterintelligence and communications security personnel assigned to OPSEC teams at division level and OPSEC companies at corps.

- Fourth, CEWI has done much to dispel the "Green Door" reputation attributed to tactical intelligence units in Vietnam. Support of the CEWI concept by division commanders who have worked with these units has been extremely positive.

Additionally, perseverance in research and development and procurement will have a positive impact on CEWI units. By the mid 1980s, field units will be issued the following ground-based systems: Teampack, Trail Blazer, TRQ-32s with the TYK-10A, Tacjam and the TLQ-17A. In conjunction with these Army procurement actions, many units are continuing to purchase off-the-shelf equipment which significantly improves unit training and support to tactical commanders. The upgrading of airborne CEWI systems is equally impressive. Again, by the mid 1980s, OV-1D aircraft will be upgraded with the APS-94F radar which is ECCM-hardened and greatly increases the SLAR capability of the system; an additional GUARDRAIL/QUICK LOOK system will be issued in Europe and FORSCOM; and to complement these corps airborne systems, QUICK FIX systems will be issued to divisions. In spite of how far we have come, there are equally important challenges re-

maining to be met.

From my viewpoint, the challenges for the next five years are indeed worthy of the talented intelligence people in uniform today and of those who will follow. We must develop solutions to the most pressing problems of intelligence personnel recruitment and retention. To assist in this endeavor, several DA programs have been developed to include monetary incentives for enlistment and reenlistment for intelligence personnel, Readiness Training Program (REDTRAIN), enlistments directly into MOS 97B, and at the direction of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, an exhaustive study to enhance linguist management throughout the Army is near completion. To support the development of CEWI literature, during FY 81 a follow-on evaluation of the CEWI concept will be conducted by TRADOC to determine required refinements and modifications to the CEWI doctrine and to organizational and operational concepts. This evaluation will refine both personnel and equipment requirements for CEWI units in the future. As currently programmed, Division 86 will have a significant impact on the structure of the CEWI battalion. However, a significant strength of CEWI organizations is their modular structure which can efficiently accommodate organizational and functional changes.

CEWI units have clearly had a positive impact on broadening the perception of commanders on tactical intelligence and have developed greater emphasis on the role of electronic warfare. Tactical units now plan for integrated artillery and EW fires and consciously weigh the alternatives of listening to or jamming enemy communications. Serious consideration is being given at all levels to the ability of CEWI as a combat multiplier on the battlefield. In spite of the complex administrative arrangements required by the division, many division commanders have formed "provisional" CEWI Battalions. A question that the Army may ultimately have to answer is "How many CEWI units can we buy for the cost of a tank battalion and what will be the net increase in combat power?" The fact that this question is being considered highlights the impact that CEWI has had and will continue to have on the Army.

USAIC Notes

Aircraft Survivability

by MAJ B. M. Barker

Members of the Mohawk community will soon be seeing a new piece of aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) being fielded to enhance their probability of mission success in a high threat environment. Soon to be produced is the AN/ALQ-147A infrared countermeasures (IRCM) set, production successor to the prototype AN/ALQ-147 "Hot Brick" now in the field with Mohawk units overseas.

The original "Hot Brick" was fielded as a "quick reaction capability" in the

mid-1970's to give interim protection against infrared (IR) seeking missiles for the OV-1D and RV-1D aircraft. The new production version incorporates many engineering and operational improvements over its predecessor and has the capability to defeat both surface- and air-launched IR seeking missiles.


Essential components of the IRCM unit are an Operator Control Unit (OCU) located in the cockpit, a small jet fuel tank to supply the unit, a transmitter section where the jet fuel is burned to heat an IR "source," and a modulator section which both mechanically modulates the emitted IR energy and contains a filter to prevent forming a visual signature during darkness.

The AN/ALQ-147A will be produced in two versions. Version one (V1) will be assembled into a single self-contained, aerodynamic pod weighing approximately 235 pounds when fueled and mission ready. It is designed for the outboard wing stores of the OV-1D.


Version two (V2) is designed for the RV-1D where fewer wing stores are available. It is a 137 pound assembly which is mounted on the aft end of a modified 150 gallon fuel drop tank but has identical operating characteristics with the V1.

Each unit receiving the new AN/ALQ-147A V1 and V2's will also receive the newly developed AN/ALM-166A countermeasures test set. This comprehensive test set can measure all significant V1 and V2 system characteristics. It will be used at all levels of maintenance to rapidly isolate system faults, and at the unit to rapidly preflight check the installed IRCM equipment. The development and fielding of the AN/ALQ-147A is one of a number of continuing programs to keep ASE abreast of the everchanging threat to air operations, especially to aircraft employed in critical intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) missions.

System Components Location



AN/ALQ-147A(V)1



Evaluation: A two-way street for field and school

by Edward Flynn, Ph.D.

Phase V of the Interservice Procedures for Instructional Systems Development (IPISD), TRADOC PAM 350-30, specifies that training results will be evaluated both in the resident school and in the field.

The Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (a new addition to the title) in each TRADOC school is charged with the proponentry of this function.

The processes and procedures for internal evaluation are fairly well established—i.e., review of Courses of Instruction (COI), test results, critiques, etc.—and generally understood.

However, the external evaluation system involving the evaluation of graduates, nonresident training materials, and Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS) products is less defined, and unfortunately, often lacking in strong support from the field commander's side.

In order to truly close the training system loop between training, assessment

of training results in the field, and improvement of school training programs based on field evaluations, the feedback from field units of information to the training developers and trainers must be timely, continuous, and articulate.

The school's evaluators must elicit this information from the field commander via correspondence and visits in a way that is meaningful, timely and cost efficient. The field commander and his subordinates must devote their valuable, and frequently limited, time to the process of reporting deficiencies and problems to the trainer.

Neither trainer nor commander has an easy task since both are faced with interpreting the mission in terms of critical tasks and translating performance on the tasks into training strengths and weaknesses.

The Branch Training Team program initiated by TRADOC during the past year assists this process. But, just as school evaluators must systematically seek out the commander's opinion, so should the commanders assume a more aggressive role in reporting shortcomings to the school.

Training problems should be reported as soon as they manifest themselves, as opposed to delaying until the school personnel visit or otherwise contact the unit. Not only should weak-

USAISD Notes

nesses in school product performance or EPMS training materials be reported immediately to the school's Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization but so should changes in mission or utilization of specific Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) which affect the critical tasks or their priority.

In summary, effective evaluation and follow-through within the IPISD system requires a close link between field and school—a two-way channel through which information concerning mission performance and training materials flows constantly. If the school is made aware of problems and requirements as they arise, it can provide the kind of dynamic, flexible support that today's mission in the field requires to maintain optimum combat readiness.

The field commander is the most informed evaluator of personnel performance and materials. He should exercise this consumer role vigorously in a full and productive partnership with the Training and Doctrine Command and the appropriate schools within that command.

AN/ALQ-147A Specification Summary



IV11



IV12

INCREASE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS FOR
OV-10/RV-10 Mohawk and most fixed wing aircraft

SIZE (V1) (STANDALONE)

Length: 82-1/2 inches
Diameter: 14 inches

SIZE (V12) TRANSMITTER

Length: 54 inches
Diameter: 14 inches

WEIGHT (V1) (STANDALONE)

Less fuel: 156 pounds
With fuel: 235 pounds
OCU: 1 pound

WEIGHT (V12) TRANSMITTER

Less fuel: 137 pounds

INPUT POWER

Nominal: 280 watts, 28V dc
Maximum: 840 watts, 28V dc

CM Set Components



MODULATOR
TRANSMITTER CASE



PROTECTIVE COVERS



OPERATOR
CONTROL UNIT (OCU)



V12 TRANSMITTER AND OCU TRANSIT CASE



V11 FUEL TANK, OCU AND
TRANSMITTER TRANSIT CASE

Russian Language Transliteration

— or, should we have lunch at the ПЕСТОПАН ?

• — • • • • — • — • — — — • — —

by COL William E. Bridges,
USAR

Opposing Force (OPFOR) training has resulted in the increased exposure of Army personnel to various Russian language abbreviations and acronyms. For example, most intelligence specialists, and a good many troopers, know that БМТ is an acronym for one kind of Soviet armored personnel carrier.

The danger is that the English letters B, M, and P were selected to most closely approximate the Russian phonetics. This process, known as transliteration, is practiced without explanation in the use of English letters and digits to identify OPFOR units in

Printed Russian Character	English transliteration of character name	Approximate English phonetic equivalent of Russian character	Russian Manual Morse	US symbol represented by Morse
А а	ah	a, in father	• —	Aa
Б б	beh	b, in boy	— •••	Bb
В в	veh	v, in voice	• — —	Ww
Г г	geh	g, in go	• — •	Gg
Д д	deh	d, in dog	— ••	Dd
Е е	yeh	ye, in yet	•	Ee
Ё ё	yo	yo, in yolk		
Ж ж	zhch	s, in measure	••• —	Vv
З з	zeh	z, in zero	— — ••	Zz
И и	eeh	ee, in feel	••	Ii
Й й	ih	i, in bill	• — — —	Jj
К к	kah	k, in king	— •	Kk
Л л	ei	l, in lamp	• — ••	Ll
М м	em	m, in map	—	Mm
Н н	en	n, in note	— •	Nn
О о	oh	o, in goat	— — —	Oo
П п	peh	p, in peak	• — ••	Pp
Р р	err	r, in realism	• — •	Rr
С с	es	s, in less	•••	Ss
Т т	teh	t, in top	—	Tt
У у	ooch	oo, in moon	•• —	Uu
Ф ф	eff	f, in funny	•• •	Ff
Х х	kuh	ch, in Bach	••••	Hh
Ц ц	tsch	ts, in mats	• — ••	Cc
Ч ч	cheh	ch, in chair	— — — •	:
Ш ш	shch	sh, in she	— — — —	:
Щ щ	shchah	shch, in rash choice	— — • —	Qq
Ъ ъ	tvordi	hard sign—indicates hardness of preceding consonant		
Ы ы	zyak	soft sign—indicates softness of preceding consonant		
Ы ы	yerwee	ui, in fluid	— • — —	Vy
Ь ь	myakhi	soft sign—indicates softness of preceding consonant	— •• —	Xx
Э э	zyak			
Ю ю	eh	e, in letter	•• — — ••	?
Я я	you	yu, in yuletide	•• — —	&
	yah	ya, in yacht	• — • —	!!

- The two dots placed over the symbol for yeh change the sound to yo. While this is significant for certain pronunciation, the Ё ё is not considered a separate character by most scholars, nor is it accorded a separate manual Morse cipher.
- The Ъ (tvordi znyak) was eliminated by the decree of 1918, except as a mark separating a hard consonant from a soft vowel within a word. This assists pronunciation, but there is no manual Morse requirement.
- Like the tvordi znyak, these characters are never used at the beginning of a word; hence, the only time capital versions might be seen would be in a poster or newspaper headline using only capital letters.

Appendix B of FM 30-102.

While transliteration is justifiable for training purposes, some letters of the Russian language, while closely resembling their English counterparts, are pronounced quite differently. Additionally, some Russian characters have no English counterpart. The purpose of this article is to provide better understanding of the Russian alphabet through a discussion of transliteration.

With a passing knowledge of the Russian alphabet, intelligence specialists can look up words in a Russian dictionary. An understanding of transliteration techniques, however, can make certain words and terms recognizable on sight.

Unlike translation, the conversion of words from one language into another, transliteration converts only alphabetical sounds and is a helpful tool for nonlinguists.

While opinions concerning the complexity of the Russian language vary, most linguists agree that Russian is a basically phonetic language. While English letters may be pronounced in several different ways, letters of the Russian alphabet can be expected to have the same pronunciation wherever they appear. This characteristic aids in transliteration.

Historically, the church had considerable influence on the development of the Russian language. St. Cyril and St. Methodius, two 9th Century Greek Orthodox monks, devised a system of writing for Slavic converts in order to promote their religious teachings. Their training resulted in the resemblance of many Russian characters of the "Cyrillic alphabet" to Greek ones.

In 1710, Peter the Great simplified the Cyrillic alphabet, reducing the number of characters from 48 to 35 and introducing the use of Arabic numerals. These simplifications greatly promoted the standardization of printing type. As a result, newspapers were published and, in 1716, the first formal Army Regulations appeared.

After the Bolshevik Revolution, an edict of 10 October 1918 further reduced the characters to the present 31 (depending on the scholarly count), each representing one basic sound, with a few minor exceptions.

It should be noted that differences between alphabets are also reflected in the manual Morse code for the transmission of English and Russian messages. It must also be noted that the Soviets rarely block-print their letters in sharp contrast to practices taught in US elementary schools and encouraged by

US Government forms. Most Soviet documents will be either printed/typed, handwritten or a combination of both.

The Russian word for alphabet is transliterated "azbuka." The Russian alphabet appears below with English transliterations and an approximate phonetic equivalent as used in word constructions. The manual Morse code symbol for each character and the English characters represented by each Morse symbol (though this has nothing to do with transliteration) illustrate the Soviet adaptation of Morse code.

Three footnotes will further explain certain aspects of the "azbuka."

The preceding table outlines general practices for converting printed Russian into alphabetical sounds which can be managed by an English speaking individual. When transliterating, the same letter or letters should be substituted consistently although it is difficult to select a perfect phonetic match in every instance.

Now that we've been through the alphabet, it is easy to see that pektoran is not pronounced "peck-toe-pah" as you might once have thought but rather "res-toe-rah," Russian for restaurant. Not a bad place for lunch.

But we still have to worry about the EMII.

An Analyst's Guide

by MSG Larry H. Hodge

Anecdotes are an old soldier's pleasure. This one has been rattling around in my head for more than a decade and I suppose its time for telling has arrived.

In 1965, with Vietnam heating up, I got orders to report to Fort Hood where I would receive "a further confidential assignment." Even as a young SP4, I had been an intelligence analyst long enough to realize Fort Hood was only a stopping point. What kind of an outfit was I going to? More to the point, where would I wind up in Nam? Calls to Branch proved fruitless, confirming only that I would receive further clarifying orders at Fort Hood.

I was at Hood long enough to process in and process out of the Provisional HQ 319th MI Battalion and leave

for Oakland, CA. I had discovered that the 319th MI Battalion would be literally "shipped out" to Fort Shafter, HI: my happiness made the SS Patrick seem like a cruise ship.

Fort Shafter was a tropical paradise but we were too busy trying to get squared away to really notice. We discovered the battalion would support HQ USARPAC by providing intelligence concerning a number of Asian nations. We had to get operational in a hurry.

The battalion commander held a commander's call at the post theater shortly after we arrived at Shafter. Lieutenant Colonel Daniel O. Graham wasn't tall or spectacular but he had a command presence that struck all who were gathered in that theater. I am willing to bet that all of the officers and enlisted men present for his commander's call remember some of the words he passed on to them.

Colonel Graham began with an expected and brief welcome. He quickly got to the meat of his remarks and what stands out in my mind are the comments he made about analysts. He told us that each of us had responsibilities he must personally shoulder. As ana-

lysts, it was our duty to seek the truth. Analysis, the colonel said, had nothing to do with rank: "When you make an analysis, stick by it until you are proven wrong. If you are proven wrong, then back up, take stock and begin again. Under no circumstances should rank interfere with or detract from intelligence analysis."

Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham retired a few years back after serving as the Director of DIA. He had a sterling career with Military Intelligence and the US Army. General Graham has probably forgotten the speech he gave to his newly formed MI battalion at Fort Shafter. I, for one, have not.

As an analyst, I have had to "back up, take stock and begin again" quite a few times. General Graham motivated the men of the 319th to do a fine job. As I write this, I am certain that, like me, many analysts' careers were changed by their presence in a post theater on Fort Shafter, HI, one morning in 1965.

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The Chinese People's Liberation Army: Ground Forces

by CPT Gary W. Banker

Introduction

The ground forces of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) parallel US Army, Army Reserve, National Guard and Border Patrol organizations.

Like the US Army, the PLA is one of the few armies in the world which is older than the nation it serves. It dates to August 1927¹ when elements of the 24th Division of the Nationalist Eleventh Army mutinied against Chiang Kai-shek. Survivors of this mutiny and other units became the First Workers' and Peasants' Army, a force which grew to an army of several million at the time of victory in 1949.

The Korean War

While still consolidating control of China and preparing to conquer Taiwan, the PRC entered the Korean War against the forces of the United Nations. During the Korean War, the PLA began to modernize its organization and equipment with the aid of the Soviet Union. It also discovered that tactics which had won the civil war would not suffice against a modern, well-trained, well-equipped army. Thus began a struggle between those wishing to modernize and professionalize the PLA and those who wished to retain the revolutionary model of the civil war. By the late 1950s, modernization was halted as the PLA abolished ranks and insignia and returned to the revolutionary model.

In 1962, border skirmishes with India turned into heavy fighting along two sections of the Sino-Indian border. The Chinese attacked, surprising the Indians and overwhelming Indian units in the east. In the west, the Chinese advance was much slower. After routing the Indian Army in the east and consolidating their gains, the Chinese announced a ceasefire and withdrew, retaining the disputed area in the west which was known as the Aksai Chin.

When Mao Tse Tung plunged China into the turmoil of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) in 1965, the PLA main force units at first remained aloof to the struggle. When the GPCR got out of hand, however, the PLA was called in to restore order.



Eventually, PLA units ran most of the country. In the early 1970s, the civil government and the Communist Party regained control.

Mao's death allowed proponents of modernization to gain the upper hand in the struggle to acquire modern military hardware, increase professionalism and study modern conventional military operations.

In February 1979, the PLA invaded Vietnam, advancing a short distance before withdrawing. The PLA and the government are trying to correct shortcomings highlighted by the war.

The PLA and Chinese Society

The PLA differs from western armies. The western ideal is an army with a professional officer corps remaining outside politics and concerning itself exclusively with military matters. The PLA, on the other hand, is heavily involved in Chinese society:

Thus, in contrast with the western model of military institutions, which stresses a high degree of professional specialization, organizational differentiation, and political neutrality, the Chinese model as developed by Mao, is marked by the multifunctionality, structural diffuseness, and politicization of the military.²

These characteristics of the Chinese model, especially the politicization of the PLA, stem primarily from the Communist Party. The PLA, however, shares several characteristics with the traditional armies of Imperial China³ which, like the PRC, considered a close

relationship between the army and the state ideal. Like the PLA, Imperial China also lacked the western professional officer. The large militia and the farms run by PLA units parallel the Imperial ideal of a part-time conscript army which would be self-supporting in peacetime. Furthermore, in China today, the production of heavy equipment is dispersed throughout the country, effectively preventing military region commanders from producing all their own heavy equipment and becoming warlords, as in the 19th century.

The PLA is controlled by the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Communist Party. In the government, the Ministry of National Defense is primarily responsible for administrative matters. The CMC runs the PLA through three departments controlling operational, political and logistic matters. Adopted during and after the Korean War, this structure indicates a heavy PLA dependence upon Soviet organization.⁴

The CMC exercises operational command over main force units through the General Staff Department (GSD). The GSD controls the armies and the large independent units and directs the seven service arms: artillery, armor, signal, engineer, antichemical warfare, railway forces and second artillery (strategic missile forces).

The CMC exercises political control over the PLA through the General Political Department (GPD) which supervises party committees down to the regimental level. In wartime, the GPD would be in charge of political and psychological warfare and the handling of prisoners of war.⁵

The GPD also exercises political control through the political officers serving in all units down to company level. The responsibilities of the political officer include political education, military and political discipline, officer-enlisted relations, army-civilian relations, party work and policy, troop morale and troop fighting ability.⁶ While political officers in the Soviet Army are installed to watch over the commander, in the PLA, their main role is to indoctrinate the troops. While the commander and the political officer sometimes struggle against one another, the system has worked well. Disputes between the two are sup-

posed to be settled by the unit's party committee.

The General Rear Services Department (GRSD) is responsible for administrative and logistical matters, including military industries. Military production is determined by the CMC and the GRSD together. The GRSD is also divided into several subdepartments covering areas such as barracks and equipment.

The People's Republic of China is divided into 11 military regions (MR) controlling and supporting most units within their boundaries. The military regions are further subdivided into military districts (MD) conforming to provincial boundaries.

The ground forces are divided into main forces and regional forces. Mao's concept of the organization of the PLA follows:

This army is powerful because of its division into two parts, the main forces and the regional forces, with the former available for operations in any region whenever necessary and the latter concentrating on defending their own localities and attacking the enemy there in cooperation with the local militia and the self-defense corps.⁷

Different sources quote varying figures for the number of divisions and their locations. The following figures are from **Defense & Foreign Affairs Handbook** and enumerate divisions. The numbers of divisions are totals for the groups of military regions.⁸

Military Regions	Main Force	Regional Force
Shenyang, Beijing	55	25
Lanzhou, Xinjiang	20	5
Chengdu, Kunming	18	8
Jinan, Fuzhou,		
Nanjing	28	18
Wuhan	15	11

Control of Main Force Units

The main force units are controlled by the central government. They move infrequently and receive administrative support from their respective military regions. The number of main force units, by type, from **Defense & Foreign Affairs Handbook** is 121 infantry, 12 armored, three airborne, one mountain, 40 artillery and 15 railroad and construction divisions and 150 independent regiments.⁹

Main force divisions are organized into approximately 40 armies sometimes referred to as corps. An army

has a relatively standard organization, usually three infantry divisions, three artillery regiments and three armor regiments. It may have as many as 46,000–51,000 men although some armies stationed in areas with more difficult terrain have fewer people and less heavy equipment. The more modern units are stationed primarily in the Shenyang and Beijing military regions bordering the Soviet Union. Most combat engineer and tank regiments are main force units. Main force units have moved infrequently in the past although this may be changing: elements of 22 armies were moved during the GPCR.¹⁰ Present PLA policy requires the periodic relocation of units and personnel but this policy has run into problems and delays.

Regional forces are controlled by the military region or district in which they are located and are heavily involved in local affairs. During the GPCR, regional force units usually defended the local party apparatus against the Red Guards. In peacetime, regional force units are widely scattered and have little time for military training above the individual or small-unit level.

The regional forces have roughly 70 divisions and between 130 and 230 independent regiments. Smaller and lighter than main force units, they have light artillery and antitank weapons but no tanks.

The Militia

The militia was originally an elite PLA auxiliary and a pool for manpower because China had no organized reserves. It became a mass organization in the late 1950s. Today, "... The militia is a paramilitary and production force organized around occupational enterprises."¹¹ It is a part-time, fully voluntary organization organized around civilian enterprises and theoretically controlled by civilian party committees. Only those with a bad class background (such as persons from former landlord families) are rejected for service in the militia which numbers from 44 million to 250 million persons. At least 75 percent of these are common militia. Receiving almost no military training, the common militia would serve as a labor and manpower pool in war.

The basic militia consists of 15 to 20 million people receiving some individual and small-unit training. It is composed of personnel between the ages of 18 and 40 (including very few women) who would assist the PLA in wartime.

Within the basic militia is the armed militia with seven to 10 million politically screened men from 18 to 25. The armed militia is responsible, in peacetime,

for coast and border patrols and would conduct rear area security and local defense in war.

Since 1973, emphasis has been placed on the formation of an urban militia with more sophisticated weapons than its rural counterpart. The urban militia trains to defend against air attacks, tanks, paratroops and nuclear and chemical attacks.¹²

While the militia is organized into units from squad to division, the company is the basic unit and larger units are administrative only. The armed militia is thought to be organized into 75 divisions and an unknown number of regiments.

The Production and Construction Corps (PCC) is a full-time para-military work force of some four million personnel organized into units up to division. It is supervised by the GRSD. PCC personnel receive the same pay as those in the PLA, and its high-ranking officers are all PLA officers on active duty. Formed in 1950, the PCC was enlarged in 1969 with the forced relocation of urban dwellers.

The PCC works in politically sensitive areas, mostly along the borders where it has constructed fortifications. Its main function is to develop areas such as Xinjiang which could not otherwise be practically developed. State farms in Xinjiang and the USSR border area are also part of the defense system.

Everyone in the PCC goes through basic military training and each regiment has one fully-armed company. The PCC falls somewhere between the armed militia and the regional forces in military effectiveness.

Military Service

The Military Service Law of 1955 made all males liable for service at age 18.¹³ This requirement was also established in the 1978 constitution:

It is the lofty duty of every citizen to defend the motherland and resist aggression. It is the honorable obligation of citizens to perform military service and to join the militia according to law.¹⁴

Only about 10 percent of those becoming eligible for service each year are called up, so the PLA can set very high health and political standards. Furthermore, because service in the PLA is seen as a pathway to success in civilian life, many are eager to serve. Terms of service range from three to five years according to branch of service. Women account for some two percent of the total.

Quotas for recruits are sent down



from the military districts. Regional forces supervise the selection of recruits and demobilization of veterans. The PLA releases roughly 500,000 veterans annually. The government finds jobs for these veterans, often in areas where their skills are needed.

After entering the service, recruits go through basic training at a training division at the headquarters of the military region. Following basic training, most soldiers go on to their units, although a few attend technical schools first. Main force units follow a 10-month training cycle, spending two months each spring absorbing new recruits.

More emphasis has been placed lately on antitank, antiaircraft, anti-airborne and Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) training. The increased importance of military rather than political training is suggested by the use of the "Hardbone Sixth Company," a unit emphasizing military proficiency, as an example for the PLA.

The Regulation on the Service of Officers, enacted in 1955, dictated ranks, promotion and pay, for officers in the

PLA¹⁵ until new regulations were published after the Sino-Vietnamese War.

In the PLA, officers are commissioned from the ranks. Candidates are selected first for political reliability and then for military ability. Spending 18 months at a military academy run by the military region, they study science, languages and ideology. Promotions are slow and vacancies are filled by party committees. Officers tend to stay in the same unit for long periods of time, engendering esprit-de-corps, stability and institutional memory as well as stagnation, clique formation, and a lack of cross-training.

All ranks and insignia of rank have been abolished and only the terms "commander," "commissar" and "fighter" are used. Officers can still be distinguished by having more pockets, better tailoring and leather shoes.

The PLA instituted two colleges for officers before 1949. Following victory in the civil war, it set up a series of military schools. By 1962, there were at least 27 military academies, many with several branches.¹⁶ Most were closed

during the 1960s. In 1977, three military academies were reopened and staff colleges have been re-established in each of the military regions. The PLA has probably re-established the National Staff College and a National War College. Since the Sino-Vietnamese War, officers are receiving more training in science and technology.

Strategy and Doctrine

The PLA has three sources of strategy and doctrine: traditional Chinese thought, Maoist theory and modern, western doctrine. The works of Sun Tzu and other ancient Chinese military writers are still studied.

There are two views on the ideal form of defense for China. Mao's "yielding strategy" is based on his view of Chinese historical experience and trades space for time:

Preserve oneself and destroy the enemy.
Deceive and surprise the enemy.

Exhaust and attack the enemy.
Attack weak points first and defeat one by one.¹⁷

Professional military people have urged a "forward strategy" since the Korean War, when the PLA absorbed Soviet tactical doctrine and organization. Forward strategy uses the same four principles as yielding strategy, but emphasizes the prevention of an invasion of China rather than the absorption of the enemy within China. The forward strategy seeks to avoid extensive war-time damage to China, especially from nuclear weapons, but it requires modernization of China's armed forces. The PLA is attempting to improve its capability to fight a modern war. It has reportedly used nuclear tests in Xinjiang to conduct combat training under actual nuclear conditions.¹⁷ There are frequent maneuvers using NBC defense equipment.

The PLA faces shortages limiting its capabilities, especially given China's size. Tank divisions have no tank transporters, hence no long-distance road mobility. The PLA can airlift at most only one of its airborne divisions. Its skill in large-unit operations involving combined arms and coordination of air-ground operations is limited but improving. The PLA can operate large armies in the field and engaged in coalition warfare with North Korea during the Korean War.

The Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 indicated how the PLA may organize and fight a future war. Primarily main force troops from 10 of the 11 military regions were used. The bulk of the troops came from southern China and regional force and militia units performed support roles. A Front was formed to prosecute the war with the commander of the Guangzhou military region as Front Commander and the commander of the Kunming military region as Deputy Commander. At the same time, a Front was formed of the four military regions bordering the Soviet Union.¹⁹

The PLA used tactics used in previ-

ous wars along with massive artillery barrages and tank infiltration. It also attempted to win over the local people through political warfare and did not move beyond the range of its relatively immobile SAM's.

Organizational Difficulties

The war revealed several organizational problems. Coordinating operations along the wide front proved difficult and there were many problems with the logistic support system. Since the Sino-Vietnamese War, the PLA has been devoting more time to combined arms training.

The mission of the PLA is to defend China and help the Communist Party rule China, but there has been some change in its role as evidenced by China's 1975 and 1978 constitutions. Article 15 of the 1975 constitution begins as follows:

The Chinese People's Liberation Army is at all times a fighting force, and simultaneously a working force and a production force.²⁰

This statement has been stricken from the 1978 constitution, leaving no mention of PLA working force or production force roles.

While the 1975 constitution stated that the mission of the PLA was "... to guard against subversion and aggression by imperialism, social imperialism, and their lackeys,"²¹ the 1978 constitution deleted "imperialism" (i.e., the US) while retaining "social imperialism" (i.e., the USSR) as the main enemy. It is estimated that at least 72 divisions are facing the Soviet Union.²²

In February 1977, four national conferences on defense modernization passed resolutions calling for modernization of the PLA to be carried out along with the modernization of the other sectors of the nation. The 1978 constitution states that China will devote major efforts to the modernization of the PLA, although economic development must precede large-scale

military modernization. China's large land area requires modern, conventional forces, increased tactical and strategic mobility and better communications, especially by satellite.

The PLA has sought, worldwide, equipment and technology which it can duplicate or improve. Priorities for ground force modernization include antitank missiles, improved armor capability and an improved infantry fighting vehicle.²³ The PRC has signed agreements to buy HOT, Milan and Crotale missiles from France and has ordered field artillery computers from a British company. The Chinese have also attempted to buy small arms from an Austrian company. The PLA is adding 600-800 tanks yearly to its current inventory of 10,000.

Modernization will extend beyond the procurement of equipment to greater professionalism and discipline. The PLA is establishing more institutions for professional officer education. It has conducted studies of German World War II victories, Soviet operations against the Japanese in 1945, the October War of 1973 and the 1975 campaign in Vietnam which have convinced it of the viability of conventional war and the advantages of mechanized forces against nonmechanized infantry armies in many areas where the PLA may fight.²⁴ The PLA has determined that modernization is imperative.

Conclusion

With its organization a product of Chinese history and the ideas of Mao, the PLA differs from Western armies. Nevertheless, the concept of a mobile main force supported by regional forces and the local militia was proved in the civil war, and the PLA has remained heavily involved in the political life of China.

Although modernization and professionalization were all but halted during the late 1950s, advocates of modernization have predominated since the death of Mao. The PLA, including the ground forces, is on the road to modernization.

Footnotes

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(continued on page 28)

The Fulda: Is It Really a Gap?

by CPT Carl E. Daschke

Introduction

Since the end of World War II, the Army has been imbued with what I term: "The Fulda Gap Syndrome," a long-standing love affair with the Fulda approach; simulations are based upon all or part of the "Gap," scenarios, military advantages of the approach abound. Best-selling books have described the Fulda Gap as the major approach into central West Germany.

Unfortunately, we may have become entrenched in our thinking, relying upon historical approaches which were valid 20 years ago, but which are no longer capable of supporting the maneuver requirements of a large scale, modernized and mechanized Warsaw Pact thrust into Germany.

Considerations which may have led to the prominence of the Fulda approach include:

- It is the shortest distance from the Deutsche Democratic Republic (DDR) border to the city of Frankfurt, a prime military objective for the Warsaw Pact forces.
- It has been a historic route of land movement to central West Germany.

A reevaluation of these factors in light of what is actually "on the ground" today unquestionably costs the Fulda much of its military significance as a viable attack route into the Central Army Group (CENTAG) area.

Terrain

While the Fulda Gap approach is the shortest, most direct route to Frankfurt from the East German border, a closer examination of the terrain which must be traversed reveals several significant mobility problems. For example, the vast majority of the approach, particularly from the border westward for the first 50 kilometers, offers very poor trafficability. The approach tends to be comprised of series after series of severe cross-compartments which will canalize movement and limit westward traffic to existing road networks. This problem is further complicated by the fact that, in addition to military traffic, the road network will undoubtedly be clogged by fleeing refugee traffic. Cross-country movement will be further restricted by the large, densely wooded areas comprising much of the Fulda approach.

Urbanization

West Germany's massive urban explosion since the end of World War II has affected the Fulda area as well. Much of the terrain which had been previously judged trafficable is now choked by the urban sprawl of German towns and cities. Thus, while urbanization is the rule for most of Germany, the factors of sprawling towns and cities, densely wooded areas, and continuous cross-compartments mark the Fulda approach as a very unlikely candidate for rapid movements of massive armored and mechanized infantry forces.

While the Fulda Gap approach is the shortest, most direct route to Frankfurt from the East German border, a closer examination of the terrain which must be traversed reveals several significant mobility problems.

Military Changes in the Past 30 Years

The Fulda approach begins to lose its intrinsic significance when one considers the changes which have occurred during the last 30 years within modern armies. During and prior to the Second World War, the armies of Europe were primarily infantry-oriented. Even the heavily armored forces of the Nazi Army relied on infantry forces. Since World War II, however, a far greater emphasis has been placed on mechanization. As a result, terrain which may have been considered trafficable in the past now presents an entirely new set of problems. Modern armies are more terrain-dependent than ever before; they can move farther and faster, but must suffer the constraints of the terrain's ability or inability to support movement. While the Fulda could support infantry forces and small armored forces, it is doubtful that it can adequately support the highly mechanized armed forces of the Warsaw Pact.

The Significance of Frankfurt

Finally, the military significance of the Frankfurt urban area is as suspect as the other considerations. Although Frankfurt may represent a significant political objective as one of the largest West German cities, there is very little military significance to Frankfurt. The obvious military objective within the CENTAG areas lies far to the west of Frankfurt in the Kaiserslautern/Saarbrücken/Zweibrücken area. Presently, several tactical airbases, logistical areas, stock storage areas, and special weapons depots (in general USAREUR's "bread basket") all lie in the general vicinity of the Kaiserslautern/Saarbrücken area. Take out the "bread basket" and you have seriously crippled USAREUR's ability to wage war.

An attacking force, moving along the Fulda Gap with the mission of securing that "bread basket," would be required to literally "slug" its way through massive urban sprawl which Frankfurt and surrounding suburbs of Wiesbaden and Darmstadt create. An attacking force could easily be bogged down in this urban area for an indefinite period of time. Bypassing it would be difficult, and would require that the attacking force travel a considerable distance northward before clearing the city's urban sprawl.

If the attacking force elected to fight through Frankfurt, it would be required to continue the attack further southwest over a mass of severe escarpments, more cross-compartmented terrain, and heavily wooded areas prior to reaching the Kaiserslautern objective.

If Not Fulda, Where?

These considerations, and the fact that the Fulda approach is astride some of the most defensible terrain in Central Europe, support my belief that the Fulda has lost its significance as a major approach into CENTAG. Where, then, would an attack into the CENTAG occur and what would be the events that would lead to such an attack?

For the past several years, the Soviet military hierarchy has preached that any future conflict should be of short duration and extreme violence. Using a surprise attack scenario, the Soviet military will be able to take maximum advantage of its speed, firepower and surprise to literally overwhelm the


defenses of any potential adversary. I believe that the advantages realized from this type of conflict far outweigh any disadvantages.

Currently, the forces which comprise the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) are capable of initiating an attack on NATO with little or no prior warning and preparation. Under a surprise attack scenario, the Soviet forces would be in a position to maximize the inherent inflexibilities of NATO, particularly those of USAREUR. An example of some of the inflexibilities of USAREUR which could be rapidly exploited include:

- Malpositioning of USAREUR forces with respect to their particular general defensive positions requires that USAREUR combat units road march for several hours when moving from their garrisons to General Defensive Position (GDP) locations.
- The forward defense positioning of US Forces creates a significant gap between the defending maneuver divisions and the bulk of USAREUR's supply facilities.
- Current defensive positioning requires REFORGER-type forces to establish defense in depth; unfortunately, movement of those forces from CONUS will require days, perhaps even weeks.
- A massive number of non-combatants and military dependents which would choke the military transport system to a point of ineffectiveness. Additionally, the military dependents' plight would pose a serious morale problem for our forces.

These, plus other intangibles, such as difference in tactical concepts between the US and its NATO allies, indicate that the Soviet use of speed and surprise may serve as the keystone for winning future conflicts.

Although it would appear unlikely that the Soviet Union in concert with her Warsaw Pact allies, would conduct an all-out attack on NATO during the next few years, it is possible that the United States and the Soviet Union could be drawn into a Central European conflict as the result of actions in other parts of the world. For example, the Middle East is an extremely unstable "hot spot." Should Soviet expansion efforts continue in the Middle East, a direct confrontation may occur. We, unfortunately, would have no other option if the Soviets moved into Iran (on whatever pretense) than to safeguard our national interests. A Mid-East conflict will most certainly spread beyond the confines of the Mediterranean into southern and



central Europe.

Were world events to lead to an attack into West Germany, I believe that the best avenue of approach (under a surprise or limited scenario) rests with the Gottingen Corridor, Meiningen and the Cheb approaches. The object under a limited attack scenario would be to get as many Pact forces into West Germany as quickly as possible. The lead echelons would make every effort to bypass USAREUR forces in an effort to seize important divisional and Army objectives. Under this scenario, the northern areas play a very small role; the historically important seaports lose their prominence in favor of logistical centers which store USAREUR and NATO's war stocks. The name of this game is to punch deep into NATO's vulnerable rear area; then, if necessary, negotiate a withdrawal to predetermined points or continue the attack to the sea.

If the Soviets believe negotiation to be the most viable option — NATO would undoubtedly be given one of two choices: realignment of the East-West political borders or a strategic nuclear exchange. I would think that, up to this point, neither side would have employed nuclear weapons. NATO would, of course, be reluctant to turn Central Europe into a nuclear wasteland. The resulting impact is that a significant portion of West Germany's industrial base and population are currently located within 50 kilometers of the FRG/DDR border.

The Gottingen Corridor/Meiningen/Cheb approaches previously mentioned will support this type of scenario. Movement by Soviet forces in support of a surprise attack will be directed towards the major military objectives in an effort to negate the defenders' ability to sustain military operations.

The Gottingen Corridor is the quick-

est avenue of approach into the city of Bonn and westward to the Atlantic Ocean. The Soviet objective will be the rapid dispersal of the Bonn government and the capture of the industrial Rhur area with a massive drive through the Benelux area to the ocean, severing lines of communications between the US and its allies. The elimination of the Rhur area would seriously hamper West Germany's ability to provide her forces with the necessary military hardware to wage their defensive campaigns.

The Meiningen approach, which begins in the vicinity of the town of Meiningen, East Germany travels southwest past Wurzberg, spilling out into the Uffinhiem basin before turning west toward the Kaiserslautern triangle, affords the most trafficable routes to possible objectives in the vicinity of Kaiserslautern. This approach has in the past been somewhat ignored in favor of the Fulda, even though it is comprised primarily of open, rolling terrain rarely interrupted by urban areas or constricting terrain. Natural and man-made obstacles are easily bypassed; the major obstacles are the Main and Rhine rivers, both crossable whether by existing bridges or spanned at numerous suitable crossing sites. The Meiningen's open, rolling terrain, is capable of supporting several armor or motorized rifle divisions in the attack's

The concept of allowing elements of the East German Army to attack along the Fulda is an extremely important one. It provides the Deutsches Democratic Republic with a significant political objective in the CENTAG area while allowing the Soviets to control the East German forces by sandwiching the Germans between two mainline Soviet armies.

first echelon.

The Cheb approach, which originates in Czechoslovakia, runs westward from the political border to Numburg, eventually spilling into the Uffinhiem basin. There, the Cheb approach forces could join with the Meiningen approach forces. This is key should the main attack into the Central Army Group (CENTAG) area be directed, and I believe that it will, toward the

Kaiserslautern/Wiesbaden area.

Conclusion

In view of the considerations I have discussed, I believe the Soviets will commit their central Group Soviet Forces, Germany units along the Göttingen approach, Meiningen, and Cheb approaches. The Soviets will leave the Fulda to the East German forces. The concept of allowing elements of the East German Army to attack along the Fulda is an extremely important one. It provides the Deutsches Democratic Republic with a significant political objective in the CENTAG area while allowing the Soviets to control the East German forces by sandwiching the Germans between two mainline Soviet armies.

We have observed a dramatic training and modernization of equipment program within the East German Army during the past decade. Currently, the DDR Army is second in terms of combat potential, only to the USSR; I believe that it is foolhardy to relegate this modern force to second or third echelon roles or worse yet—decided among the armies of the GSFG. Politically and militarily, the East Germans are capable of contributing significantly to the Warsaw Pact Attack—besides, relegation of the Fulda to the East Germans will free main-force Soviet units to more profitable approaches.

Development of the Quick Response Multicolor Printer Underway

COL Daniel L. Lycan, Commander and Director of the US Army Engineer Topographic Laboratories (ETL), Fort Belvoir, VA, recently announced that development of an advanced prototype xerographic color map reproduction system, the Quick Response Multicolor Printer (QRMP), will officially begin. After several months of negotiations, representative from both Xerox Corporation and the federal government agreed on a \$6.4 million contract calling for the development of this system.

Experts at ETL, originators of the QRMP, believe that by using color xerographic reproduction techniques, it will be possible to meet military requirements for the quick production of high quality, cost effective, multicolor

reproductions of topographic maps, terrain intelligence information, overlays for existing maps and multicolor overprinting onto conventional maps.

Development of the QRMP is a significant breakthrough in mapping reproduction technology. The addition of a laser scanner has improved the "dry copying" process by making possible the high resolution necessary for map reproduction. New laser technology will provide greater reliability and simplification, making the QRMP easier to repair and maintain.

It is estimated that the QRMP will produce 24" by 30" maps at a speed greater than one map per minute with one run through the printer. A single-color press now in use in the field requires about eight hours to print 500

five-color maps. Furthermore, the QRMP will weigh significantly less than current presses, be mobile enough to move from place to place, and require less manpower and a lower skill level to operate and maintain.

Fred Myers, QRMP project engineer at ETL, estimates the prototype, which will be built by the Electro-Optical Systems Division of Xerox, Pasadena, CA, will be completed by mid-1983.

Xerox was represented at the signing by Clifford I. Cummings, from their Washington, DC office. Robert A. Payne, contracting officer for the US Army Mobility Equipment Research and Development Command, executed the contract for the government.

Physical Security Officer: The Unavoidable Extra Duty

by CPT Jonathan M. House

Introduction

You have just reported in as S2 of a combat battalion, and you're eager to introduce intelligence training in garrison and Opposing Forces doctrine in the field. Yet your first interview with the battalion executive officer centers on preparing the company arms rooms for an Annual General Inspection, and your first order from the battalion commander is to investigate a barracks larceny which occurred over the weekend. You are suddenly confronted with an "additional duty" which will threaten to consume all of your time: Physical Security Officer.

In vain you cite **FM 101-5, Staff Officer's Field Manual**, which makes "Maintenance of Discipline, Law, and Order" the responsibility of the G1 or S1.¹ In a peacetime garrison army, the vast majority of battalion and brigade S2's are expected to coordinate the Physical Security and Crime Prevention Programs of their organizations. In many cases, your credibility as an intelligence officer will be a direct function of your success in these "irrelevant" extra duties. The S3, XO and CO will hardly listen to you until you have eliminated the headaches of physical security.

Physical Security Officer

Like many other additional duties, Physical Security Officer involves a mass of details which vary from unit to unit and post to post. This article will therefore concentrate on the basic principles, functions and publications of this subject.

Perhaps the only similarity between tactical intelligence and physical security is that in both areas, the basic function of the battalion S2 is to acquire and distribute useful information. Thus, the first goal or principle must be to establish such a flow of information concerning the requirements of physical security. In addition to the basic regulations discussed in this article, you will need to read local and major command directives and your unit's existing Physical Security Plan.

Because each unit's security problems are complex and unique, you must establish a close working relationship with Physical Security Officers (PSO's) and Military Police Inspectors

at the headquarters above your own. Whether directly or through the chain of PSO's, the inspectors who actually conduct Annual General Inspections in this area should be consulted about physical security problems which are not clearly addressed in regulations. After you have familiarized yourself with your battalion's motor parks, arms rooms and similar sensitive areas, request an MP physical security courtesy inspection to identify weaknesses and to discuss unit security problems.

Armed with this information, you should be able to conduct your own inspections and assistance visits in your subordinate units. Such visits should be conducted as often as other duties will permit but at least once quarterly. These visits will provide an appreciation of local security requirements in the battalion and increase awareness of and attention to physical security in general.

If you do not have time to inspect an entire company, pick a critical area such as weapons security. Remember that the commander of a subordinate company must be informed of your visit and findings. Whenever you find a deficiency in a unit, you should give its commander clear recommendations for resolving the situation. If the battalion commander and executive officer allow you any freedom of action as a PSO, deal with minor omissions and deficiencies on the spot; few company commanders will thank you for making trivial details a matter of record and reply-by-endorsement.

Another aspect of acquiring and distributing information is to make contact with personnel who repair different security barriers. To cite only two examples, you need to know who maintains your arms room alarm system (if any), and who can repair locks and security containers which refuse to open or close.

A second principle to bear in mind is to balance physical security needs against mission accomplishment. Although you and the Military Police may be able to devise all manner of barriers, guards and procedures to improve your physical security, the cost in materiel and unit efficiency may well be prohibitive.²

The MP physical security inspector's duty is to identify and recommend remedies for every possible weakness in your unit. Part of your duty as a battal-

ion PSO is to identify and if possible minimize those measures which consume so much time and equipment that the unit cannot perform its daily missions. In practice, most members of your organization will take short-cuts or simply ignore procedures which seem time-consuming and inconvenient, so there is little point in trying to enforce such requirements outside of highly sensitive areas. Instead, you and the physical security inspectors from higher headquarters should seek a compromise which fulfills requirements and provides genuine security with minimum interference in unit operations. Once such a solution is reached, put it in writing to preclude misunderstanding and to record the situation for future occasions. If you cannot arrive at a solution, you must raise the problem with your commander, providing alternatives and recommendations so that the commander can make an informed decision. Above all, you should reflect carefully before adding additional requirements to those of higher headquarters.

A third point to bear in mind is that physical security is more than fences and guards. Maintaining continuous custody of and responsibility for government property is equally important, so that such property is accounted for and available at all times. For example, the strongest arms room in the world will not prevent loss or theft of weapons if the personnel who have access to that arms room do not maintain a chain of custody to determine who was responsible at the time the weapons disappeared. Similarly, the soldier with the keys to a supply room or tactical vehicle effectively controls that room or vehicle, and may damage or misappropriate government property. Thus hand receipts and key control procedures are as critical to physical security as the walls and locks used to protect property. As a physical security officer, you need to be the battalion expert on key control, and should be familiar with the supply responsibility procedures in your organization. Similarly, you should coordinate with the logistics officer and property book officer so that you can assist each other on the security of weapons and other sensitive items. Everyone who has control of government property must understand the responsibility to account for and physi-

cally secure such property.³

A fourth principle is that any set of procedures or protective barriers is only as strong as its weakest link. You must look at the entire system protecting a particular sensitive item or area within your unit. A stout lock is worthless if the hasp it hangs on is fragile and poorly secured to the door, or if the door itself can be taken off its hinges because no one spot-welded the hinge pins. Similarly, an elaborate system of key box, access roster and sign-out registers will not protect your vehicles if the key which unlocks that key box is casually transferred between dispatchers or left unattended in public view. In examining a particular area or type of equipment, try to put two locks and two series of barriers between the intruder and the equipment. In reviewing key control or similar procedures, trace the entire process over a 24-hour period to identify any logical weaknesses or omissions.

More than "Command Emphasis"

Finally, the entire chain of command must be involved in physical security. This does not merely mean "command emphasis," the glib solution suggested for every problem in the Army. It does mean that every supervisor must understand and enforce the physical security plan of the battalion. You, the PSO, cannot be everywhere, so you must have the willing and intelligent cooperation of company officers and NCOs who are too frequently the greatest offenders of physical security regulations. The first sergeant trying to get the company going at 6 a.m. may feel he does not have time to conduct a joint inventory and transfer of control of the arms room, so he tosses the key ring to the armorer and hopes that nothing is found missing. Remember that such violations are even more likely if security procedures seem irrational and unnecessarily complex.

The best way to achieve cooperation is through the physical security officer, crime prevention officer and key custodian in each battery, company, or troop. If possible, these three additional duties should be given to the same platoon leader in each unit, to provide a single point of contact on physical security matters for unit members and for you. Do not, however, put the entire burden of unit security on this officer. He or she, like you, has many other obligations and duties to perform. In fact, many commanders will give their physical security officers another major additional duty, such as supply or maintenance officer, in the mistaken belief that physical security is a minor matter

except during Annual General Inspections. What the company PSO can do is to provide an extra set of eyes, an informed and conscious observer who views all company activities with security requirements in the back of his or her mind. You should therefore keep company PSO's informed of all changes in these requirements.

Functional Responsibilities

With these basic concepts in mind, we can consider your functional responsibilities. Physical security is actually a set of additional duties, each with its own basic regulation and predictable problems.

Of all these functional areas, none is more complex or more visible than the security of arms and ammunition. **Army Regulation 190-11, Physical Security of Weapons, Ammunition, and Explosives**, provides elaborate standards for the structure of arms rooms, inventory of weapons and of arms room keys, issue and turn-in procedures and the securing of arms in the field. The February 1979 Change 5 to **AR 710-2, Materiel Management for Using Units, Support Units, and Installations**, provides for a different and sometimes conflicting set of inventories, and for this reason you should consult with your property book officer and Military Police Physical Security Inspectors to ensure that your arms room Standing Operating Procedures will satisfy both requirements.⁴

We have already noted the frequent failure to inventory and transfer the arms room correctly when arms room keys change hands. In addition, there are two problems common to many Army companies. Paragraph 2-13b, **AR 190-11**, requires that all personnel authorized unaccompanied access to an arms room must have a favorable National Agency Check (NAC) or Entrance National Agency Check (ENTNAC), and that local police and personnel files will be reviewed every three years to identify derogatory information about these individuals.⁵ In other words, the company commander, first sergeant, armorer and anyone else with access to the arms room keys or to the container where those keys are secured (company safe, etc.) must undergo an investigation equal to that required for a "Secret" security clearance. Most senior NCO's and virtually all officers have such investigations in their records, but armorers are a different story. Even if the armorer has a NAC or ENTNAC, he or she may well have Article 15, UCMJ, proceedings or other derogatory information in personnel records. Moreover, when an armorer is suddenly relieved or transferred, there may be a long

delay before you can complete the necessary investigation. You should therefore persuade company commanders to designate several alternate armorers who can be investigated and trained prior to the primary armorer's departure.

The other common problem in weapons security is the processing of new personnel into a company. Assignment of a weapon, issuance of a weapons receipt card (DA 3749), and briefing on security of arms and ammunition should be an integral part of in-processing. If these required actions are not done on a daily basis, unannounced physical security inspections will produce major deficiencies.

A second major aspect of unit physical security is Crime Prevention. **AR 190-31, Department of the Army Crime Prevention Program**, requires the appointment of a Crime Prevention Officer at every level down to and including company or detachment. This officer's duties include instructing newly assigned personnel in crime prevention and conducting monthly announced and unannounced crime prevention inspections of unit areas.⁶ Most major commands and posts have published supplements to **AR 190-31** which include standard checklists for these monthly inspections. Such inspections can identify many weaknesses which are not strictly related to crime prevention. By inspecting at unpredictable times of the day and night, you and the company crime prevention officers can improve vastly the instructions and conduct of unit Charge of Quarters during non-duty hours. You should also encourage unit commanders to obtain Military Police working or search dog visits as often as possible, and to urge personnel to etch identifying marks on their personal property to aid in the location of stolen property.

Company and battalion crime prevention plans must reflect all requirements of **AR 190-31** with local supplements, and should include practical instructions for securing personal as well as government property from theft or vandalism. Take these plans to the crime prevention section of your installation's Military Police unit, and obtain written approval from the MP's after making any necessary revisions. This plus constant checking of the Charge of Quarters will go far towards satisfying Annual General Inspection requirements and reducing unit crime.

The third major aspect of your duties is physical security, which includes key and lock control and involves three doctrinal references.

AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program, requires all com-

manders to establish a unit Physical Security Program and to appoint a Physical Security Officer.⁷ One of your major duties as PSO is to prepare and update the unit Physical Security Plan. This plan must identify those areas which are vulnerable, sensitive or mission-essential and provide precise instructions as to the safeguarding of such areas as well as all unit personnel and property. **AR 190-13** requires that this plan provide for an armed security force, if only the local military police. The plan must systematically review all security problems and measures including liaison with local military police and procedures to counter terrorist activities.⁸ Your local and major command physical security plans or supplements to **AR 190-13** will undoubtedly include many other requirements for your unit plan.

If you are fortunate, your predecessors will have left you an adequate physical security plan. Even if this is so, but particularly if you have to write your own plan, you should review the results to ensure that all required elements are present. All plans, instructions and SOPs for Crime Prevention, weapons security, physical security, key control and Charge of Quarters duties should be standardized battalion-wide whenever possible. Having obtained the tentative approval of your battalion commander, you can then forward this plan to the installation PSO or MP Physical Security Section. After receiving such comments revising the plan accordingly, forward it again to obtain written approval prior to any physical security inspections or surveys.

Of course, a physical security plan is useless if no one reads and obeys it. Once you have a plan which satisfies both your commander and the Physical Security inspectors, distribute multiple copies to the companies and staff sections. You and the company PSOs must ensure that all supervisors know the security procedures which apply to their duties and areas of responsibility.

FM 19-30, Physical Security, has been revised to provide current guidance in solving specific security problems. Some commands have issued directives which make **FM 19-30** procedures mandatory rather than recommended.

AR 190-51, Security of Army Property at Unit and Installation Level, is the first security regulation to direct specific procedures and safeguards for unit equipment and require training in physical security procedures.⁹ For each type of property, this regulation provides two sets of physical security measures. Level 1 physical security measures are mandatory for all organi-

zations, while level 2 measures are additional steps to be taken at local option.

One important aspect of **AR 190-51** is vehicle and motor park security. The regulation requires that vehicles have locks and chains installed in accordance with **Technical Bulletin 9-2300-422-20, Security of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles**. Moreover, any motor park which is not continuously guarded must be illuminated, and must be surrounded with a specific type of chain-link fence with barbed wire top guard. Vehicles inside must be chained or locked, with valuable components secured elsewhere. The motor park must be checked by a roving guard at irregular intervals of two hours or less.¹⁰

A second major aspect of **AR 190-51** is Appendix D on key and lock control. Each company must appoint a Key Custodian. Both keys and key control registers for signing keys in and out must be secured in locked metal containers when not actually in use. All keys issued for personal retention, including keys to barracks rooms

and office desks, must be inventoried monthly; all other keys must be inventoried every six months. Locks must be changed at least once each year, or whenever a key is lost.¹¹

Conclusion

Unfortunately, there is no substitute for experience as a Physical Security Officer at a particular post. Too many requirements and procedures are unique to individual units or installations. This article has only reviewed the main principles, functions and publications involved. When you arrive at a new unit, you should begin by reviewing local supplements to regulations and local physical security plans. Seek answers to the questions on the physical security checklist by consulting PSOs in higher and adjacent headquarters. Once you have developed some expertise in the subject, only constant inspections and corrections will make your physical security plan a genuine part of unit operations, and only this will free you for your real duties as an intelligence officer.

Physical Security Checklist

Upon arrival in a new unit, determine the requirements, procedures and means of recording the following actions:

Weapons Security:

- Transfer of responsibility and of keys to arms room
- Monthly key inventory of arms room keys and alarm system keys
- Monthly arms inventory
- Quarterly arms inventory
- Issue and turn-in of weapons to individuals
- Issue and turn-in of unassigned weapons for cleaning
- Briefings on weapons security
- Records of NAC/ENTNAC and local files checks for unaccompanied access
- Unit and higher headquarters unaccompanied access rosters

Crime Prevention:

- Crime Prevention Plan, and approval of this plan by higher HQ
- Instructions to Charge of Quarters concerning
 - Non-duty hours security checks
 - Visitor sign-in procedures
 - Keys received after duty hours
 - Rooms and personal property found unsecured
 - Severe weather, bomb threat, and similar emergency actions
- Equipment and records for etching identification numbers on personal property
- Required monthly crime prevention inspections, including location of records for past inspections

Key and Lock Control:

- Key registers (sign-in and sign-out of keys)
- Key access roster (who is authorized to issue and receive keys)
- Key inventories
- Key and lock rotations
- Availability of Series 200 (NSN 5340-00-158-3807 or 5340-00-159-3805) padlocks (PSO should have reserve on hand)

Vehicle and Motor Park Security:

- Chains and locks installed IAW TB 9-2300-422-20
- Security of maintenance buildings
- Security of Prescribed Load List parts
- Security of tool cage and mechanic's tool sets
- Procedures for issue and inventory of all tools
- Lighting and fencing
- Clear zone inside and outside fence

Physical Security Plan:

- Local requirements
- Approval from local Military Police Physical Security section
- Availability of portable welding equipment
- Availability of locksmith
- Spotcheck of supervisors on their knowledge of physical security procedures

Training:

- Both periodic, and upon arrival in unit
- Physical Security, including Key Control
- Crime Prevention
- Security of Weapons and Ammunition

(continued on page 60)

Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS)

by SFC James H. Peery

Introduction

The acronym REMBASS describes a family of mutually compatible tactical unattended ground sensors, digital data communications equipment, and combination receiver-display components. The equipment can be selected to suit the tactical situation and operated in various system configurations in most environments worldwide to provide the field commander with an all-weather, day-night, over-the-hill, early warning, surveillance and target development capability.

REMBASS is in the final stages of Engineering Development with testing scheduled for completion in mid-1982. The system will include a variety of single-target classifying sensors and detection-only sensors, single-channel repeaters, a small handheld receiver-display, and a sensor monitoring set with receiver displays, and a hard-copy printer. A typical system employment concept is illustrated in Figure 1 while some system components are shown in Figure 2.

REMBASS sensors are being designed for emplacement by hand, air or artillery. All will detect personnel and vehicular intrusions within their respective zones of detection and transmit intrusion data on preselected radio frequency (RF) channels directly or via repeaters to the sensor monitoring set which is usually located within the friendly supported force's perimeter. The design of REMBASS equipment will enable it to operate under various weather and terrain conditions including ice, snow, sand, frozen ground, foliage, and in all types of soil, e.g. rocky, soft, sandy and savannah. In its various system configurations, REMBASS will also complement, supplement and cue other manned and unmanned surveillance systems.

REMBASS will be organic to the Ground Surveillance Company of the divisional Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) battalion. Trained remote sensor (REMS) teams will employ, operate and maintain the

equipment. Along with ground surveillance radar (GSR) teams, REMS teams will be attached according to the division's tactical surveillance plan to maneuver brigades and battalions, armored cavalry squadron elements, the division support command or special task forces as necessary. Once attached, REMS teams will be responsible to the S2 of the supported unit. Upon reporting to the supported unit, the REMS team leader must establish a working dialogue with the intelligence officer in order to define the commander's intelligence needs and determine the extent of REMBASS coverage required to best fulfill these needs. Using maps, aerial photographs and ground reconnaissance information, the REMS team and other supporting personnel will then proceed to emplace REMBASS sensors in selected areas to intercept and monitor enemy activities.

Hand Emplacement

The location of each sensor is re-

corded as accurately as possible to maximize the utility of its detection reports. Each REMS team is equipped to hand-emplace as many as 50 sensors per mission and operate at ranges out to 30 kilometers. Implant missions can be conducted day or night under most weather conditions. Occasionally, supported units must provide security and assistance for the implant operations. The supported unit's assistance is particularly important when the REMS teams are split for simultaneous implant missions.

Air Emplacement

When and where aircraft survivability is favorable, REMS teams can emplace sensors and repeaters via rotary wing aircraft. When aerial implant missions are determined most appropriate for "seeding" an area to be put under surveillance, the REMS team equipped with dispensing equipment, sensors and repeaters will rendezvous with the designated aircraft. The aircraft crew chief, assisted by the REMS team, will

REMBASS

Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System




Figure 1.

temporarily attach the dispensing equipment to the aircraft and load the sensors and repeaters to be dropped. Before the flight, the REMS team leader will brief the pilot on the employment area and aerial delivery procedures. During the aerial delivery operation, an on-board REMS team member plots the exact map location of each sensor's impact point while simultaneously monitoring the operating channels to confirm operability when each aerially delivered sensor transmits its "I am working" status message. Upon completion of the mission, the dispensing equipment is removed from the aircraft and the monitoring of the sensors occurs as described for hand-emplaced sensors.

Artillery Emplacement

REMS teams will assist in the emplacement of sensors via 155mm howitzers. When the decision is made to emplace sensors via artillery, the REMS team must coordinate the mission with REMS maintenance section in the CEWI Battalion's Service Support Company. The REMS maintenance section picks up the REMBASS projectiles from the ammunition supply point, electronically sets sensor identification codes and operating frequencies and transports them to the REMS team at a designated field artillery firing battery. The REMS team must coordinate with the Fire Direction Center to insure the firing of individual REMBASS rounds in proper sequence into the correct emplacement area. Artillery-emplaced

sensors transmit status report like the aerially-delivered ones and monitoring procedures are the same as for the other type sensors.

Emplacement of Repeaters

After areas for sensor emplacement are designated, it may be necessary for the REMS personnel to make terrain profiles to insure line-of-sight exists between sensor locations and the monitoring site. When line-of-sight restrictions are apparent or a sensor transmission range limitation is exceeded, it will be necessary to employ individual or multiple repeaters in tandem to relay the sensor transmissions to the appropriate monitoring site. Repeater emplacement occurs prior to sensor emplacement since it may service several sensors. Thus, during emplacement, the REMS team can confirm the operability of each sensor through the repeater(s) to the monitoring site. If it is necessary to implant the sensor at a different location to establish the communications link, the emplacement team leader's selection of the new location must also assure the sensor's anti-intrusion mission can be accomplished.

Tactical Applications

Once emplaced, the sensor strings, belts, or grid arrays can provide real time combat information in one or more of the following forms on targets:

- Location and time of target detection.

- Classification of target, i.e. personnel, wheeled vehicle, or tracked vehicle.
- Direction of movement.
- Length of column.
- Rate of movement.
- Number of intruders.

In actual practice, it is envisioned the tactical use of REMBASS will be limited only by the imagination of the intelligence officer. Some sensor applications are:

Area Surveillance. In a situation where the level of enemy activity in a large area (several square kilometers) is of interest, REMBASS may be emplaced in a widely spaced grid pattern to determine where the enemy may be maneuvering within the area.

Route Surveillance. REMBASS can be emplaced along a specific route or avenue of approach to determine the rate of movement, direction and level of enemy activity. In this application, sensor location accuracy is a necessity.

Economy of Force. REMBASS can be used in an economy of force role to provide surveillance in an area from which a commander has purposely shifted his forces in order to concentrate those forces in another area.

Barrier and/or Minefield Surveillance. REMBASS can be used in conjunction with barriers and minefields to determine the level of enemy activity in and around selected areas and improve the effectiveness of the barriers or minefield with timely harassing fire.

Landing Zone/Drop Zone Surveillance. REMBASS can be emplaced in enemy-held territory positions adjacent to potential landing zones several days prior to an air mobile/airborne operation. Information furnished by the sensors can be used to decide whether or not the landing zone should be used. This application would also be useful for airborne drop zones. It can be used to provide early warning of suspected enemy activity in rear areas where air landed activities are possible.

Target Development. REMBASS can be emplaced in areas likely to be selected for use as assembly areas, headquarters, and supply points to provide information on occupancy and levels of activity. Information obtained from REMBASS can be used to plan the desired type of reaction and the time the target would be most vulnerable to an attack.

Cueing. REMBASS information can be used to cue target acquisition systems such as the Stand-Off Target Acquisition System (SOTAS) and the Netted Universal Radar System which can be employed to verify or clarify enemy actions or indications.



Figure 2.

Rear Area Combat Operations. REMBASS sensors can be integrated with physical security preparations and improve the protection of rear area facilities such as supply/ammunition dumps, petroleum and communication lines, etc. The sensors are emplaced in conjunction with off limits areas, curfew and patrolled areas to minimize the detection of uncontrolled friendly activities.

Surveillance in Urbanized Terrain. Urbanized terrain surveillance requires a combination of the above sensor applications.


Other Users

The US Marine Corps plans to re-

place first generation sensor equipment developed during the Vietnam era with REMBASS. The US Air Force is coordinating the development of a Base/Installation Security System with the US Army to insure commonality with REMBASS. Interest in the potential offered by REMBASS among our allies and within federal, state and local law enforcement agencies continues to grow. Successful tests using REMBASS equipment have been made by the Drug Enforcement Agency, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Department of Justice.

Planned REMBASS Improvements

Multichannel airborne repeaters, artillery-delivered repeaters, commandable turn-on and turn-off sensors, imaging sensors for use in urbanized areas, and a special processing unit to expedite data reporting and processing are all in various phases of development. These future system improvements will be in the form of an add-on to presently conceived REMBASS equipment with little or no modifications necessary. These future improvements will greatly facilitate the employment of REMBASS in over-the-hill roles and in such extended life roles as stay-behind and border surveillance operations which should prove valuable to other users in performing their missions.



The Alaska Brigade: Arctic Intelligence and Some Strategic Considerations

"... we were mushin our way over the Dawson Trail. Talk of cold! through the parka's fold it stabbed like a driven nail. If our eyes we'd close, then the lashes froze till sometimes we couldn't see..."

Robert Service
"Cremation of Sam McGee"
The Spell of the Yukon

by 1LT Anthony Paternostro

The 172nd Infantry Brigade, Alaska (once called the Husky Brigade), is unique in the Army's inventory. It is organized to conduct sustained independent combat anywhere in Alaska. The 172d Infantry Brigade (AK) is composed of the 172d Light Infantry Brigade (LIB) which has operational control over the following: the Brigade Headquarters (LIB) and Headquarters Company; 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry; 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry; 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery; 172d Support Battalion; and 562d Engineer Company, located at Fort Richardson near Anchorage. Located at Fort Wainwright near Fairbanks are the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry (MANCHU); Battery C of the 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery; and Troop E First Air Cavalry. Intelligence support is provided to the entire 172d Infantry Brigade (AK) by the 452d Military Intelligence Detachment which is assigned to Headquarters Special Troops at Fort Richardson. General aviation support is given to the 172d Infantry Brigade (AK) by the 222d Aviation Battalion located at Fort Wainwright. Although operationally controlled by commander 172d Infantry Brigade (AK), the 222d is a non-TOE unit. At Fort Greely, located near Delta Junction, is the Northern Warfare Training Center. This command has the mission of conducting instructor qualification and orientation in Arctic and mountain warfare techniques. It is under the operational control of US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and under command of the 172d Infantry Brigade (AK). The 297th Infantry, Alaska National Guard Eskimo Scouts, a non-172d Infantry Brigade (AK) organization (unless mobilization occurs), is commanded by the Governor of Alaska through

the state Adjutant General. The three Scout Battalions in the 297th Infantry are without counterpart in the US Army due to their composition; they are manned mostly by Indians and Eskimos organized in small teams located in villages from the North Slope to the Aleutians.

Aspects of Arctic Intelligence

Brigade Alaska does not possess the intelligence collection assets normally associated with a unit of its size. There are no ground surveillance radars (GSR) or remote sensors and the only night observation devices available are starlight scopes. It has been said that such equipment would not function properly at extreme temperatures. In my experience no equipment functions properly at temperatures colder than 50

degrees below zero. At the same time, however, a battalion from the 82d Airborne Division, in Alaska for Basic Cold Weather Training (BCT), brought GSRs and found that they functioned at temperatures approaching 40 degrees below zero. Furthermore, it is important to note that this equipment could be used during spring and summer and in much of the winter. A better reason for not having such equipment is unit mobility. As a light infantry unit, the 172d has none of the tracked vehicles normally used for transporting this equipment. (For information on equipment cold-weather capabilities, contact Cold Regions Research and Testing Center (CRTC), Fort Greely, AK 99737.)

The S2 in Alaska, therefore, has few resources with which to gather information about the enemy. One resource which was available until recently was the 172d Military Intelligence Detachment Aerial Surveillance (MIDAS), of the 222d Aviation Battalion. The 172d


Living quarters for summer mountain operations (poncho hooch).



(MIDAS) was moved to Hunter Army Airfield, GA. The 172d (MIDAS) was extremely useful to Brigade Alaska, until temperatures dropped below -30 degrees Fahrenheit, creating some mechanical problems for its OV-1D aircraft.

The Arctic S2 quickly learns to work with his scouts; they are his most important collection asset. He also insures that his front line troops are trained to accurately report combat intelligence information. Occasionally the liaison is exercised between the Light Infantry Brigade and the Alaska National Guard Eskimo Scouts. I have worked with the 3d Battalion, 297th Infantry, based at Kotzebue, and found it to be very competent in its mission:

C Battery, 1/37 Field Artillery airmobiles in one of its 105 mm howitzers while in direct support of the 4/9 Infantry. Aviation support is critical to Brigade Alaska.



Rear trains area at Granite Mountain Airstrip, AK. During this exercise, the maneuver area was from Fairbanks to Nome.

"...to perform surveillance and reconnaissance within (its) areas, and to provide guides for other units operating in Arctic regions." The scouts are all well-trained in the recognition of Soviet equipment. Many have actually seen Soviet aircraft and ships, although this is not spectacular when one considers the fact that the US island of Little Diomed is approximately three miles from the Soviet Union's Big Diomed and that the scouts hunt and fish on pack ice on the US side of the Bering Strait. The liaison exercises have been very effective; 172d Infantry Brigade soldiers have taught the scouts such skills as patrolling and map reading while the scouts have taught our troops how to more effectively deal with the extreme cold of Arctic winter. Who but the scouts would know how to start a fire with a piece of ice? The scouts have also treated active Army soldiers to such culinary delights as raw Arctic char dipped in seal oil.

In Alaska the S2 must operate in a very different world than that of his counterparts in other commands. First of all, he must be an expert in on-the-spot terrain analysis which must occasionally be performed through personal reconnaissance due to the nonavailability of maps (in areas that have yet to be mapped) or photos. One may say that S2s in Germany or Korea are faced with the same problems but they have set areas in which they will perform most of their training exercises. In Alaska, a unit may go through two years worth of exercises and ARTEPs

without ever training in the same place twice. And no higher command can furnish intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) studies of Selawik, Shugnak, Bormite or Kiana or, for that matter, most of Alaska's 586,400 square miles (approximately one-fifth the land area of the rest of the US).

In Alaska the S2 must be able to develop weather forecasts for the areas in which he will train. This can be very difficult when attached weather observers must send observations to forecasters 500 miles away. Communication is thus another serious problem in Alaska due to distance and atmospheric conditions. A weather front moving in on a unit will cost that unit its airmobile assets for a week or more. This can be serious if those air assets are carrying its C-rations. Air assets are critical to light infantry units operating in environments like Alaska. Despite its tremendous size, Alaska has only approximately 5,000 miles of road network. Because the terrain is mostly marshy tundra in the summer and frozen snow drifts in winter, one cannot expect to drive organic ground vehicles where there is no road. D-8 bulldozers have been known to sink underground and disappear from sight during the unfrozen summer months. For this reason, most Alaskan cities can only be reached by air. Small units of the 172d Infantry Brigade (AK) are mobile in winter months via ski, snowshoes, or organic snow machines (snow mobiles).

In the area of illumination data, the northern S2 must also shine while operating in as much as 22 hours of daylight during summer months or as little as four hours of daylight in the winter. This is critical when, during a week-long exercise, he can go from a day that gets no darker than civil twilight

(sun dips 6° below the horizon) to one with end nautical twilight (sun dips 12° below horizon).

The S2 in the Arctic Light Infantry must also be able to perform his analysis of the enemy, plan his reconnaissance (both aerial and ground), make use of terrain and weather, perform his doctrinal templating, keep accurate account of local weather systems, and do all of the above without the aid of a myriad of field manuals and graphic aids. In Alaska, the S2 carries what he can fit in his backpack. For summer mountain operations he may work without the aid of an actual tactical operations center (TOC). He has his radio telephone operator (RTO) and a poncho hooch or shelter (jump TOC) which remains low to the ground for concealment. A sustained, and more elaborate TOC may be found somewhere in the rear, logging intelligence reports and keeping higher headquar-



White camouflage nets issued to the 172d Inf Bde (AK) make these positions almost invisible from the air.

River crossing exercise, Delta River, Alaska.



ters informed of the current enemy situation. In winter months, the TOC can be set up in the back of a gamma goat or in a 10-man tent. But in a tactical operation on the move, the S2 must work out of his rucksack while on skis or snowshoes. The TOC will be airmobiled in once the unit has reached an area for defense or sustained operations.

Effects of Extreme Cold Weather on Operations

With JRX Brimfrost 1981 soon to descend upon Alaska, there are some considerations CONUS units must face when preparing to travel north. During a similar exercise in 1979, the temperature hovered around 55 degrees below zero. At an exercise at the same location in February 1980, the temperature dropped to 83 degrees below zero (ambient air temperature). At this time of year, there are approximately five hours of daylight during which visibility is usually restricted by "ice fog." Ice fog occurs at temperatures of 20 degrees below zero or colder when ice crystals suspended in the air hamper visibility. These ice crystals can form from vehicle and aircraft exhaust. This should be considered when planning airmobile or convoy operations.

In addition to causing equipment malfunctions, the cold will reduce the soldier's ability to function normally and

perform the most basic tasks. It takes longer to eat a meal and walk a "click." The staff planner must never forget that, especially in the Arctic, a grease pencil on the situation map moves much faster than does the vapor barrier boot (VB boot), required in extreme cold weather, or the soldier.

The danger of death or extreme injury due to frostbite or hypothermia is an extreme problem in the "Yuke" (short for Yukon, used by Arctic soldiers to describe their environment). Small unit leaders must watch out for their people more in the Arctic environment than in any other. Leadership at 60 degrees below zero is much more difficult than under more temperate conditions. It is not uncommon for a unit leader to frequently inspect his people's fingers, faces, and feet, as sometimes the soldier himself is unaware that he has been bitten by the "Hawk" (a term used by 172d Infantry Brigade to describe cold weather or its effects).

Equivalent windchill is another phenomenon that the Arctic soldier must understand. When the ambient air temperature is 55 degrees below zero, as it often is during winter months in central Alaska, the equivalent windchill temperature with an 11-15 knot wind will be 100 degrees below zero. At this temperature, exposed flesh may freeze within 30 seconds.

In Alaska the soldier must learn how to make efficient use of his Arctic equipment, including whatever civilian equipment he can buy to augment his military equipment. For example, it is very hard to eat C-rats or "lurps" along the trail in the winter, because C-rations will freeze "harder than woodpecker lips" and unfrozen water is a scarce commodity. The Arctic sourdough soldier will carry finger foods (Gorp) in his field pants pocket to keep his caloric intake up while on the march. He will also keep his water in a boda bag kept under his shirt to prevent its freezing. Water and a high caloric intake makes the soldier more resistant to frostbite or hypothermia.

While soldiers in Alaska have learned to deal with climatic hardships and, indeed, use those hardships to their benefit, CONUS-based units deployed to Alaska for Brimfrost '81 will be at a distinct disadvantage.

Alaska as a Front in Future Conflicts

Alaska has been given little strategic recognition and remains a low priority for documentation concerning the opposing force (Alaskan scenario). The threat is more prevalent in Europe or South Korea; however, Alaska's use as a front in wartime is not without precedent. During World War II, the Japanese occupied part of the Aleutian Archipelago. This move diverted approximately 100,000 American troops who could otherwise have been used against Japan or Germany on other

fronts.

To compare the threat to Alaska with that of Europe or Korea is ridiculous. The threat to Alaska differs significantly because of terrain and weather. It is highly improbable that motorized rifle units would be employed in Alaska. I believe the threat to Alaska would be found in airborne, naval infantry, or special operational forces intended to tie up CONUS-based units in Alaska's defense.

Eskimo scouts of the 3 Bn, 297th Inf treating 4th Bn, 9th Inf chaplain, CPT Bauer, to raw Arctic char dipped in seal oil.



"... And I wait for the men who will win me—and I will not be won in a day; And I will not be won by weaklings, subtle, suave and mild, But by men with the hearts of Vikings, and the simple faith of a child; Desperate, strong and resistless, unthrottled by fear or defeat. Them will I gild with my treasure, them will I glut with my meat ..."

Robert Service
"The Law of the Yukon"
The Spell of the Yukon

Fire From Ice

For those of you wondering how the Eskimos start a fire with a piece of ice: They take a piece of clear ice from a stream or lake and shape it into a prism which is then used like a magnifying glass to start tinder.

Opposing Forces Europe: A New Perspective

by CPT Jack B. Keller, Jr.

Introduction

The need for training incorporating a realistic potential adversary has long been recognized: the US Army has adopted a number of training vehicles in past decades to satisfy this need. The current training vehicle, governed by AR 350-2, is the **Opposing Force (OPFOR) Program**.

OPFOR training is usually represented by a periodic lecture, class, film or display on Soviet/Warsaw Pact or North Korean armed forces, or perhaps an FTX employing the tactics and equipment of an actual potential adversary. While unit-oriented training sessions are valuable for imparting awareness and providing US units with a "red" aggressor force, they generally fail to satisfy the needs of those personnel in almost every combat arms and combat support arms unit whose positions require a more detailed knowledge of a potential foe, an understanding detailed enough to allow them to make recommendations or decisions which would defeat the adversary on the battlefield.

A New Perspective

To the average soldier in today's Army, **Opposing Forces Europe** refers to FM 30-102, a basic reference manual used in conjunction with the OPFOR Program. But, to 65 officers, warrant officers and enlisted personnel, **Opposing Forces Europe** refers to an entirely new perspective on the art and science of warfare. These 65 are graduates of the new **Opposing Forces Europe Operations and Intelligence Course**—two weeks of intensive and unique training conducted last summer at the Sixth US Army Intelligence Training Army Area School (6ITAAS) at Fort MacArthur, CA.

OPFOR Europe was presented almost entirely from a Soviet point of view, as though the students were attending a Soviet command and staff college for Soviet reservists' "pre-mobilization" refresher training. Friendly forces were presented from an American perspective, but OPFOR subjects were presented by "Soviet" in-

structors from a perspective consistent with current Soviet political-military thought on combat organizations and equipment, command and control, tactical doctrine and operational norms, battle maneuver and special operations, intelligence principles and operational methods, and artillery and air support.

Following blocks of detailed instruction, students were organized into Soviet division and regimental command and staff groups for planning and execution of map maneuver exercises. Using a Soviet-styled scenario, students had to plan a deliberate defense against an imperialistic Western opponent, plan a Soviet intelligence preparation of the battlefield for an upcoming offensive, plan and execute a breakthrough operation as a counter-offensive, and plan and execute the exploitation phase of a breakthrough by seizing targets deep in rear areas of the Western Allies. They were forced to think, plan and act as Soviets.

During the final day and a half of the course, the instructors and students returned to an American perspective and concentrated on those subjects which, when coupled with the detailed data base assembled on Soviet subjects, would prepare the students for making sound recommendations or decisions to counter and defeat a European opposing force. These subjects included friendly operational security, intelligence analysis of threat tactical indicators, and Soviet ground forces vulnerabilities. US Army tactics were not specifically addressed.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of the course is to provide selected command and staff personnel of the Active and Reserve Components of the US Armed Forces with the basic tactical doctrine, force structure and tactical employment of the opposing forces in Europe, with emphasis on the Soviet Ground Forces, in order to enhance their knowledge and improve their capabilities against these forces in the operations and intelligence fields. The target audience is currently limited to combat arms and combat support arms unit personnel.

The scope of the course is both broad and comprehensive. Subjects range from ideological concepts to

Soviet perceptions of US and NATO strategies, from Soviet divisional equipment capabilities and densities to radioelectronic combat techniques and from strategic intelligence efforts to tactical formations and maneuvers. "As far as I know, nowhere else in the Army school system is so much information about the Soviet Army consolidated and integrated so logically and presented so effectively," reports Robert J. Carter, Chief of the Opposing Forces Division of USAICS' Directorate of Training Development, a Reserve Officer graduate of the course. While the course concentrates on Soviet Army combat and intelligence operations, it also develops those basic analytical skills required for exploitation of combat information and tactical intelligence.

The information is concentrated, the pace is brisk and the academic standards are high. The course is presented as if at a Soviet command and staff college both in perspective and in the level of instruction. Instructors wear facsimiles of Soviet officer uniforms, address the students as "comrades," and say "we" when referring to the Soviet Army. Students are taught how to plan the defensive and offensive use of Soviet artillery, air defense, engineers, tanks, anti-tank weapons and reserves, motorized rifle troops, chemical troops and reconnaissance assets. This requires a rather well-educated student body, for the course presupposes the students have certain requisite knowledge. The instructional scenario, by treating the students as Soviet reservists undergoing "pre-mobilization" training, treats them as if they have had previous military training which is now being "refreshed" and up-graded.

Course Prerequisites

Because the course was developed for a particular audience group, certain grade, assignment, knowledge and clearance prerequisites were built into it.

Students must be commissioned officers, grade O-3 or above, warrant officers, or non-commissioned officers, grade E-7 or above, of the US Army Active or Reserve Components, or an appropriate DA civilian. The course is open to officers and NCOs of comparable grade in the other services.

The student must be assigned to a leadership, staff or selected position in a combat arms or combat support arms unit. A "selected position" is one recommended by the unit commander and accepted as valid by the approving authority for course enrollment. The type unit is important because the information presented in the course is designed to be exploited on the battlefield by combat and combat support units.

The student must possess a working knowledge of US Army tactical doctrine and organizations. When confronted, as "Soviets," with a "Western" opposing force utilizing an active defense, the student must know how that defense is organized and conducted because this is not taught in the course. The student must also have a working knowledge of military map reading and overlay techniques and possess basic weather and terrain analysis skills. Because there is no way to pretest an applicant's knowledge in these areas, the approving authority for course enrollment must rely on the applicant's commander's recommendation for approval as assurance that the applicant possesses the required knowledge and skills. At 6ITAAS, a number of students found themselves studying both US and Soviet tactics and organizations at night.

Finally, the student must possess a current Secret clearance because one-fourth of the course material, including one exercise, is presented at that level.

For the initial two presentations of the course at 6ITAAS, Sixth US Army waived the grade restrictions in certain cases, especially where an individual of a lower grade was performing in a position authorized a higher grade that

would otherwise qualify to attend the course. This practice will continue in the future on an individual basis.

OPFOR Subjects

The course opens with an examination of the threat posed by two opposing camps in Europe. Classes include: Current Soviet Threat Worldwide; Threat Posture: American/West European View; and Threat Posture: Soviet/East European View.

An overview of the potential European adversary is presented in a series of classes including: Basic Communist Ideology; Soviet Political-Military Relationships; Soviet Armed Forces; and Warsaw Pact Armed Forces.

A comprehensive and detailed analysis of the Soviet Ground Forces' combat organizations and equipment follows, including: Ground Forces Organizational Structure; Motorized Rifle Regiment Organizations and Equipment; Tank Regiment Organizations and Equipment; and Combat Divisions.

These are followed by 29 hours devoted to Soviet operational and tactical doctrine subjects: Operational Art and Military Tactics; Chemical Warfare Capability; Defensive Tactics and Retrograde Operations; Artillery and Air Defense; Motorized Rifle Division Defensive Exercise; Radioelectronic Combat; Offensive Tactics and Operations; Motorized Rifle Division Counteroffensive Exercise; Special Operations in Support of the Offensive; and Motorized Rifle Division Offensive Exercise.

Soviet Tactical Air Support, OPSEC Analysis: Threat Intelligence and the Friendly Force Profile, Intelligence Analysis of Threat Tactical Indicators,

Soviet Ground Forces Vulnerabilities, and Unit Training in OPFOR Europe are also presented.

Course Evaluation

Like all new courses, Opposing Forces Europe was closely examined and evaluated for content and the attainment of training objectives. The highly encouraging experience of the first two presentations promises a wider dissemination of the course through the Army service schools. The overwhelming majority of graduates and visitors to the course commented very favorably on its value, especially in terms of content and perspective.

The course presents a range of subjects with a level of detail and accuracy that far exceeds anything that unit-oriented OPFOR training can hope to achieve. Its perspective forces the student to think like the potential adversary being studied, making the course an invaluable training asset that can supplement most unit-oriented OPFOR programs.

Developed by Sixth US Army under the auspices of US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), the program of instruction is currently undergoing revision based on the 6ITAAS evaluations. The revised POI will then be duplicated for export to other Army Service Schools. If past experience is any indication of the course's potential, the OPFOR Europe O & I Course will achieve far wider dissemination in coming years.

The 6ITAAS presentations were visited by LTG Charles M. Hall, Commander, Sixth US Army; BG James A. Teal, Jr., Commander, USAICS; BG Robert S. Young, Chief of Staff, Sixth US Army; COL Julius Parker, DCSI, FORSCOM; COL Kenneth White, DCSOPS, Sixth US Army and numerous other official visitors from FORSCOM, Sixth US Army and USAICS. The visitors agreed that the course needed to reach a larger audience, especially among the Active Components.

This would require that additional Army Service Schools offer the OPFOR Europe program of instruction. FORSCOM is expected to direct the dissemination of the revised POI to First and Fifth ITAAS and to USAICS when exportable. Thus, the course will possibly be presented to the Reserve Components primarily through the ITAAS system and to the Active Components primarily through USAICS. The 65 graduates of the course at 6ITAAS include 18 Active Army personnel, 12 Army National Guardsmen, and 35 Army Reservists. Next summer's enrollment is not expected to exceed 100, including 25 Active Army personnel.



Course instructors, from left to right, CPT Robert A. Newport (in an airborne sergeant's uniform), MAJ Dale Leamon (in artillery major's uniform), MAJ Allan Miller (in rocket, tubes and artillery major's uniform) and CPT Jack B. Keller (in motorized rifle captain's uniform).

MI Company Grade Officer Survey

by CPT(P) Norman B. Patten

The Directorate of Training Developments, USAICS, in cooperation with the US Army Occupational Survey Program (AOSP) will conduct a survey of all company grade Military Intelligence officers holding specialty codes 35 and 36. The survey, to be delivered in early 1981, will collect data on specific tasks, responsibilities and skills required of each officer in his/her duty position. The results of the survey will be used to redesign USAICS courses so that training will better reflect the demands made upon MI officers in the field. The validity of the results and their ultimate impact upon training will depend upon the conscientious response of all company grade MI officers.

The surveys are a key element in the Interservice Procedures for Instructional Systems Development (IPISD) approach to training which TRADOC has adapted from the recommendations of the DA Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) study group. Formed in 1977, the group recommended a comprehensive methodology to train Army officers and to integrate training and

individual officer career development.

TRADOC initiated the IPISD process with a series of pilot programs at the Infantry, Military Police and Missiles and Munitions schools. The efforts made at these schools confirmed the importance of the AOSP survey in providing comprehensive information on what officers *really* do. The results surprised analysts and indicated that the perceived training needs of the "school house" do not always coincide with the needs of the unit in the field.

USAICS has been at work on the survey instrument through this past year. The process has involved extensive examination of authorization documents in order to find out exactly where MI lieutenants and captains are assigned and what equipment they use. FMs, TMs, ARs, training circulars/pamphlets, subject matter experts, current instruction and new concepts and doctrine were all addressed in picking out those tasks, skills and responsibilities appropriate to intelligence duties. Additionally, coordination throughout TRADOC helped to identify those non-MI functions for which MI officers are sometimes responsible.

Research resulted in a compilation of duty positions, activities and equipment spanning the 35 and 36 specialties. Remember, however, that training resources are scarce and


not every requirement identified needs to be, or should be, trained. For this reason, the survey is critical.

USAICS must decide how to best use its training resources by determining which tasks are essential to all MI lieutenants and are, therefore, a necessary part of MI Officer Basic Course training. In which areas do 35s and 36s get most involved? How do the responsibilities of senior captains differ from those of junior lieutenants? Which responsibilities should be addressed in the MI Officer Advanced Course? What requirements are best learned at the unit? At USAICS?

USAICS' own answers to these questions may not reflect the views of officers in the field and so USAICS will give officers in the field, and their supervisors, the opportunity to correct any misconceptions.

Survey results will be thoroughly analyzed and incorporated into future training decisions. If training at USAICS is to prepare future MI officers, the assistance of junior officers is required.

Be thorough and diligent in completing the survey and return it promptly. Questions concerning the survey can be referred to USAICS' Officer Personnel Management Systems at AUTOVON 879-5406/3244 or addressed to: Commander, USAICS, ATTN: ATSI-TD-ITD, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613.



533d CEWI

(continued from page 7)

June. The last platoon will activate in September.

The final company, D Company (the Aviation Company) combines SOTAS and QUICKFIX and will be stationed at Giessen (45 kilometers north of Frankfurt). SOTAS is presently collocated with 3AD's 503d Aviation Battalion (Combat) in Hanau, as the CAB provides all the aviation maintenance and related support. It is expected that such support will not only continue to be required, but in the future, additional requirements will be added when QUICKFIX is assigned to the Division.

Because aviation support (maintenance, flying hour program, pilot qualifications, etc.) is such an important aspect, it became the overriding consideration in stationing. Additionally, since both systems, QUICKFIX and SOTAS, will be used in a general support role to the Division, tasking will be accomplished in generally the same manner for both systems. We realize that training will be a problem for the QUICKFIX personnel (98G), and thus we will establish a small secure training facility at Giessen to accommodate this training.

The formal activation of the 533d CEWI Bn is drawing near. As we look

back over the past two and one-half years, the problems and setbacks we faced do not seem as severe as they first appeared. The key to any organization is the people assigned to it. The personnel assigned to both the ACofS, G2 and 533d CEWI Battalion have, in the face of great adversity, created and nurtured the CEWI Battalion.

On 16 September 1980, the 533d CEWI Bn will officially activate. It is a vibrant, dynamic organization which today enables the 3AD to "see the battlefield." That capability will be even greater tomorrow.

KGB

(continued from page 22)

Presidium, the First Secretary or delegated representatives.

Working through the Central Committee, KGB recommendations become orders passed on to the army, Foreign Ministry or other arms of the Soviet state. Additionally, all KGB officers hold the rank of military officers although, except for those in the counterintelligence branch who are assigned at division level and attached down to company level, they are in no way attached to the armed forces. Its enlisted personnel are all noncommissioned officers of the upper grades. The KGB officer is a bureaucrat in the highest sense; he is a member of a career service. He is exceptionally cautious and the omnipotence of Moscow's authority forces an almost slavish dependence on the execution of orders. If one criticizes an order, he is criticizing the entire system and, to the KGB, "inefficiency is the same as criminality, and criminality, by definition, is not an individual's deviation, but automatically a political crime against the state."¹⁶ KGB presence in the military prevents officer initiative, forcing total compliance with orders. The Soviet officer fears the KGB more than his commanding officer, and for good reason.

In the combat zone KGB elements are subordinated to the counterintelligence section of the higher military units and the intelligence staff. Activities in the enemy rear occur under the direction of the corresponding highest central administration and the coordination of that unit's intelligence staff. Chiefs of counterintelligence sections and military directorates and their authorized agents in troop units may keep the appropriate military commander (at that echelon) informed of only those activities expressly permitted by the next higher KGB operative. Usually, such cases are of minor importance. The counterintelligence officer

at the unit level can inspect activities of military commanders and staffs and the political organs of the armed forces.

"They are capable of rendering judgments on the political reliability of any individual, including generals, admirals, and marshals, and that of complete units, organizations and branches no matter where."¹⁷

Defectors from the Soviet military have often said that the atmosphere of suspicion and natural distrust fostered by the KGB is a source of tremendous resentment. No one falling into the hands of the KGB is treated without suspicion, regardless of rank, honors, decorations or other distinctions. The bodyguards assigned Marshall Zhukov during World War II were intended to observe as well as protect him because his independent thinking and initiative on the Eastern front suggested unreliability. Later he was transferred to a less important command in the eastern Soviet frontier. The most "trusted" KGB officers are themselves observed.

KGB operations are more intense among the troops stationed outside the USSR for fear of their exposure to political, ideological and social "infection" by the general populace. Every "non-Russian is considered a potential threat to the state."¹⁸ After World War II, every Soviet soldier returning home was regarded as a potential security risk, searched and placed under surveillance.¹⁹ The Red Army was purged of those who had advanced too far into the West during the war because the Soviet leadership feared soldiers who had experienced the Western way of life firsthand might wonder about the Soviet system.

Conclusion

The eyes and ears of the Soviet Union, the KGB will permeate the frontlines and the rear of the enemy on the battlefield even as it disrupts the internal organization of any opposing

nation. Through interrogation of prisoners of war, communications and human intelligence collection, infiltration and penetration of agents in key government organizations, assassinations, murders, and a strong propaganda program the KGB will provide the USSR with a means to direct the battle and defeat the enemy from within and without. Working directly for the Communist Party, each KGB officer remains above military orders and poses a serious threat to all military personnel. Highly trained and disciplined, with boundless devotion to the Party and the State, an unequalled hatred for the capitalists and "enemies of the people," KGB agents can be considered ready to execute, blindly and selflessly, all orders, including self-sacrifice.

Footnotes

1. Peter Deriabin and Frank Gibney, **The Secret World** (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1950), p. 201.
2. Anatoli Granovsky, **I Was An NKVD Agent** (New York: The Devin-Adair Company 1962), p. 179.
3. John Barron, **KGB: The Secret Work Of Soviet Secret Agents** (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974), p. 77.
4. Barron, p. 78.
5. Barron, p. 85.
6. Deriabin and Gibney, p. 243.
7. U.P. Artemiev and G.M. Viktorov, **Soviet Security Forces and Intelligence Organs** (Oberammergau, Germany: Detachment R, APO 172, US Forces, April 1962), p. 100.
8. B.H. Liddell Hart, **The Red Army** (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956), p. 271.
9. Hart, p. 266.
10. Barron, p. 319.
11. Artemiev and Viktorov, p. 14.
12. Artemiev and Viktorov, p. 20.
13. Deriabin and Gibney, p. 138.
14. Deriabin and Gibney, p. 209.
15. Deriabin and Gibney, p. 96.
16. Deriabin and Gibney, p. 73.
17. Artemiev and Viktorov, p. 30.
18. Deriabin and Gibney, p. 85.
19. Granovsky, p. 273.

The 525 MI Group (continued from page 18)

Interrogation Company will have 10 in-interrogation teams in general support to the Corps and 4 interrogation teams in general support to the divisions. The company will also have a document exploitation section for the exploitation of captured SIGINT/EW material.

The Operations Security Company has a counterintelligence platoon with 12 counterintelligence teams in support of the Corps and a signal security section to monitor friendly radio and telephone traffic for security violations.

The Electronic Warfare Company of the 519th Tactical Exploitation Battalion provides signal intelligence collection, processing and reporting and electronic warfare operations in support of the Corps. This company is organized into an operations platoon, a high frequency platoon and three reporting and analysis sections. The company has the capability to intercept single and multi-channel communications, analyze enemy signal communications, engage in electronic countermeasures in support of corps operations.

The Interrogation Company and the Operations Security Company have been fully organized and have been operational for some time now within the organizational framework of the 525 Group. Personnel and equipment for the Electronic Warfare Company will begin arriving at Fort Bragg during January 1981.

Units Attached to the 525 MI Group (CEWI)

In addition to the units to be assigned to the 525 CEWI Group, the Group will also have three units attached to it: The 1st Military Intelligence Battalion, the 180th Military Intelligence Detachment, and the FORSCOM Intelligence Training Detachment (FITD).

1st Military Intelligence Battalion. The mission of the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion is to provide photo, infrared and Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) imagery interpretation support to the XVIII Airborne Corps and other Corps in the theater of operations. The battalion, commanded by LTC Billy C. Rea, has been identified as an Echelon Above Corps (EAC) unit, but will remain attached to the 525 MI Group (CEWI) until decisions are made in FY 82 on an EAC architecture. During the interim period, the battalion will continue to provide aerial reconnaissance support to all Army forces stationed in the United States.

The 1st Military Intelligence Battalion consists of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company and four detach-

ments. Normally each of these detachments is deployed separately to an airfield with an Air Force tactical squadron in time of war. The battalion already has one detachment collocated with the 62nd Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron at Shaw Air Force Base, SC, and one detachment located with the 12th and 91st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons at Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX.

The two detachments stationed at Fort Bragg interface with the eight National Guard and Reserve Tactical Reconnaissance squadrons located in the United States and would deploy with these units if they were called to active duty.

The Headquarters Company has an Imagery Interpretation Platoon to provide imagery interpretation support for XVIII Airborne Corps contingency planning and a delivery platoon that can deliver special studies, terrain studies, OPSEC studies, map substitutes and other imagery interpretation products in support of operations planning to the battlefield commander. The Delivery Platoon would play an important role in most XVIII Airborne Corps and Army Rapid Deployment Force contingencies where it is likely the Air Force Reconnaissance squadrons would be stationed a great distance from the corps headquarters.

The 17th Military Intelligence Detachment (MID) attached to the 1st MI Battalion, was formed in the second quarter of FY 80 to provide a strategic imagery interpretation capability for the XVIII Airborne Corps. This detachment also operates the Digital Imagery Test Bed (DIT-B), which provides digital imagery to the Corps commander.

The 17th MID commanded by CPT Peter R. Mahan, has an authorized strength of 45 officers and enlisted personnel. During the last six months, personnel from the 17th MID and the 1st MI Battalion have laid the foundation for the use of digital imagery at Corps and in any Army Rapid Deployment Force contingency. This unit recently returned from Europe where it successfully provided intelligence from digital imagery. In the coming months, personnel from the 17th MID and the 1st MI Battalion will make recommendations for improvements on the hardware, software and human engineering aspects of the DIT-B in preparation for the development of more advanced imagery interpretation systems projected for the 1980s and early 1990s.

180th Military Intelligence Detachment. The 180th Military Intelligence Detachment provides a limited technical intelligence capability to Corps. The detachment, consisting of seven

officers and enlisted personnel primarily from Ordnance Corps, analyzes captured equipment and material and makes recommendations on the best means to exploit enemy equipment deficiencies.

FORSCOM Intelligence Training Detachment (FITD). The mission of FITD is to provide on-site, realistic intelligence training to both Reserve Component and Active Army Units. For Reserve Component units, the FITD training program is funded by FORSCOM at no cost to the requesting units, except for administrative supplies and movement of unit personnel to a common training site, if required. Active Army units are required to fund FITD training. While FITD training cannot be substituted for formal MOS qualification training, the goal of FITD is to assist units in attaining and maintaining a high state of intelligence training and readiness, through enhancement of both individual and section proficiency. Training programs utilize specialized training/instruction; orientations; practical exercises; and a tactical intelligence Command Post Exercise (CPX). Additionally, FITD personnel informally advise units in development of standing operating procedures (SOPs) and internal training programs, to include sources of training material. FITD training programs are designed to promote an environment of uninhibited learning, in which intelligence personnel are encouraged to experiment with new concepts and learn through their mistakes. For this reason, FITD training is not to be used as a test or evaluation vehicle, and no after-action reports concerning performance are provided to higher headquarters. Last year FITD trained over 13,000 soldiers in 153 units throughout the United States and Puerto Rico.

CEWI Implementation

CEWI is a reality at Fort Bragg. The 525 MI Group (CEWI) has trained and functioned as a CEWI Group since the summer of 1979. Existing organizations have been modified to conform to CEWI doctrine and new units have been added to the Group to give it the capability to provide the Corps commander with an accurate assessment of the enemy on the battlefield. Work-space, equipment storage facilities, billeting, and other necessary logistical arrangements have also been made as CEWI has been implemented. In every FTX and CPX during the last 18 months, including the RDF CPX's Positive Leap and Gallant Knight, the 525 MI Group has played the headquarters of the Aerial Exploitation Battalion, Tactical Exploitation Battalion and CEWI

Group Operation Center. These actions have clearly improved Group readiness, eases the transition to a full CEWI Group and gives real meaning to the

Group's mission of being ready today to go anywhere in the world, to respond to any security threat to the United States, and to provide the intelligence

needed by the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander.

Military Motivation in Peacetime

by CPT(P) Kenny Allred

Realism excites people and motivates soldiers. How does one develop the realism necessary to motivate?

We constantly search for cost-effective ways of spending training resources. Soldiers charged with the defense of the nation must repeatedly practice combat skills, but this has presented commanders and training managers throughout history with a dilemma. What excites a peacetime soldier and encourages him to remain proficient in peacetime? More pay? More favorable working conditions? More time off? Relaxed standards? Probably not.

While all soldiers currently wearing green do so freely, fewer people are choosing military careers. Many opt to reenter civilian life after one or two terms of service and many never serve.

This might be changed by challenging peacetime soldiers to perform their jobs under conditions approximating combat as closely as possible.

One possible means of accomplishing this goal is the use and expansion of the recently begun Opposing Force (OPFOR) program. OPFOR allows soldiers, no matter what their jobs, to focus attention on the real world threat and understand the need for superior job performance. OPFOR offers soldiers targets for their skills and the opportunity to excel or fail based on individual ability and training. It reinforces well-performed skills and shows where more training is required.

One method of training, which can be termed traditional, occurs in a classroom. The subject is organization and capabilities of a Soviet motorized rifle company, the audience an infantry platoon. The instructor introduces himself and begins discussing the Soviet threat. The first viewgraph depicts the

organization of a Soviet motorized rifle company. A slide projector clicks, showing Soviet equipment. Slides of AKM assault rifles, RPK machine guns, hand grenades and bayonets lead to slides of BMP infantry vehicles and BRDM SAGGER missile carriers. A T-62 tank appears and the instructor explains its capabilities and the Soviet concept of routinely attaching armor to motorized rifle troops. This feeds into a discussion on Soviet tactics. The instructor explains offensive and defensive doctrine, the Soviet four-to-one combat power ratio and how targets will appear on the battlefield. Members of the audience attempt to visualize how they would hit those targets. The presentation continues with slides depicting rank insignia, uniforms and equipment worn by the Soviet soldier. When the film is over, the various squad leaders march their men to the motor pool to check oil levels and adjust track tension. A successful training day? Perhaps. Classroom training has its place in the training cycle, but there is a more effective alternative.

Picture those same soldiers in defensive positions awaiting an "enemy" attack in the local training area. The operation order indicated a Soviet motorized rifle company would attempt a penetration in their platoon's area of responsibility.

Artillery, in the form of artillery simulators, "falls" for approximately 30 minutes. The enemy attack begins and the defenders can see the dust clouds and exhausts of enemy vehicles. As the enemy comes within range of the defenders' tank killing systems, four tanks, dispensing clouds of smoke behind them, are observed to be leading the attack. The defenders must decide whether to shoot immediately to knock out the tanks and expose the attacking forces hidden by smoke (as well as their defensive positions) or wait for a sure kill as the range lessens, leaving

too little time for all targets. The dilemma is solved once the tanks stop dispensing smoke, revealing 10 BMPs and two BRDM SAGGER missile carriers. The speed and shock of the attack are overwhelming. The massive firepower of the attacking force gains new meaning for the members of the infantry platoon as they realize they will routinely face such a force.

The defenders are ordered to maintain their position as the attackers move within 50 meters of them and stop. Soldiers dressed in Soviet-style uniforms dismount and stand in front of their vehicles.

The infantry platoon is instructed to assemble in front of their defensive positions as several members of the Soviet-style unit, carrying Soviet-made weapons and wearing the Soviet rank insignia of private through captain, approach. A critique of the action, given by the Soviet-style unit commander, follows. Other members of the unit are introduced, and rapt attention is given as training, tactics, weapons, equipment, and uniforms are discussed. Weaknesses and strengths are explained and the members of the infantry platoon gain a better appreciation of how to defeat the enemy.

After the class, each force mounts its own vehicles to take new positions. The action begins anew. Utilizing the feedback from the previous engagement, the defenders are not quite as overwhelmed by the attacking force. They kill more of the enemy. They experience the realism of a Soviet attack. Motivation is reflected in their performance.

Traditional classroom training is important. To make it worthwhile, however, it must be complemented by field instruction with a realistic, competitive, Soviet-style force maneuvering against US units, not just the teaching of Soviet doctrine in the classroom and the employment of US tactics by both sides in field training.



The Veterans Administration at 50

During his second inaugural address in March 1865, President Abraham Lincoln called upon Congress and the American people "to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan." These words have become the motto of the Veterans Administration which celebrates its 50th anniversary this month.

The VA was established on July 21, 1930 to help America's veterans, their dependents and survivors. If you're a veteran on active duty, separated from service or retired, you should take advantage of the many benefits offered you and the time frame for their use. Use them or lose them!

Benefits with no time limit for use after separation from service include:

- **GI Loans.** VA will guarantee your loan for the purchase of a home, mobile home or condominium. Unmarried surviving spouses of veterans and spouses of service personnel listed as missing in action or captured for more than 90 days are also eligible for VA loans.
- **Disability Compensation.** Compensation for disabilities brought on or aggravated by military service will be paid by VA. Payments are made from the date of separation if the claim is filed within one year of separation. Depending on the degree of disability, veterans may receive additional allowances for their dependents.
- **Medical Care.** VA provides hospital care which covers many medical services. Outpatient treatment is available for all service-connected conditions, or non-service-connected conditions in certain cases. Alcohol and drug dependence treatment is also available. Certain medical care services are available to dependents or survivors of veterans with service-connected disabilities.
- **Dental Treatment.** Veterans with dental disabilities resulting from combat wounds or service injuries, and certain POWs and other service-connected disabled veterans are eligible for treatment.
- **Employment.** Assistance in finding employment in private industry, Federal service and local government is available through VA. Similar benefits are provided for unmarried widows or widowers and mothers of deceased veterans.

This also applies to spouses of service-connected disabled veterans who can no longer work in their usual occupations and mothers of permanently and totally service-connected disabled veterans.

Other benefits available to vets, but with time limits on use after separation from service include:

- **GI Education.** VA will pay you while you complete high school, go to college, learn a trade, either on the job or in an apprenticeship program. Also, vocational and educational counseling is available. Veterans have 10 years or until December 31, 1989, whichever comes first, to use this benefit. Surviving spouses of veterans who died as the result of service-connected disabilities are eligible for educational assistance. Spouses of veterans who are permanently and totally disabled, or of service members who are missing in action or prisoners of war are also eligible.
- **Counseling.** VA provides general or psychological counseling to help veterans adjust to civilian life. This benefit must be used within two years of discharge or before October 1, 1981, whichever comes first.
- **One-Time Dental Treatment.** VA provides one-time dental care for certain service-connected dental conditions. Vets have one year to use this benefit.
- **GI Insurance.** Low cost life insurance (up to \$10,000) is available for veterans with service-connected disabilities. Totally disabled veterans may apply for a waiver of premiums on these policies. Vets have one year from the date of notice of VA disability rating to apply.
- **Veterans Group Life Insurance (VGLI).** Servicemen's Group Life Insurance (SGLI) may be converted to a 5-year non-renewable VGLI term policy. At the end of the 5-year term, VGLI may be turned into an individual policy with a participating insurance company. Veterans have 102 days or one year with evidence of insurability; or up to one year if totally disabled.
- **Unemployment Compensation.** The benefit amount and payment periods vary among

states. Veterans should apply immediately after separation to their state employment service.

- **Reemployment.** Veterans should apply to their former employers for employment. They have 90 days after separation in which to do so.

Veterans can apply at local VA offices for the above benefits, with the exception of Reemployment and Unemployment Compensation.

VA's mission has not changed. It continues to support veterans, their dependents and survivors.

Veterans should take advantage of available benefits while they can. VA cares and can offer assistance.



Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific during World War II, by W. J. Holmes, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1979, 231 pages, \$11.95

Although Winterbotham's *The Ultra Secret* and Lewin's *Ultra Goes To War* have heightened interest in the very significant role of communications intelligence during World War II, much remains to be written on the interplay between intelligence, operations and the outcome of the war. Retired Navy Captain W. J. Holmes has produced just such a book on Ultra and naval operations in the Pacific theater.

Holmes, an Annapolis graduate and retired submariner before the war, was recalled to active duty to serve in the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. Writing from personal experience and close contact with Navy cryptanalysis personnel, he has produced a fine account of the little-known Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific (FRUPac) where Ultra was produced.

Double-Edged Secrets covers communications intelligence from the days before Pearl Harbor through the battles of Coral Sea or Midway to the last gasp launch of kamikazes. Holmes rounds out his story with a look at the interaction between information gathered from Ultra, photo reconnaissance, prisoners of war and captured enemy documents.

Captain Don Rightmyer, USAF
Office of Air Force History

Professional Reader

Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics, by Timothy J. Colton. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA and London, England, 1979, vii-365.

Military involvement in the overthrow of governments is not uncommon in the world today. In the Soviet Union, however, the military plays a vital role in maintaining the political status quo.

In **Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics**, Timothy J. Colton analyzes a rare but apparently successful relationship between the military and the political establishment. Colton suggests that the military's vital role in support of the Soviet government will continue in the near future: "In comparative perspective, the party-army relationship has been remarkably free of direct conflict, and the safest prediction is that such confrontation will be avoided in the future." (Text, p. 285)

Several factors have contributed to the cooperation of the military and political structures. The status, interest and material needs of the military establishment have been enhanced by the Party. Marshall Malinovskii is quoted as indicating that the military is "profoundly grateful" to the regime." (Text, p. 259) Additionally, political leaders recognize the expertise of Soviet officers and often call upon them for advice on specialized policy questions. It must be noted that Party leaders have been extremely reluctant to commit the military to foreign conflicts. "Most important in the eyes of the generals, the party leaders have never lost a war." (Text, p. 274) Thus the Soviet military can be expected to support the Party on key issues. It will continue to oppose autonomy for the various ethnic groups within the Soviet Union. It will not support an increase in the consumer economy and will probably oppose concessions to various dissident groups.

Sources used in the preparation of Colton's book include memoirs of former Soviet military officers, articles from the Soviet military press and information from specialized Soviet military journals. The book takes the Soviet Union through the 1970s.

The book appears to be technical-

ly oriented. It will be appreciated by readers with a deep interest in Soviet military affairs and a substantial background in Soviet studies. In particular, it should appeal to anyone interested in comparative military politics and civil-military relations.

William E. Kelly, Ph.D.
Auburn University

The Battle of Leyte Gulf, by Adrian Stewart, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1979, 223 pages, 28 illustrations, \$14.95.

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander, Central Pacific Command, once proclaimed, "On the surface, Clifton Sprague's little screening vessels, steaming boldly into battleships and cruiser fire, dodging through smoke and rain, chasing salvos, opposing 14- and 16-inch shells with 5-inch when they had expended their torpedoes, provided the slender margin that enabled the air-attack to succeed and most of the escort carriers to escape." There is no denying the central importance of the Battle of Leyte Gulf in the Pacific Campaign during World War II. Adrian Stewart's excellent book is devoted to that battle.

For three days, October 23-25, 1944, the last great naval battle of history was fought in Leyte Gulf in the Philippines. If the Battle of Midway and the attack on Pearl Harbor have received more attention since the end of World War II, the United States Seventh Fleet and "Taffy 3" in the Battle of Leyte Gulf have received less study and interpretation than they deserve. Stewart's combination of scholarship and simple explanation of this naval battle is commendable. Stewart does an outstanding job in taking the reader from the planning stage for the return of General MacArthur through the battle to the belated entry of the Army Air Force on October 26, 1944.

The author brings to stage center the naval ability and leadership of Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, Commander of the US Seventh Fleet and Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague, Commander of Task Group 77.4.3, known as "Taffy 3," too long overshadowed by Admiral of the Fleet William F. Halsey and General of the Army Douglas A.

MacArthur. While Halsey certainly was a fine strategist, it is overdoing matters to proclaim him the hero of Leyte Gulf. Stewart does a service in emphasizing Kinkaid's and "Ziggy" Sprague's parts in the Leyte operation. His book is fascinating not only for descriptions of the organizations and movements of naval forces, but also for his reporting of the controversial issue that still swirls around Halsey's pursuit of the Japanese forces to the north and south which led "inferior forces to deal with the enemy in the two areas" and, for all intents and purposes, the US Seventh Fleet to fend for itself. Not a single destroyer was left by Halsey to watch the San Bernardino Strait. Thus the Japanese plan for an attack upon the invasion force, for all its weaknesses, was working, until what Sprague later called "the definite partiality of Almighty God" was recognized. Believing that he had done as much damage to "Taffy 3" as he could, Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita ordered his scattered warships to fall back and reorganize. Kurita's force later escaped practically unscathed through the San Bernardino Strait.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf suggests that Halsey's associates were "wiser than he was at the time." While Halsey was a top-notch naval strategist, in the Battle of Leyte Gulf he permitted his animus for the Japanese to allow him to underestimate them. This may be a simplification, but, by reading Stewart's book, you will discover that the greater credit for the survival and success of the US Navy and MacArthur's operations ashore must be claimed by the US Seventh Fleet.

Stewart does not omit mention of the exploits, expertise and endurance of the subordinate commanders like Vice Admiral John S. McCain, Vice Admiral Willis Lee, Rear Admiral Thomas Sprague (no relation to his namesake), Rear Admiral Felix Stump, Vice Admiral March Mitscher and Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf, to name a few men on whom the outcome of the battle depended. The aviators, the gunners, and the radiomen have not been forgotten. Adrian Stewart does not let you miss the contributions they made in the destruction of the Imperial Japanese Navy in October 1944.

The Battle Leyte Gulf merits wide reading of an exceptional account of the "last epic sea battle."

Reginald W. Hall, COL (Ret.)

Camouflage—A History of Concealment and Deception in War, by Guy Hartcup, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1980, 156 pages.

For centuries, military organizations have devised and improved upon various means of hiding their soldiers and their equipment from their enemies. It was not until World War I, however, that camouflage played a significant tactical role in warfare. Mr. Hartcup's history of camouflage and deception is an excellent study of various techniques which have evolved over time.

Camouflage—A History of Concealment and Deception in War is packed with photographs, illustrations and detailed sketches. While it emphasizes World War II camouflage and deception, the book includes the influences of the war in Vietnam.

What is perhaps the book's most interesting section is its look at deception techniques from decoys to "dazzle-painting" to the dummy paratroopers of the D-Day invasion of Normandy.

A well-written book, replete with humorous quotes and anecdotes, **Camouflage—A History of Concealment and Deception** is of definite interest to the military audience.

2LT Lee E. Taylor
Co. G, USAICS

The Revolutionary Armies: The Historical Development of the Soviet and Chinese People's Liberation Armies, by Jonathan R. Adelman, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1980, 230 pages, no price listed.

A dissertation is designed to allow a student to prove to his advisory committee and the academic community that he is capable of conducting exhaustive research on a unique topic. Normally such a product involves extensive documentation. **Revolutionary Armies** appears to be little more than a revised version of Dr. Adelman's dissertation. For example, it contains 452 footnotes on 48 of the text's 138 pages while 423 bibliographic entries use an additional 26 pages.

The author tends to overuse quoted material, breaking up the flow of his work. Quotes too often seem out of context. Some other minor problems include: 1) the author fails to use the new phonetic system for Chinese spelling which has been adopted in the US; 2) the author relies heavily on statistics from an era which, by his own definition, must be considered questionable for the underdeveloped and propagandistic nature of sources producing the statistics; and 3) the book spends far too much time attempting to establish similarities between the Soviet and Chinese Armies.

Despite these problems, the book does provide some interesting material for the students of the military-political-societal interrelationships between China and the Soviet Union. The author clearly demonstrates that the PLA has a greater involvement in Chinese politics and society than its Soviet counterpart and the primary reasons for this disparity between the two armies and their respective nations.

CPT Howard G. Salisbury, USAR

MI6 Pilot: The Final Escape of Lieutenant Belenko, by John Barron, Readers Digest Press, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1980, \$10.95.

On September 6, 1976, Lieutenant Viktor Belenko, a Soviet pilot, landed his MiG-25 at an airport in Japan and sought asylum in the West. This marked the first time that the West had ever obtained a MiG-25. In addition, Belenko was one of the more valuable defectors from the Soviet Union.

The story begins with his takeoff from an air base in Chuguyevka, about 120 miles northeast of Vladivostok, and traces his erratic and hectic flight to Japan.

The story then returns to the life of Lieutenant Belenko and why he chose to defect. Belenko's unhappy adolescence, his love of flying and his entry into the Soviet Air Force are recounted in such detail that the reader can almost feel as though he were Belenko's constant companion.

Belenko's landing in Japan, his transfer to the United States and the international crisis that it produced are faithfully recounted in the remainder of the book. Some details about the exploitation of the plane by technical experts from Japan and the United States are also discussed.

Worthwhile reading for all intelligence officers, **MI6 Pilot** offers the reader a new perspective on the conduct of the arms race between the US and USSR. It also provides a great deal of insight into conditions in the Soviet Air Force and Soviet industrial production while pointing out the role of foreign material exploitation in modifying US intelligence estimates.

Apart from relating Lieutenant Belenko's defection and American intelligence operations, **MI6 Pilot** is a searing indictment of life in the Soviet Union. Lieutenant Belenko's observations on situations in the Soviet Union would make an excellent situation comedy on the communist leadership.

A short 217 pages, the book made for easy and enjoyable reading. I would recommend it to all intelligence officers and especially to those who are involved with aviation units or strategic-level intelligence.

MAJ William L. Howard

ULTRA in the West, by Ralph Bennett, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1979, 336 pages.

In 1977, the public learned of an ingenious system the Allies had used throughout World War II. Developed by the British in early 1940, ULTRA allowed the Allies to break virtually every code used by the highly sophisticated German Enigma system. With ULTRA, the Allies deciphered every Nazi transmission during the entire war. ULTRA itself remained one of the best-kept secrets of all time.

Ralph Bennett, the British intelligence officer who decoded German signals at Bletchley Park's Hut #3 throughout the war, offers the reader an insider's perspective on Great Britain's development of ULTRA (with a great deal of assistance from Poland), its daily operation and its impact upon subsequent intelligence encoding. Although it is sometimes technically difficult, this portion of the book is most interesting and fascinating.

The meat of **ULTRA in the West** is doubtless the startling way in which ULTRA shaped Allied tactical operations throughout the war. Allied foreknowledge of German Army moves suggests reason for concern regarding some of the decisions made by the Allied Supreme Command. In his book, Bennett tackles this question. Emphasizing the Normandy Campaign of 1944-1945, Bennett offers insight into the "hows" and "whys" surrounding this major military campaign which broke the Nazi offensive and resulted in a victory which might well have been impossible but for ULTRA.

I found **ULTRA in the West** to be well-written and illustrated. It is must reading for the intelligence professionals.

2LT Lee E. Taylor
Co. G, USAICS

Escape from Laos, by Dieter Dengler, Presidio Press, San Rafael, CA, 211 pp., \$10.95, 1979.

Resilient, resourceful, undaunted, courageous: such adjectives fall miserably

short of describing Dieter Dengler, a US Navy pilot shot down over Laos in February 1966. Dengler recalls his five months as a PW and his escape from captivity in the book.

Escape from Laos is an extraordinary account of courage and the horrors of war. A painful story of human suffering, it nevertheless confirms the indomitable nature of the human will. The description of Dengler's march to Hoi Het prison and his interrogation gives the reader special insight into the workings of the Communist Pathet Lao.

Escape from Laos is must reading for anyone in the American Armed Forces.

2LT William E. Miller
Co G, USAICS

The Eagle Squadrons: Yanks in the RAF 1940-1942 by Vern Hangland, Ziff-Davis Flying Books, New York, 1979, vii-206.

Even before America's formal entry into the war against Hitler's Germany, many of her young men were in the sky successfully battling the Luftwaffe. How they got there and what they accomplished becomes the subject of **The Eagle Squadrons: Yanks in the RAF 1940-1942**, by Vern Hangland. Using basically a historical method, the author traces their role from recruitment through training, combat and eventual transfer to American control.

These "Eagles," as they were called, came from all parts of the United States and often at considerable risk. Since the United States was legally and technically neutral at the time, these brave young men found it necessary to exercise discretion when volunteering for aerial combat in the services of King George. They came for various reasons—love of flying, adventure, idealism and perhaps even danger. Many would not live to see the conclusion of the war but their gallant efforts were not in vain. They inflicted serious damage upon the enemy and kindled a spirit of aerial combat which set an example for other Americans who would take up the fight following America's entry into World War II.

In writing the book, the author used a variety of sources which include logbooks, personal accounts, official records and contemporary documents. The writing is lucid and commands the attention of the reader.

The Eagle Squadrons identifies an important contribution made by Americans in the struggle against Nazism and should appeal to students of military history and contemporary

military analysts of aerial combat.

William E. Kelly, Ph.D.
Auburn University

Psychiatric Battle Casualties: The Missing Column in a War Without Replacements, by MAJ Larry G. Ingraham and MAJ Frederick J. Manning, *Military Review*, August 1980, pp. 18-29.

Psychiatric Battle Casualties discusses the psychological stresses upon the combat soldier which, if not properly treated, will needlessly incapacitate him. The authors observe that the way such afflictions are labelled has a significant impact on how the soldier handles himself: words implying mental illness invariably result in further disorder. Interestingly enough, the sooner a soldier can be rehabilitated and sent forward again, the more fully he will recover.

Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces, by Vernon Aspaturian, *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1980, pp. 1-18.

Moscow's policy since the early 1970's is less a reflection of a "grand design" than a seizing upon "targets of opportunity," writes Dr. Aspaturian. The invasion of Afghanistan marks a departure from Soviet caution and uncertainty for an emboldened course. In recognizing that global power status and equality with the US must be asserted, Moscow has developed the capability and the drive to establish its might in the international arena. Nevertheless, the Kremlin understands that the present "correlation of forces," attained largely by default due to Washington's preoccupation with Watergate and Vietnam, is highly susceptible to revised US policy and objectives.

Soviet Tactics in Afghanistan, by Edgar O'Ballance, *Military Review*, August 1980, pp. 45-52.

In **Soviet Tactics in Afghanistan**, Mr. O'Ballance provides background information on the Soviet invasion, reviewing how Soviet forces have been deployed and explaining the significance of those dispositions. He also discusses the disintegration of the Afghan Army and why Soviet efforts to reconstitute it will not succeed. The four-stage Soviet plan to contain

and defeat the *mujahidin* is also considered.

Doubts and Difficulties Confronting a Would-Be Soviet Attacker, by P. H. Vigor, *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies*, June 1980, pp. 32-37.

In **Doubts and Difficulties**, the author argues that the West should evaluate the Soviet Union's ability to smash through Western Europe in light of "the very real practical difficulties which actually face the Russians rather than ... on the West's knowledge of its own Western deficiencies." His crucial assumption: Soviet leaders will avoid total nuclear war at all costs.

Physical Security Officer
(continued from page 43)

Footnotes

1. Army Field Manual 101-5, Staff Officer's Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 19 July 1972), paragraph 4-5c(f), p. 4-3.
2. Army Inspector General Technical Bulletin TB IG 1, Inspector General Inspection Guide, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, November 1978), para. 17-10d, p. 17-5.
3. Army Regulation 735-11, Accounting for Lost, Damaged, and Destroyed Property, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 15 October 1978), Appendix E, para. e and k, p. E-1.
4. Army Regulation 710-2, Materiel Management for Using Units, Support Units, and Installations, with Change 5 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1 February 1979), para. 2-10j, Army Regulation 190-11, Physical Security of Weapons, Ammunition, and Explosives, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 30 March 1977), para. 2-5, p. 2-2, and para. 2-8d and g, p. 2-6.
5. AR 190-11, para. 2-13, p. 2-10.
6. Army Regulation 190-31, Department of the Army Crime Prevention Program, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 18 August 1977), para. 7e (4), p. 1.
7. Army Regulation 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program, (Washington, D.C.: 23 August 1974), para. 1-3g, p. 1-1.
8. *Ibid.*, para. 2-1e through 2-1h, p. 2-1.
9. Army Regulation 190-51, Security of Army Property at Unit and Installation Level, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1 October 1978), para. 2-2.
10. AR 190-51, para. 2-4.
11. *Ibid.*, para. 3-5(a)(5).
12. *Ibid.*, Appendix D, p. D-1.



REENLIST



66TH MI GP HAS EXISTING VACANCIES IN THE FOLLOWING MOS

05B 05C 05D 05G 05K 11B 05H 26E 26K 31E 31G 31J
31S 31V 31Z 32F 32G 33S 35B 36K 41J 52C 52D 54E
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75E 75Z 76D 76Y 76Z 79D 81C 81E 83F 84B 94B 96C
96B 97B 97C 98C 98G 98J 00Z 98Z


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